IMT Nuremberg Archives

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International Court of Justice

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1544-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

File Memorandum

on my parting visit with the Chancellor.

(Bundeskanzler)

After an exchange of irrelevant courtesies, the conversation turned to the speech of the Chancellor (Bundeskanzler). I said to him that though he had used very cordial expressions on the German mission of Austria his dramatic advocacy of her independence which he apparently considered threatened had drowned out this testimony to a large extent, to say nothing about some unnecessary pinpricks against Germany. To his assertion that he had reestablished his authority in the country by this speech I added that this speech also had provoked a debate yesterday in the French Chamber. In my opinion it was greatly to be regretted that the Austrian question had again become the center of European discussions. For Germany an Austrian independence supported by French and Czech crutches was intolerable, for it would lead to arguments which might easily endanger the peace concluded recently.

The Chancellor admitted this without qualifications and requested me to inform the Reich Foreign Minister as soon as possible that neither he nor any other political agency in Austria had instigated this debate in the French Chamber, and that he shared my opinion on its extraordinarily disrupting effects. On my request he stated his willingness to publish Sunday morning an article in the official paper "Wiener Zeitung" (Viennese Newspaper) in which he would clearly detach the problem of Austrian independence from French interests. And he had instructed the Austrian press to carry only meagre excerpts of the debate in the Chamber.

I then introduced into the conversation the wide-spread opinion that he had acted under "brutal pressure" in Berchtesgaden. I myself had been present and been able to state that he had always and at every point had complete freedom of decision. The Chancellor replied he had actually been under considerable moral pressure, he could not deny that. He had made notes on the talk which bore that out. I reminded him that despite this talk he had not seen his way clear to make any concessions, and I asked him whether without the pressure he would have been ready to make the concessions he made late in the evening. He answered: "To be honest, no !" It appears to me of importance to record this statement.

In parting I asked the Chancellor never to deceive himself that Austria could ever maintain her status with the help of Non-German European combinations. This question would be decided only according to the interests of the German people. He asserted that he held the same conviction and would act accordingly.

Vienna, 26 Feb 1938

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

OF DOCUMENT 1544-Ps

26 November 1945.

I, LUDWIG HARTMAN, Tec 4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 1544-PS

(7540)

LUDWIG HARTMAN
Tec 4, 37446052

United Mexican States)
Mexico, Federal District) ss
Embassy of the United)
States of America)

Mexico City, D. F.)
) ss
Mexico)

RAYMOND H. GEIST, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

I came to Berlin in December, 1929, as Consul and continued in that capacity, exercising my official functions until the end of 1939. In 1938 I was appointed First Secretary of the Embassy and continued in that office discharging at the same time my duties as consul. During the entire period of ten years my work was of such character that I frequently came into contact with many officials of the German Government. After the Nazis came to power in 1933, these contacts increased owing to the much more frequent occasions on which it was necessary to intervene with German officials in order to protect the rights of American citizens and their properties. During this period I not only had many official contacts but also friends and acquaintances, both in Berlin and elsewhere in Germany. My work permitted and occasionally required travel in Germany. It was my custom to make bicycle trips, as well as excursions by automobile to various points particularly in the environs of Berlin, often to the extent of fifty miles. Although I do not have the first-hand information with regard to developments under the National Socialists for all of Germany that I have regarding the neighborhood of Berlin, I saw enough during my excursions, and was told enough by friends and acquaintances to know that the activities hereafter described in and around Berlin were being substantially duplicated all over Germany.

There were indeed few military establishments in the neighborhood of Berlin in 1929 and until 1933 there were the Casernas at Potsdam and the military establishment at Doeberitz. After the Nazis came to power, military establishments of all sorts grew up with enormous rapidity. Before the end of 1933, during my frequent excursions, I discovered outside of Berlin on nearly every road leaving from the city new large military establishments, including training fields, airports, barracks, proving grounds, anti-aircraft stations and the like. For these establishments most of the ground was broken during the year 1933; there were probably fifty within the immediate vicinity of Berlin. Most of these establishments were being openly prepared; nevertheless they were under guard. It was apparent with respect to others that an attempt was made to preserve secrecy. I recall in particular that the large anti-aircraft station near my house in the Gruenwald was built under secrecy, likewise a munitions dump burrowed in the hills of Wildpark near Potsdam was also built under secrecy. Being disguised as a German and speaking the language, I was able on my bicycle trips to penetrate certain of these establishments where at various times I saw military exercises, including the use of tanks, in various maneuvers. I recall from my travels beyond Berlin and the information and reports which I had from friends and acquaintances that the same feverish preparations were in progress throughout the length and breadth of Germany, in fact, all establishments which couldsserve a military purpose were converted to military uses.

I also saw the preparations being made for building up the new army. I visited the camps of the compulsory labor service, the Arbeitsdienst, which was well under way by the end of 1933, with camps established all over Germany. Though this was ostensibly a

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labor service, it was essentially military in character, as is well known. I saw the men working on reclamation projects and was informed that they worked two hours in the morning and two hours in the afternoon, the balance of the time being spent in military tactics and in instruction in Nazi ideology. So that when conscription went into effect in 1935, through the medium of these camps, it was possible for the Germans to put up a trained army of at least 3,500,000 men, which formed the nucleus of the future army of aggression.

Particularly through the years 1933 and 1934 the hordes of storm troopers (S.A.) were much in evidence practicing military exercises. They were being converted into a military organization. I frequently encountered the storm troopers deployed in fields and in forests engaged in military technical exercises. This was all the part of a general plan to prepare Germany's manpower for war.

I witnessed, too, scores of times, the training of the Hitler Youth, which included boys from 14 to 17, who, dressed in their uniforms, were likewise generally in evidence wherever I chose to travel. I frequently saw them in the woods near Berlin, deployed in ravines, in fields, woods and hillsides staging mock attacks, employing the technique of actual maneuvers. Frequently they were under the direction of uniformed leaders and at times under officers of the Reichswehr. This type of training of the youth extended everywhere in Germany. Frequently my route of travel had to be changed in order not to find myself in the midst of some maneuvers which required the use of roads or paths along which I was riding. It was not considered wise to get too close to these operations, particularly if they were on an extensive scale.

The Deutsche Jungvolk (boys from the ages 6 to 14) was also the vehicle for military training. They were also in evidence throughout the country. I frequently met them marching. I saw them engaged in military exercises in the school yards during the school recesses, particularly throwing hand grenades usually under expert adult leadership. Often I have seen these children in large numbers engaged in what were obviously military maneuvers, and under the direction of adult uniformed officers.

I had occasion, at times, to witness the organizations which were created for the girls that were part of the Hitler Youth and were also incorporated in the so-called Arbeitsdienst, usually located somewhere near the camps for men. The resultant illegitimate children were a definite planned result of the program; they were part of the manpower and the army for the next generation. The shame and the grief of parents over this program fostered and urged by the Nazis although it existed, was seldom openly expressed on account of dangers to which the parents might expose themselves.

So far as the youth were concerned, the entire program was carried on with lavish propaganda and enough benefits to the participants to make it extremely popular. The Nazis provided the youth with special trains, special trucks, special bathing beaches, food and other privileges. At the same time, the semi-hysteria which was maintained about the whole National Socialist program made it impossible for parents or anyone else to speak against it even if they had wished to do so. The German people were well acquainted with the goings on in concentration camps and it was well known that the fate of anyone too actively opposed to any part of the Nazi program was liable to be one of great suffering. Indeed, before the Hitler regime was many months old almost every family in Germany had had first-hand accounts of the brutalities inflicted in the concentration camps from someone either in the relationship or in the circle of friends who had served a sentance there; consequently the fear of such camps was a very effective brake on any possible opposition.

In addition to what I saw during these many years with my own eyes regarding the preparation and the building of a huge armed force, I received reliable information from trustworthy sources as to its scope and strength. One of my close friends in Berlin was one George Graffenstein, who lived at 34 Altenauer-strasse, just across the street from me. He was a German, formerly a member of Meile Printing Company of Chicago and a man strongly opposed to the Nazis. He had been an officer in the German army in the First World War; therefore he knew a large number of the officers of Reichswehr. Occasionally he gave in his house beer-evenings which a number of Reichswehr officers attended, including certain generals. To these parties I was occasionally invited. One of these generals was General Goettke, who was the head of the artillery on the General Staff and a very close friend of Graffenstein. In addition, Graffenstein's nephew was on the General Staff and was at the same time the liaison between the Reichswehr and the S.A. Late in 1934, George Graffenstein told me that from the information which he had received from his friends, the armament program was already so complete, so far advanced, so gigantic and all-inclusive, that there was no doubt of Germany's winning the war on sheer weight of arms alone. That same information was given to me directly by certain of the high officers of the Reichswehr, whom I met at Graffenstein's house.

By the middle of 1934 it had become obvious that the rearmament program, though in its beginning, was being planned on a vast scale so that it could not possibly be considered as defensive armament but only as a weapon for offensive war. This was, however, not a conclusion of my own; but it was openly stated as such to me. Graffenstein told me in 1934, during the conversations to which I have already referred, that the purpose of the program was an aggressive war. He told me that he had been so informed by General Goettke in particular. This statement was borne out by other persons who were in the know in Germany at that time. I confirmed his statements by my own conversations with the generals who gathered in his house. They intimated to me, not only that Germany was embarked upon an inevitable program toward war but even gave me indications of the general plan, namely, the drive to the East and the attack upon Russia after Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria had been eliminated. This was as early as 1934, and I had many similar conversations along the same line at Graffenstein's house during the following years.

Similar information was constantly being confirmed from other sources at later dates. For instance, in December 1938, I had a conversation with General Franz Halder, who was then Chief of Staff, at the house of Dr. Etscheit, a prominent Berlin lawyer. Halder stated to me: "You must take into account the National Socialist program in the East. If you, the Western powers, oppose our program in the East, we shall have to go to war with you." During this conversation he made it clear to me that the program of the Nazis for expansion in the East was unalterably fixed and decided upon. It included the attack on Poland, the annexation of Austria, territorial expansion in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Russia, particularly in the Ukraine. The latter provinces would have to be German. When I replied to Halder that I was positive the Western powers would never tolerate any such aggressive program and that inevitably it would not only mean war with England and France but with the United States as well, Halder replied: "That is a pity."

The same information as to the aggressive intention of the Nazis was given to me by a friend, Count von Bismarck, formerly Counselor of the German Embassy in London. He was violently anti-Nazi. In Germany, where I knew him, he held no official position, deriving

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his income from his estates in East Prussia; but he was a man with wide contacts in officialdom, particularly in the Foreign Office. He said that the Nazis were headed for war, for huge aggressive adventures, that conquest of the East was a major part of the vast plan and that conquest of the West would only follow, when complete victory in the East solidified Germany's strength and resources in those quarters. He made this statement to me in 1936 and we discussed it often in 1937 and 1938. He was extremely disturbed, not over the aggressive plans of the Nazis, but over their manner of converting Germany into a slave State, which he repudiated entirely. He considered that the course of the Nazis militarily could not be hindered and furthermore, no country was preparing to stop them.

I also had the same information from another reliable source. After Hitler came to power in 1933, General von Hammerstein withdrew from public life. He had been head of the Reichswehr under Chancellor Bruening. Although he was then retired, he knew and associated intimately with the Generals of the German Army, as he was among them primus inter pares. He told me of the German program for aggressive war during a long conversation which we had during a musical recital in 1938 at Dr. Paul Kempner's home. The army, he said, was at a highly mechanized strength, extremely mobile and ready for anything. He was sure, in view of the preparations and the excellent character of the German equipment that the German Army was then an instrument of invincible striking power. He stated categorically that it was a superb instrument which had been formed to wage war and that it would not be much longer delayed. He did not know the plans and details but he confirmed the information that I had from all sources, that Germany intended to strike in the East and that the war in the West depended on whether or not the Western powers would endeavor to intervene when the German war machine started moving.

Of these aggressive designs I learned also from other sources. A personal friend, Dr. Hans Henniger, a veterinarian in Berlin, was an intimate friend of an officer by the name of Schlessicher (I believe that is the correct spelling), who was the responsible purveyor to the German Army, therefore a high member of the Quartermaster Corps. I do not remember his exact title. Dr. Henniger received from this man information constantly with regard to the preparations being made by the Germans in 1939. A month before March 15, 1939, I was informed of the plans for marching into Prague on that date and that large stocks of food and other equipment were being accumulated near the border of Czechoslovakia. On March 15, 1939, the German Army rolled into Prague.

I also had a good deal of personal experience with and first-hand knowledge of the internal policies from 1935 to 1939. Indeed, from the very outset of the regime, I had intimate and continuous contact with various officers of the German Government in the course of my duties as an American official protecting American citizens or protesting against their mistreatment. The acts of violence against American citizens were numerous, particularly during the early years of 1933 and 1934. In addition, I was constantly receiving information as regards other Nazi tactics and the nature and number of victims from a variety of sources; the victims themselves on many occasions, both American and German, told me their experiences and appealed for help; relatives and friends of victims, both those who came back and those who did not; the foreign newspaper correspondents and, to a very considerable degree, I received information from the Gestapo itself.

For a period I dealt directly with Herr Heinrich Himmler, then subsequently with Herr Reinhard Heydrich and often with Dr. Werner Best.

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My vigorous relations with the Gestapo began in March, 1933, in fact I knew the organization of the secret police and dealt with that organization before the Nazis came to power. It was then the Politische Abteilung des Politzeipraesident, i.e., the political division of the Politizeipräsidium, which was charged with supervisory and preventive functions with regard to political matters, then chiefly investigating the terror of Communists. It was located in Berlin at the Politzeipräsidium. On March 6, 1933, it was moved from the Politzeipräsidium to No. 8 Prinzalbrechtstrasse and became the famous Gestapo (Geheimstaatpolizei), its first chief was Rudolf Diels, who was succeeded by Heinrich Himmler, in May, 1934. I knew well not only Diels but also Himmler, his second in command, Reinhard Heydrich and his administrative officer, Dr. Werner Best. The organization at No. 8 was huge with over 1,000 persons employed there. Besides, as rapidly as administrative measures permitted, Gestapo headquarters were established throughout Germany, not only in the cities but in provincial places to such an extent that the smallest hamlet and village fell under direct Gestapo supervision. At the beginning of the Hitler regime, the only organization which had meeting places throughout the country was the S.A. (storm troopers). Until the Gestapo could be organized on a national scale the thousands of local S.A. meeting places became the "arrest points." There were at least fifty of these in Berlin. Communists, Jews, and other known enemies of the Nazi party were taken to these points and, if they were enemies of sufficient importance, they were immediately transferred to the Gestapo headquarters. During 1933 and 1934, when the Gestapo became universally organized, the S.A. were gradually eliminated as arresting agents and the S.S. (Schutzstaffel) were incorporated as administrative and executive officials into the Gestapo. By the end of 1934, the S.A. had been fairly well eliminated and the S.S., the members of which were elegant black suits and were therefore called Elite Guards, became almost identical as functionaries with the Gestapo.

Immediately in 1933, the concentration camps, as soon as they were established, were put under the immediate charge of the Gestapo and they remained exclusively a Gestapo institution. Only "political" prisoners were held in the concentration camps. Ordinary criminals remained the responsibility of the regular police authorities and the established courts. On being sentenced, they were confined in the regular prisons. These confinements were always the result of duly carried out legal procedure. Incarceration in concentration camps was carried out without any legal procedure, neither indictment nor trial. Prisoners were, occasionally, released from the concentration camps and turned over to the prosecuting attorney for prosecution before the legal courts of justice. A prisoner accused of high treason, for example, whose offense might carry a death sentence, would be released to the prosecuting attorney for trial in the people's court. All felonies were tried by the regular courts.

As I have stated, my frequent contacts with this entire Gestapo organization began with the first wave of terrorist acts in the week of March 6-13, 1933. That wave was accompanied by universal mob violence. Since 1925, one of the cries of the Nazi party had been "Jude Verecke" (Death to the Hews) and when the Nazi party won the elections in March, 1933, on the morning of the sixth, the accumulated passion blew off in wholesale attacks on the Communists, Jews, and those who were suspected of being either. Mobs of S.A. men roamed the streets, beating up, looting, and even killing persons.

No American citizen, so far as I am aware, was killed, but a number of them were assaulted and injured and appealed to the Consulate General for aid and protection. For example, Nathaniel Wolff, an American citizen, who resided in Rochester, New York, made an affidavit which stated:

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"This morning, March 6, at 5 o'clock, there came into my room five or six Nazis with drawn revolvers. They abused me, called me a dirty Russian Jew and started going through my belongings. They asked me what remarks I had made. I replied that I had made none that I knew of and that I am not interested in politics. One of them shouted "Do you call throwing bombs not being interested in politics?" Another asked at the same time, "Are you the Wolff who lived in the Pension Stephanie?" Having left the Stephanie on account of difficulties with the Portier regarding the price of the room and his behavior, I whistled very softly, intimating that I understood the source of the denunciation. Thereupon one of the Nazis remarked: "Du Scheiss Jude, warum pfeiffst du?" and hit me in the jaw. They said that they would take me to the police station, whereupon I answered, "The quicker, the better, because my conscience is absolutely clear." One of them said, "Do you call throwing bombs having a clear conscience?" The intruders were not accompanied by an officer, nor did they carry "Hilfspolizei" armbands. They took me in an automobile to an address in the Knesebeck Strasse beyond the Kant Strasse (I believe No. 67 or 76, Gartenhaus left, I think three or four flights up the stairs). I was conducted to a bare room in which the shutters were closed and the windows boarded, evidently to prevent sounds from getting out, where, after my possessions were taken away including my keys, I was left with two guards who spent the time abusing the Jews. At five minutes before seven, the group who had arrested me returned with two or three members including one who was apparently a leader, when I was again abused, that is, they gave me to understand that they imagined I was implicated in communistic activities. I remarked that I should like to send a telegram to my cousin, Alan Steyne at the Hamburg American Consulate, and asked if I had the right to do so, whereupon the leader replied: "As a foreigner you have no right, and especially not as a Jew." One of the men then proceeded to bind my hands and feet as closely and as painfully as possible. I still bear the marks of the bruises on my wrists. I was questioned about various English and French letters which had been found in my room and taken along with them and then I was left about half an hour alone because they evidently discussed my fate. After some time one of the group returned and advised me that every one had a right to his own political opinions as long as no attempt was made to mix into politics. He remarked that nothing was to be gained by brutality, undid the rope and freed my hands and feet and gave me a cup of coffee and said, "Probably the thing isn't so bad because women chatter a great deal" and that I was denounced by a girl. After a few minutes he elaborated the statement that the girl, Paula, of the Pension, had denounced me as having the intention of throwing bombs at the Nazi parade. I expressed my astonishment and told him the facts of the case. He appeared to laugh it off and asked me if I would be willing to sign a paper on the condition that they would release me. I said "yes." They then said I would have to go to the police to have my signature attested to and one of the men who had come in, in the meanwhile, went out to draft the paper I was to sign. He returned with the paper which read: (1) "I am a Jew." (2) "I will leave tonight for Paris,"

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(3) "I promise never again to set my foot on German soil." "I attest that no physical violence was done to me and that none of my property was stolen." This paper I signed. They told me to put on my coat and come to the police. Instead of taking me to the police station they took me to Charlottenburg towards the Gruenwald. When I asked to which police station they were taking me, they replied "You'll get there soon enough." When we were near the Heer Strasse they pretended that the automobile was broken down and informed me that I would have to walk through the woods to get to the police station. We proceeded into the woods where three members drew their pistols and the other two brought straps out of their pockets and informed me that they were going to teach me a lesson and made as if they were about to tie me to a tree. They said that they intended to beat the life out of me and "You can walk back afterwards." I replied that I hoped I would be able to walk. This was probably about eight o'clock and we were entirely alone as nobody had followed us. I took off my coat myself and remarked "If one can't help oneself, one may as well make the best of it." One of them threw my coat to the ground and said "Get ready" and after making a threatening gesture, said "You can go home now!" pointing to the wrong direction, whereupon they walked rapidly to the automobile and disappeared yelling after me, "Keep your mouth shut." I was also threatened that if they ever caught me in Germany again, they would know how to get me out of the way..."

Another American, Herman I. Roseman, made an affidavit which stated:

"Yesterday, March 10, 1933, in the afternoon at about 4:30, I came out of "KDW" with my fiancee, Fraulein Else Schwarzlose, residing in Wilmersdorf, Kaiser-Allee 172, and proceeded to walk along Tauentzien Strasse. A man in S.A. uniform stepped on my toe purposely, obviously offended me and said "Pardon." I said "bitte," and walked ahead. He followed me and kicked me saying: "Na und?" A policeman saw this and walked ahead, paying no attention to attacks made on me. Then I took my passport out of my pocket, showed it to the second policeman, and said that I was an American citizen, but he walked ahead, obviously not able to afford me protection, or at least being unwilling. The S.A. man continued to attack me, struck me in the face, wounded me over the eye, and continued to do me bodily harm. During this attack, all the time my walking along, we reached another policeman, and I applied to him, showing my passport and said: "I am an American and am entitled to protection." He shrugged his shoulder and said "What can I do?" By this time the S.A. man had obviously inflicted enough attack upon me and walked away.

Upon my appeal the policeman brought my fiancee and me to the station house at 13 Bayreuther Strasse. My fiancee and I reported to the officer in charge. He heard the story and said that he was sorry, but that there was nothing to do. My face was bleeding. The policeman said that he had had orders not to interfere in any affair in which an S.A. man took part. I then asked him what I could do to protect myself. He said that there was nothing to do but to wait until the situation was better. He added that the police were absolutely powerless, and were under the direction of the S.A., and that there were S.A. Sturm-Abteilung in the police itself. Thereupon I departed..."

Another American, Mrs. Jean Klauber, made an affidavit which stated:

"That on the night of Friday, March 10, 1933, she and her husband had retired for the night when they were awakened by a prolonged ringing of their apartment bell. They heard pounding upon the street door and a demand for immediate entry, and a concurrent threat to break the door down. The street door was opened by the janitor's wife, and a party of four or five men entered and went at once to the apartment of the deponent where they again rang and pounded on the door. Mr. Klauber asked who was there, and was answered - "The police." He opened the door and a party of four or five men in brown uniforms, one wearing a dark overcoat and carrying a rifle, pushed in, jostling Mr. and Mrs. Klauber aside. One asked Mrs. Klauber where the telephone was and she indicated the room where it was to be found, and started to go there. Thereupon, she was knocked down by one of them. They went on to the bedroom where Mr. and Mrs. Klauber followed them, and there they demanded their passports. Mr. Klauber went to the wardrobe to get his, and was stopped, being asked by the intruders whether he was carrying any weapons. Being clothed only in pajamas, his denial was accompanied by a gesture indicating his garb. He then turned to the wardrobe, opened it, and reached for one of his four suits hanging therein where he thought the passport was, and was immediately attacked from behind by all but one of the intruders, who beat him severely with police clubs, the one with the overcoat and rifle standing by. Remarks were shouted such as "Look. Four suits, while for fourteen years we have been starving." Mrs. Klauber tried to inquire the reason for their actions, and was answered - "Jews. We hate you. For fourteen years we have been waiting for this, and tonight we'll hang many of you."

When the intruders stopped beating Mr. Klauber he was unconscious, and they demanded the passports again of Mrs. Klauber. Mrs. Klauber found her American passport and her German passport (required by local authorities as the wife of a German citizen, and issued by the Police at Munich after her arrival here), and the intruders took both in spite of Mrs. Klauber's protests that she was American. She then searched for her husband's passport, laid hold of his pocket-book, and in her excitement offered it to them. Though full of money they refused it, and again demanded the passport. Mrs. Klauber then found it and handed it over.

Then the intruders returned to the unconscious Mr. Klauber, saying "He hasn't had enough yet," and beat him further. Then they left, saying "We are not yet finished," and just as they departed one of them said to Mrs. Klauber "Why did you marry a Jew? I hate them" and struck her on the jaw with his police club."

I personally can verify that the police had been instructed not to interfere; that is that there was official sanction for these activities. Affidavits taken from numerous victims attest this fact. I had become acquainted with the two police officers stationed at the corner of Bellevuestrasse and Tiergartenstrasse near where the Consulate General was located; those officers told me that they and all the other police officers had received definite instructions not to interfere with the S.A., the S.S. or the Hitler Youth.

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For the Germans who were taken into custody by the Gestapo, chiefly Communists at that time, there was, from my experience and from the information that I had from all sources, a regularly pattern of brutality and terror. Upon arrest, the victims would be systematically subjected to indignities and brutalities such as beatings, kicking, pushing downstairs, deprivation of food and all comforts, and threats of much worse. After the victims had been imprisoned - usually in cellars, since both the headquarters at No. 8 Albrechtstrasse and the S.A. meeting places usually had then - they would be beaten with various degrees of severity. If the Gestapo believed that the victim - particularly Communist leaders - had information as to other alleged accomplices they would give systematic beatings, usually when stripped and tied on a table. This would go on often for many days until they had extracted the information they wanted or killed the victim.

Based on all of the reports which I had from many sources, my judgment is that the victims were numbered in the hundreds of thousands all over Germany. Many of them were ultimately released. I can state with certainty that the contemporaneous accounts in foreign newspapers, such as the London Times and the American newspapers which I have seen, are accurate.

The second wave of terror was not so systematic nor so concentrated as to point of time. It was directed chiefly against the Jews, and was chiefly the result of the ruthless and occasionally violent enforcement of numerous decrees and orders, such as the Nurnberg Decrees. After the initial outbreak in March, 1933, and all through that year and the next, the Jews still in Germany had, in many cases, come to believe that things might become a little better and that they could live in some sort of peaceable relationship with the Nazis, even though they were reduced to the status of second or third class citizens. In 1935, however, the pressure on them began to increase and they began to be excluded completely from certain civil activities. The terrorism was continued all the time to some degree; but the enforcement of the new decrees in 1935 was characterized by such brutality and ruthlessness that it warrants special attention. Inadvertent violators were dealt with, for example, with great severity.

The 1938 wave of terror was a very pronounced and definite one. Again the object was the Jews, particularly the wealthy ones. The ostensible occasion was the murder of the German diplomat, von Rieth, by a French Jew, but the violence was in no sense spontaneous. Dr. Best, the Administrative Officer of the Gestapo, told me that the terror had been decided upon and ordered by Hitler himself, and that he, Dr. Best, could, therefore, do nothing about it. Actually, that statement corroborated what everyone knew. Innumerable persons with whom I talked and who witnessed the violence told me that at all of the synagogues, which had been set on fire by the Nazis, the fire departments were always present, but never acted except to prevent the fires from spreading to neighboring non-Jewish properties. Nor did the police interfere with any of these acts of vandalism and incendiarism.

I personally did not see any of the violence nor the burning of the synagogues while the acts were being perpetrated, as the mobs throughout Germany commenced to work at midnight on November 8, 1938, and carried through their activities during the early morning hours of November 9. At that time I was on my way to the

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Wartburg Castle, and on the day of November 9 I saw the burned synagogues and the looted and smashed shops in Eisennach, and later in Berlin. I also know that at this time many of the wealthy Jews, who had previously escaped attack, were arrested, among whom were relatives of American citizens. Pursuant to requests from the United States, some of which were transmitted through the Department of State, I personally intervened with the Gestapo through Dr. Best, and secured the return of nearly twenty victims from the Saxonhausen Concentration Camp. Among these victims were Fritz Warburg and Eugene Garbaty. I think that many, perhaps most of these people, were released in the space of ten days or two weeks with the warning that if they remained in Germany they would have cause to regret it. In all cases the victims were subjected to rough treatment. Those who returned from the concentration camp and whom I saw in my office had their hair closely clipped, a common outward sign that they had been at Saxonhausen.

The Gestapo authorities with whom I spoke on my frequent, and often daily visits to the Gestapo headquarters did not hesitate to state that they regarded Communists in particular as subversive and as an element dangerous to the State, and that it was necessary to wipe them out. Diehls, the first chief of the Gestapo, in particular, whom I saw nearly every day of the March wave of terror in 1933, made no attempt to conceal the systematic character of the round-ups of what he called "subversive persons"; though he did attempt to justify it to me as necessary to the safety of the State. While denying that any violence against American citizens was contemplated, he admitted that it was being undertaken against Germans. Terroristic tactics, however, in all their various forms, were so completely and thoroughly the actuating policy, that it would have been wholly redundant to discuss it. They and I both understood that it was the mainspring of all Gestapo activity - indeed of all Nazi activity - and that it was beyond discussion.

On one occasion I received a clear and definite admission of the Nazi terroristic policy with respect to many of their victims. In 1938 I was making strenuous efforts to free a young man from a concentration camp. He had been arrested in March, 1933, for aiding certain of his comrades to escape Germany, and had been sentenced by regular courts to a sentence of 2 1/2 years. When he was released from the Brandenburg Prison at the end of that time, he was taken into custody by the Gestapo and sent to Dachau, the notorious concentration camp, and from there to Buchenwald. I had tried over a long period of time to secure his release by appeals personally to Himmler, Heydrich and Best, and had failed. In 1938, however, I was told by Ministerialrät Krohne, in the Ministry of Justice, that if I could reach Gruppenfuehrer Eiche of the Todtenkopfverbaende (Death's Head Regiments) I might be successful. Eiche was then the head of all German concentration camps. After having first been told officially by the Gestapo that no such person existed, I was finally able by a ruse to secure his telephone number whereupon, through the recommendation of Krohne, I was able to make an appointment with Eiche at the Saxonhausen Concentration Camp near Berlin. He told me that with respect to Communists and any other persons who were suspected of holding views contrary to the Nazi conception of the State, such persons were "Asociale", that is, impossible of social assimilation and, therefore, they must be physically eliminated from society, or destined to perpetual confinement.

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Thaelman, the leader of the Communists in the Reichstag, was, as is well known, kept during the Hitler regime in perpetual confinement. His ultimate fate has never been revealed.

On another occasion I was given considerable information by a high official of the Gestapo as to the policy of the Nazis with respect to the Jews. I had had considerable contact with the head of the Jewish section of the Gestapo, known as the "Judischeabteilung des Gestapos", one Dr. Hasselbacher, in connection with making arrangements for official representatives of the American Joint Distribution Committee to visit certain Jewish centers throughout Germany, for which visits, of course, the permission of the Gestapo was necessary. These negotiations brought me frequently in touch with Dr. Hasselbacher, whom I came to know very well. He told me that Germany will be made "Judenrein", that is, clean of Jews. He said that all the Jews who failed to leave Germany would be exterminated. That statement was made in 1938 before the extermination camps were established, but the statement of Hasselbacher clearly indicated the eventual emergence of extermination camps in accordance with the general Nazi plan; for certainly the Jews were unable to leave Germany, even if they had been permitted to do so by the Nazis, as no world-wide arrangement had been made to receive them in other countries.

I had a great deal of experience with the systematic measures which were taken to confiscate property of non-Nazis, particularly Jews. Force of circumstance and a settled governmental policy made this campaign a more gradual one. Drastic and sudden action would have lead to the alienation of a great deal of ready assets owned by the Jews and would have tended to destroy the economic value of Jewish-owned property. It would also have resulted in the physical destruction or hiding by Jews of things of value, as indeed did happen to a great extent. Consequently, the Nazis permitted many Jews, particularly those of wealth and position, to remain unmolested for many years, giving the Jews the faithless and false assurance that they were exempted from the general repressive program for various reasons. For example, I knew well the leading German cigarette manufacturer, Eugene Garbaty. Until September, 1938, he was in complete control of his fortune. During that month, however, he was compelled to sell his factory, worth between seven million and ten million marks, for the sum of one million marks. In October, 1938, his country estate near Dresden, valued probably over two million marks, was simply confiscated with no payment at all. It was to be used, as the authorities stated, for a welfare center for German Youth. After his experience in the Pogrom of November 8, 1938, Garbaty applied for a passport and received one only after paying a bribe of 500,000 marks to the corrupt Count Heldorf, Chief of Police in Berlin, and enough other fines to equal the million marks that he had received for his factory. He left Germany with nothing, except that earlier, by bribing the customs officials with approximately 250,000 marks, he had been able to get valuable art treasures out of Germany. Garbaty is now a citizen of the United States and is living in Connecticut.

Another instance of the same nature occurred with respect to my landlord, Mr. Franz Rinkel, who told me the entire story of his persecutions at the hands of the Nazis. He had a fine

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house at No. 2 Bruckenalle in Berlin, in which I lived. Rinkel was one of the victims sent to Saxonhausen and whom, after the space of a week, I was able to rescue. One Dr. Lilienthal, a fanatical Nazi lawyer practicing in Berlin, coveted Rinkel's house. The general system of expropriating the property of the Jews was illustrated in this particular case. My landlord was approached by Dr. Lilienthal and told the price the latter desired to pay, a mere fraction of the value of the estate. He was given a few days to make up his mind to sell at that price. He sold because he knew that if he did not, he would be accused of some trumped-up crime and taken away to the concentration camp. Dr. Lilienthal took possession of Rinkel's house. I know that on many occasions where it was thought necessary to increase the pressure, the prospective purchaser or his agent would be accompanied by a uniformed S.A. or S.S. man. I know because I lived in the immediate neighborhood and knew the individuals concerned, that Baron von Neurath, one time Foreign Minister of Germany, got his house from a Jew in this manner. Indeed, he was my next door neighbor in Dahlem. Von Neurath's house was worth approximately 250,000 dollars. I know too that Alfred Rosenburg, who lived in the same street with me, purloined a house from a Jew in similar fashion. There were, of course, innumerable instances in which Nazis used their positions in the Party to void debts and the like. An illustration of this were the cases of the persons who came to the Consulate in Berlin and informed us of the circumstances. For example, Max Schussler, an American citizen, made an affidavit which states:

"....I own several apartment houses in Berlin, one situated at Ring Strasse 11, Berlin-Steglitz. On the property at Ring Strasse 11 resides a tenant by the name of Hans Zink, who owns and operates a restaurant in these premises. He has been in arrears in his rent for about a year. Since the first of February of this year, that is, since the new Government came into power, he has refused to pay his rent. I gave instructions to the Sheriff to have him put out. Yesterday two uniformed men came to my office and spoke to my secretary and said that if I do not recall the order to the Sheriff to have Zink evicted, something will happen to me. I did not see these men. My secretary received them. She stated they were black trousers and brown shirts. She referred them to my attorney, Felix Szkolny, Charlottenstrasse 17, Berlin S.W. 68. They went to the attorney, but he refused to give the order. They came to my office again and said to my secretary that if I did not give the order in writing and hand it over to a certain address within an hour's time, something would happen. I then called the police station at Alexandrinenstrasse 134, Revier No. 113, and a police officer came to my office and accompanied me to a taxi, when I went home.

About a week before, it may be noted, Zink had come to my office and insisted on my rescinding the order of eviction, and said, "I care nothing about law; we are now in power, remember that. Do anything you please, I am not going out of the office until you cancel the order". I called the police, and an officer came. Zink said, "I do not care what you say". After about ten minutes the officer put him out.

At two o'clock Tuesday morning, March 7, I was awakened and faced by two men with pistols, who had

come into the house. They were allowed to enter by the janitress, as they claimed to be "Hilfspolizei", and also by my maid. These two men were accompanied by two others in civilian clothes, the former wearing the brown National Socialist uniforms. They said, "Here, dress yourselves, quick too". My wife asked them to turn about while she dressed, but they refused. She was compelled to remove her night gown at the point of a revolver and stand naked before the intruders. When she protested they said, "Don't be theatrical". My wife then wanted to telephone, but they said, "No, sit down. Do not touch the telephone", while they kept their pistols pointed at us all the time. I sat down. One of them said, "Have you got a fountain pen? You sign that". I had to sign the order to the Sheriff cancelling the order of eviction, and had to sign another letter to the tenant Zink, stating that the order of eviction was called off. I hesitated to sign and they drew their revolvers on me, and my wife in terror fell to her knees, and then I signed. I asked if they had credentials, and they pointed to the "Hakenkreuz" on their sleeves and said that was their credentials. They then said, "If you recall that order tomorrow, you will be dead". After I signed, they left...."

Actually, all Nazis used their positions in the Party as a means of enriching themselves. I have already spoken of the bribe to the customs officials and the Foreign Office officials, which Mr. Garbaty was compelled to pay. Another instance of the venality of the Nazi officials was illustrated in the case of Mendelssohn Bartholdy, who owned a house near me and whom I knew well. He was told by Count Helldorf, Chief of Police in Berlin, through his stooge, one Herr Schmidt, that his passport would cost him 250,000 marks. Bartholdy told me the facts and asked me if he should pay. Knowing the Nazi practices and the danger which he ran as a Jew in Germany, I advised him to pay. He did, got his passport and visa, and left Germany. This happened in November, 1938.

I was informed by a personal friend, a Jewish banker in Berlin, Herr Kempner, whom I believed to be qualified to make an accurate estimate, that the total confiscations from Jews in Germany was between seven and eight billion marks.

I had less experience with the manner in which the Nazis operated in industrial firms. However, from the accounts of numerous American businessmen with manufacturing plants in Germany, accounts which agreed with the information which I had with respect to similar activities in German factories, I know that the Nazis used their Party position to obtain authority and power. Many American businessmen told me that they had serious troubles operating their factories because the Nazi officials in the establishment, usually recruited from the workmen, attempted to take over the management themselves, and engaged consistently and ruthlessly in acts of persecution against non-Nazi workmen. Many German firms were actually dominated by fanatical Nazis, usually persons who had had no previous position of importance, such as janitors, timekeepers and the like. Their position in the Nazi hierarchy gave them importance in the enterprise out of all proportion to their standing and position.

Signed: Raymond H. Geist

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Subscribed and sworn to
before me William L. Brewster
Vice Consul of the United States
of America, duly commissioned
and qualified,
in Mexico, D. F., Mexico,
this 28 th day of August 1945.

Signed: William L. Brewster
Vice Consul of the United
States of America

Service No. 6684
Tariff No. 38
No fee prescribed.

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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1780-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Translation of Excerpts from Jodl Diary

1937

4 February:

Decisive conference about the scarcity of raw materials by the Commissioner of four-year plan.

Only 50% of steel and iron available, therefore rationing necessary. Full allotment only for export. Armed forces and constructions for four-year plan must be cut down by about 40%. Therefore, requests for money have to be converted into requirements for raw materials. Three branches of the Armed Forces and L. for R.V. special resources must make up a priority sequence. Until further notice no more orders to be placed with industry so they will have a chance to fill the many orders previously placed with them.

The sentence "Money is an unimportant factor" has come true, even in another sense. The main part is the raw materials.

Bad harvest and (illegible), especially bread grain (Brotgetreide), demand considerable use of foreign currency for the feeding of the people.

31 March:

Report to the Minister about the maneuvers of the Armed Forces. The Field Marshal emphasized the necessity to bring some influence to bear (on the manauvers) in so far as a special Armed Forces problem has to be dealt with daily. These exercises are to be designated as "Armed Forces Maneuvers" (army, etc.). After two years, a two front war, i.e., two maneuvers, should be presented.

5 November:

Hitler develops his ideas of future development, intentions, and conduct of policy to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.

There is a divergence in the recording of his ideas as made by the Chief of the Armed Forces Office (War Department) (des Chef WA (R Kr. Min)) and by Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (Directive to the Chief of the General Staff of Air Force). (No minutes were kept).

Intention of L to put ideas on paper and transmit them to the Services (C-in-C, Air Force); furthermore, to incorporate them into mobilization instructions.

1938

11 February:

In the evening and on 12 February General K. with General V. Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol.

13 February:

In the afternoon General K. asks Admiral C. and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer's order is to the effect that military pressure by shamming military action should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval.

16

14 February:

At 2:40 o'clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence office VII and initiates the different measures.

The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations.

15 February:

In the evening an official communique about the positive results of the conference at the Obersalzberg is issued.

16 February:

Changes in the Austrian government and general political amnesty.

22 February:

At 1300 hours General K. sees the Fuehrer in order to inform him about the planned advances (vorstosse).

3 March:

The Austrian question is becoming critical. 100 officers shall be dispatched there. The Fuehrer wants to see them personally. They should not see to it that the Austrian Armed Forces will fight better against us, but rather that they do not fight at all.

10 March:

By surprise and without consulting his ministers, Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or preparation.

Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Goering. General v. Reichenau is called back from Cairo Olympic Committee. General v. Schebert is ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise Horstenau, who is with the District leader (Gauleiter) Burckel in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 1:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o'clock. I follow at 10:15, according to the wish of General v. Viebahn, to give him the old draft.
"Prepare case Otto."

1300 hours: General K informs Chief of Operational Staff (and) Admiral Canaris. Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath takes over the Foreign Office.

Fuehrer wants to transmit ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet. A personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini and the reasons are ~~developed which~~ force the Fuehrer to take action.

1830 hours: Mobilization order is given to the Command of the 8th Army (Corps Area 3), 7th and 13th Army Corps; without reserve Army.

Air puts 300 JU-52 in readiness for dropping of propaganda pamphlets. In addition, one Pursuit Squadron (Jagdgruppe), 3 bomber groups (Kampfgeschwader) and two companies as airborne troops with transport planes are held ready at civilian airports (Friedensflugplatze) in Bavaria.

Subordinated to the Army are: one commander of the Air Force, 2F, 3H Squadrons, courier squadron, 1 heavy AA Bn., Regt General Goering.

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11 March:

Instruction No. 1 of the Fuehrer is given on 11 March at 2:00 without signature; at 1300 hours with his signature.

The Army is joined by the SS Military Units (V.T.) by regiments, 40,000 men of the police and the Totenkopf Unit Upper-Bavaria as second wave.

1700 hours: The Navy has ordered all ships back home.

1800 hours: Schuschnigg has resigned; Seyss-Inquart is chancellor. SA and SS perform duty in uniform. Own movements have commenced. Frontier will not be crossed at the moment. Air Force plans large scale propaganda flights for tomorrow. The police force will be needed in any case and will be mixed with the troops.

1835 hours: Department L. has been informed. Colonel Winkler and Oberfuehrer Petri have also been informed. The Air Force has its doubts if it should initiate the movements that have not yet started.

Decision: yes.

2030 hours: Briefing received from Major General Viebahn that the situation has changed once more. The occupation will take place.

Later undated entry.

After annexation of Austria, the Fuehrer mentions that there is no hurry to solve the Czech question because Austria has to be digested first. Nevertheless preparations for Case Green will have to be carried out energetically; they will have to be newly prepared on the basis of the changed strategic position because of the annexation of Austria. State of preparations (see memorandum L I a of 19 April) reported to the Fuehrer on 21 April.

The intention of the Fuehrer not to touch the Czech problem as yet is changed because of the Czech strategic troop concentration of 21 May, which occurs without any German threat and without the slightest cause for it.

Because of Germany's self restraint, its consequences lead to a loss of prestige of the Fuehrer, which he is not willing to take once more. Therefore, the new order is issued for "green" on 30 May.

22 May:

Fundamental conference between the Fuehrer and K. Henlein (see enclosure).

23 May:

Major Schmundt reports ideas of the Fuehrer. Further conferences, which gradually reveal the exact intentions of the Fuehrer take place with the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command (OKW) on 28 May, 3 and 9 June, see enclosures. (War Diary L)

30 May:

The Fuehrer signs directive Green, where he states his final decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates military preparation all along the line. The previous intentions

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of the Army must be changed considerably in the direction of an immediate break-through into Czechoslovakia right on D-Day (X-Tag), combined with aerial penetration by the Air Force. Further details are derived from directive for strategic concentration of the army. The whole contrast becomes acute once more between the Fuehrer's intuition that we must do it this year and the opinion of the Army that we cannot do it as yet, as most certainly the Western Powers will interfere and we are not as yet equal to them.

10 August:

The Army chiefs and the chiefs of the Air Force groups, Lt. Col. Jeschonnek and myself are ordered to the Berghof. After dinner the Fuehrer makes a speech lasting for almost three hours, in which he develops his political thoughts. The subsequent attempts to draw the Fuehrer's attention to the defects of our preparation, which are undertaken by a few generals of the Army, are rather unfortunate. This applies especially to the remark of General Wietersheim, in which to top it off he claims to quote from General Adams (die er noch dazu dem General Adams in den Mund legt) that the western fortifications can only be held for three weeks. The Fuehrer becomes very indignant and flames up, bursting into the remark that in such a case the whole Army would not be good for anything. "I assure you, General, the position will not only be held for three weeks, but for three years." The cause of this despondent opinion, which unfortunately enough is held very widely within the Army General Staff, is based on various reasons. First of all, it (the General Staff) is restrained by old memories; political considerations play a part as well, instead of obeying and executing its military mission. That is certainly done with traditional devotion, but the vigor of the soul is lacking because in the end they do not believe in the genius of the Fuehrer. And one does perhaps compare him with Charles XII. And since water flows downhill, this defeatism may not only possibly cause immense political damage, for the opposition between the Generals' opinion and that of the Fuehrer is common talk, but may also constitute a danger for the morale of the troops. But I have no doubt that (?) the Fuehrer will be able to boost the morale of the people in an unexpected way when the right moment comes.

21-26 August:

Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent (Reichsverweser). Accompanied by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Honved Minister v. Raatz (?).

They arrive with the idea, that in the course of a great war, after a few years, and with the help of German troops, the old state of Hungary can be reestablished. They leave with the understanding that we have neither demands from, nor claims against them, but that Germany will not stand for a second provocation by Czechoslovakia, even if it should be tomorrow. If they want to participate at that moment, it is up to them.

Germany, however, will never play the role of arbitrator between them and Poland. The Hungarians agree; but they believe that, when the issue arises, a period of 48 hours would be indispensable to them to find out Yugoslavia's attitude.

6 September:

Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Halder, has a conference with the Hungarian Chief of General Staff Fischer.

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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT
NO. 1780-PS. Continued

Before that he is briefed by me on the political attitude of the Fuehrer - especially his order not to give any hint on the exact moment. The same with OQ I, General v. Stuelpnagel.

8 September:

General Stulpnagel OQI asks for written assurance that the Army High Command will be informed five days in advance if the plan is to take place. I agree and add that the overall meteorological situation can be estimated to some extent only for two days in advance, and that therefore the plans may be changed up to this moment (D-day-2) (X-2 TAGE).

General Stulpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders whether the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned. It presupposed that the Western Powers would not interfere decisively. It gradually seems as if the Fuehrer would stick to his decision even though he may no longer be of this opinion. It must be added that Hungary is at least moody and that Italy is reserved.

I must admit that I am worrying too, when comparing the change of opinion about political and military potentialities, according to directives of 24 June, 5 Nov 37, 7 Dec 37, 30 May 38, with the last statements.

In spite of that one must be aware of the fact that the other nations will do everything they can to apply pressure to us. We must pass this test of nerves, but because only very few people know the art of withstanding this pressure successfully, the only possible solution is to inform only a very small circle of officers of news that causes us anxiety, and not to have it circulate through anterooms as heretofore.

1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force (present were Jeschonnek, Kammhuber, Sternburg and myself).

We agree about the promulgation of the D-Day order (X-Befehl) (x-1, 4 o'clock) and preannouncement to the Air Force (D-Day-1, x-1 day, 7 o'clock). The "Y time" has yet to be examined; some formations have an approach flight of one hour.

10 September:

General Halder back from Nurnberg. He reports that the Fuehrer signed decree subordinating the Reich Labor Service to the Army High Command, as of 15 September. Furthermore it was decided that the 13th and 2nd motorized divisions would join the Reichenau Army and their place would be taken by two other divisions (3 words illegible).

11 September:

In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Jahnke from the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on imminent common tasks.

The joint preparations for refutation (wiederlegung) of our own violations of international law, and the exploitation of its violations by the enemy, were considered particularly important.

15 September:

In the morning conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staffs of Army and Air Forces; the question was discussed what could be done if the Fuehrer insists on advancement of the date, due to the rapid development of the situation.

LO

16 September:

General Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700 hours. He graphically describes the results of the conference between Chamberlain and the Fuehrer. The next conference will take place on the 21st or the 22nd in Godesberg.

With consent of the Fuehrer, the order is given in the evening by the Armed Forces High Command to the Army High Command and to the Ministry of Finance, to line up the V.G.A.D. along the Czech border.

In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to have the empty rolling stock kept in readiness clandestinely for the strategic concentrations of the Army, so that it can be transported starting 28 September.

17 September:

Contrary to the previous intention to transfer all Sudeten Germans with previous military training to the Replacement Army, the Fuehrer issues order to unite them into a Sudeten German Free Corps. The Armed Forces High Command puts Lt. Col. Koechling (reporter on youth questions) at the disposal of Konrad Henlein as advisor to Henlein.

19 September:

Order is given to the Army High Command to take care of the Sudeten German Free Corps.

20 September:

England and France have handed over their demands in Prague, the contents of which are still unknown. The activities of the Free Corps start assuming such an extent that they may bring about, and already have brought about consequences harmful to the plans of the Army. (Transferring rather strong units of the Czech Army to the proximity of the border). By checking with Lt. Col. Koechling, I attempt to lead these activities into normal channels.

Toward the evening the Fuehrer also takes a hand and gives permission to act only with groups up to 12 men each, after the approval of the Corps HQ.

21 September:

The motorized reinforcements by the L. take effect.

1130 hours: Telephone call from the Adjutant of the Fuehrer, Captain Engel, (it is submitted during the conference with the Chiefs by Captain Eberhardt). "The Fuehrer has received news five minutes ago that Prague is said to have accepted unconditionally."

1245 hours: Department heads are informed and directive is given to continue preparation for "Green", but nevertheless to get ready with everything necessary for a peaceful penetration. Orders to the Ic and Ib of Navy High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force; General Stumpf to be informed.

22 September:

1920 hours: Ia reports about a telephone call from Godesberg by General von Stulpnagel on behalf of Keitel. Subject: a) Date cannot yet be ascertained (D-Day)(x- Tag); continue preparations according to plan. In case "Green" occurs, it will not be before 30 September. If it occurs sooner, it will probably be improvised.

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25 September:

By order of the Fuehrer, two Death Head (Totenkopf) SS battalions have moved into the Panhandle territory near Asch (Ascher Zipfel) to the rear of the Free Corps.

26 September:

Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the Army High Command, has stopped the intended approach march of the advance units to the Czech border, because it is not yet necessary and because the Fuehrer does not intend to march in before the 30th in any case. Order to approach towards the Czech frontier need be given on the 27th only.

In the evening of the 26th, fixed radio stations of Breslau, Dresden and Vienna are put at the disposal of the Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda for interference with possible Czech propaganda transmissions.

Question by department "Foreign Countries" whether Czechs are to be allowed to leave and cross Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed Forces High Command: yes.

1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs General Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations and about the Fuehrer's opinion. In no case will x day be before the 30th.

It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn into military engagements because of false reports, before Prague replied.

A question of Stumpf about Y hour results in the reply that on account of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of the Air Force and Army cannot be expected. The Army needs the dawn, the Air Force can only start later on account of frequent fogs.

The Fuehrer has to make a decision for the commanders in chief who is to have priority.

The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has to proceed. The Fuehrer has not made any decision as yet about commitment against Prague.

2000 hours: The Fuehrer addresses the people and the world in an important speech at the Sportpalast..

27 September:

1320 hours: The Fuehrer consents to the first wave of attack being advanced to a line from where they can arrive in the assembly area by 30 September.

28 September:

Stapf (?) reports about a conference with Goering where the latter states that a Great War can hardly be avoided any longer. It may last 7 years, and we will win it.

1700 hours: Tension relaxes. The Fuehrer has decided on a conference with Chamberlain, the Duce and Daladier in Munich.

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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1780-PS. Continued.

29 September:

The pact of Munich is signed. Czechoslovakia as a power is out. Four zones as set forth will be occupied between the 2nd and 7th of October. The remaining part of mainly German character will be occupied by the 10th of October. The genius of the Fuehrer and his determination not to shun even a World War have again won the victory without the use of force. The hope remains that the incredulous, the weak and the doubtful people have been converted and will remain that way.

1939

23 August:

Received order from Armed Forces High Command to proceed to Berlin and take over position of Chief of Armed Forces Executive Office. (WFA).

1100 hours-1330 hours: Discussions with Chief of Armed Forces High Command. X day has been announced for 26 August. Y time has been announced for 0430 hours.

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CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1780-PS.

22 November 1945

I, Ludwig Hartman, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of excerpts in Document No. 1780-PS.

Ludwig Hartman
T/4
37446052

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Mexico City, D. F.)
) ss.
Mexico

United Mexican States)
Mexico, Federal District)
Embassy of the United) ss
States of America)

GEORGE S. MESSERSMITH, being first duly sworn deposes and says:

During the years 1933 and 1934, while I served as Counsul General of the United States of America in Berlin, I was in close touch because of my duties and because of the necessities of the times with the diplomatic representatives not only of England and France but with those of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Austria, Bulgaria, Rumania, Greece, Turkey and Holland. I saw the Chiefs of these Missions, most of whom were also close friends of mine, almost every day, as well as some of their principal subordinates once or twice a week and in many cases oftener. In Austria where I went towards the middle of 1934 as Minister, my contacts with the diplomatic representatives of these countries was if anything even closer and more frequent.

I also had frequent contact during my duty in Germany with many high ranking Germans, including Goering, Goebbels, Frank, Schacht, von Papen, Funk, Lammers, Darré, Ley and many others of the same category and in secondary categories. This contact was made necessary by the nature of my duties and in the protection of our interests. While serving in Germany and in Austria, I also kept in close touch with many of the leading diplomatic and political figures in most parts of Europe with the exception of Russis where I happened at the time not to have any specific contact. These contacts which I maintained with diplomatic and political figures in other countries was based on previous associations and I kept in close contact through various trips which I made from time to time and more particularly through confidential correspondence and through mutual friends. From all these sources I obtained an intimate familiarity with the aims and methods of German diplomacy from 1933 until I returned to the United States to assume a position in the Department of State about the middle of 1937.

As early as 1933, while I served in Germany, the German and Nazi contacts which I had in the highest and secondary categories openly acknowledged Germany's ambitions to dominate Southeastern Europe from Czechoslovakia down to Turkey. As they freely stated, the objective was territorial expansion in the case of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The professed objective in the earlier stages of the Nazi regime, in the remainder of Southeastern Europe, were political and economic control and they did not at that time speak so definitely of actual absorption and destruction of sovereignty. Their ambitions, however, were not limited to Southeastern Europe. From the very beginnings of 1933, and even before the Nazis came into power, important Nazis speaking of the Ukraine freely said that "it must be our granary" and that "even with Southeastern Europe under our control, Germany needs and must have the greater part of the Ukraine in order to be able to feed the people of greater Germany". After I left Germany in the middle of 1934 for my post in Austria, I continued to receive information as to the German designs in Southeastern Europe. In a conversation with von Papen shortly after his appointment as German Minister to Austria in 1934, von Papen frankly stated to me that "Southeastern Europe to Turkey is Germany's Hinterland and I have been designated to carry through the task of bringing it within the fold. Austria is the first on the program." As I learned through my diplomatic colleagues, von Papen in Vienna and his colleague von Mackensen in Budapest, were openly propagating the idea of the dismemberment and final absorption of Czechoslovakia as early as 1935.

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The Nazis planned to gain their aims by force, preferably by the threat of force alone if possible, and by war if needed. At the beginning, however, - that is in the first two years of the Nazi regime - the Nazis wanted peace to give themselves time - that is time to arm - then to divide and isolate their intended victims. I have often heard prominent Nazis say in 1933 and 1934, and I translate literally, "We must have peace until we are ready". By the late summer of 1938, they felt themselves ready.

Immediately after the Nazis came into power they started a vast rearmament program. This was one of the primary immediate objectives of the Nazi regime. As a matter of fact, the two immediate objectives of the Nazi regime when it came into power had to be and were, according to their own statements frequently made to me; first, to bring about the complete and absolute establishment of their power over Germany and the German people so that they would become in every respect willing and capable instruments of the regime to carry through its ends; and second, the establishment of a tremendous armed power within Germany in order that the political and economic program in Southeastern Europe and in Europe could be carried through by force if necessary, but preferably by a threat of force. It was characteristic that in carrying through this second aim they emphasized from the very outset the building of an overpowering air force. Goering and Milch often said to me or in my presence that the Nazis had decided to concentrate on air power as the weapon of terror most likely to give Germany a dominant position and the weapon which could be developed the most rapidly and in the shortest time. In 1934 from a high ranking General in the German Army, whose name I cannot recall for the moment, I learned that they planned to build 1200 planes that year, which was a huge air force for that period and something in terms that no one had thought of before in any country. The rapid development of this air program was obvious to everyone for one could not go out on the streets in Berlin or in any other City of importance in Germany without seeing pilots and air force trainees in evidence everywhere. They were given special privileges and special housing in order to encourage young men to enter the air training program. The rearmament program as a whole, it should be emphasized, proceeded with unbelievable rapidity. It proceeded more quickly, as high Nazi leaders themselves stated to me, than they themselves believed would be possible. It proceeded more rapidly than even informed and trained foreign observers in Germany would have believed possible even though they knew the resources of the German industrial machine.

At the same time that this rearmament program was in progress, the Nazi regime took all possible measures to prepare the German people for war in the psychological sense. Throughout Germany, for example, one saw everywhere German youth of all ages engaged in military exercises, drilling, field maneuvers, practicing the throwing of hand grenades, etc. In this connection I wrote in an official communication in November 1933, from Berlin as follows:

> "..... Everything that is being done in the country today has for its object to make the people believe that Germany is threatened vitally in every aspect of its life by outside influences and by other countries. Everything is being done to use this feeling to stimulate military training and exercises, and innumerable measures are being taken to develop the German people into a hardy, sturdy race which will be able to meet all comers. The military spirit is constantly growing. It cannot be otherwise. The leaders of Germany today have no desire for peace unless it is a peace which the world makes at the expense of complete compliance with German

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> desires and ambitions. Hitler and his associates really and sincerely want peace for the moment, but only to have a chance to get ready to use force if it is found finally essential. They are preparing their way so carefully that there is not in my mind any question but that the German people will be with them when they want to use force and when they feel that they have the necessary means to carry through their objects ..."

Military preparation and psychological preparation were coupled with diplomatic preparation designed to so disunite and isolate their intended victims as to render them defenseless against German aggression. I well remember one conversation I had with Goebbels in the earliest period of the Nazi Government, in which I expressed the opinion that they could never get away with their program in Europe. His reply was "But you don't know what we can do by creating dissension - without anything being done specifically on our part or which can be laid to our door, we will get these people to fight among themselves and so weaken themselves that they will be an easy prey for us". I can still recall the cynical manner in which he specifically indicated the "sore spots" in Austria and in Czechoslovakia and in other countries and on which by insidious means German agents could arouse dissension and get the peoples in the countries themselves disunited.

From surface appearances and judging from historical standards only, the obstacles to the achievement of the Nazi objectives were formidable indeed. Completely aside from the difficulty of bringing about complete coordination within Germany and complete control, and in carrying through such a huge military program, there were these definite obstacles in the political and diplomatic field. In 1933 France was the dominant military power on the Continent. In the interest of security she had formed within the framework of the League of Nations, a system of mutual assistance both in the West and in the East. The Locarno Pact of 1928, supplemented b the Franco-Belgian alliance, guaranteed the territorial status quo in the West. Yugoslovia, Czechoslovakia and Rumania were allied in the Little Entente and each in turn was united with France by mutual assistance pacts. Since 1922, France and Poland had likewise been allied against external aggression. Italy had a special interest in Austrian independence which she made definitely clear. From 1934 to 1936, France and Italy each proposed and endeavored to sponsor political and economic accords to strengthen the powers of resistance of the eastern European countries to German designs. Throughout all of Southeastern Europe, France and Italy both were active through their diplomatic machinery in strengthening the position of these countries and of their independence. The most important of these arrangements were the proposed East Locarno Pact, inspired by France and intended to include all countries in the East, ranging from the Baltic to the Adriatic and Black Sea, and the proposed Danubian Pact which had for its principal objective strengthening the economic position of the countries of Southeastern Europe by promoting mutual trade relations between Austria and the other countries which had recently been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Nazi Germany launched a vigorous diplomatic campaign to break up these alliances and understandings, to create division among members of the Little Entente and the other Eastern European powers, and to divide all of them from France on whose military power the security of these smaller states in the last analysis rested. To some of these countries, particularly Yugoslavia, Hungary and Poland, Nazi Germany made extravagant and often inconsistent promises

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of territorial and economic rewards as a price for cooperation in the German program of aggression against their neighbors. To other countries, especially France and England, Nazi Germany offered the attractive prize of peace and security as the price of giving Germany a free hand in Southeastern Europe. To allay the fears of its neighbors until Germany had completed its military and diplomatic preparations, Germany cleverly proceeded step by step, always giving solemn assurances that the immediate objective was her last. In making these promises she was uninhibited by any scruples as to the sanctity of international obligations. High ranking Nazis with whom I had to maintain official contact, particularly men such as Goering, Goebbels, Ley, Frick, Frank, Darré and others, repeatedly scoffed at my position as to the binding character of treaties and openly stated to me that Germany would observe her international undertakings only so long as it suited Germany's interests to do so. Although these statements were openly made to me as they were, I am sure, made to others, these Nazi leaders were not really disclosing any secret for on many occasions they expressed the same ideas publicly.

In this specific connection I quote from a letter which I wrote to Under Secretary of State Phillips in Washington, dated March 24, 1934:

> "Her (Germany's) agreement with Poland is only one of a series of agreements which she would like to make to follow out her policy of gaining time and allaying suspicion, but when one realizes what a callous attitude those in power here take now towards agreements of any kind, and hears what they have to say about them, one realizes that they mean nothing more than what they are intended for, i.e. a part of her policy to keep the peace and maintain the status quo until she is prepared to gain her ends through force if they cannot be achieved otherwise".

In the last analysis, however, it was not faith in Germany's promises but fear of German might and possible aggressive action which induced Germany's neighbors, particularly the small ones, to progressively acquiesce in her designs. The huge German rearmament program, which was never a secret, and which was openly announced in the spring of 1935, and Germany's reoccupation of the Rhineland, all done with only mild protests from France and England, and the failure of the League to stop Mussolini's Abyssinian adventure, convinced the peoples of the smaller countries of Eastern Europe that France either could not or would not resist German expansion in the East, that England would not take any positive steps to stop Germany, and that the only thing that was left to them was to make the best possible deal with Nazi Germany.

These considerations to be sure did not convince all people and all political leaders among Germany's neighbors. The Nazis made plain, however, that any opposition which remained would be helpless. She continued the program of stirring up internal dissensions wherever they existed in other countries and openly aided sympathetic Nazi and Fascist and anti-Government groups, particularly in Yugoslavia, Hungary, Rumania, Austria and Czechoslovakia.

Such briefly was the general plan of "German diplomacy" and political action and economic action during these years. I had occasion to follow the details of its operation from close observation during the years 1933 to 1937.

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Austria and Czechoslovakia were the first on the German program of aggression. As early as 1934, Germany began to woo neighbors of these countries with promises of a share in the loot. To Yugoslavia in particular they offered Carinthia. Concerning the Yugoslav reaction, I reported at the time:

> "...The major factor in the internal situation in the last week has been the increase in tension with respect to the Austrian Nazi refugees in Yugoslavia. ... There is very little doubt but that Goering, when he made his trip to various capitals in Southeastern Europe about six months ago, told the Yugoslavs that they would get a part of Carinthia, when a National Socialist Government came into power in Austria. ... The Nazi seed sown in Yugoslavia has been sufficient to cause trouble and there are undoubtedly a good many people there who look with a great deal of benevolence on those Nazi refugees who went to Yugoslavia in the days following July 25."

Germany made like promises of territorial gains to Hungary and to Poland in order to gain their cooperation or at least their acquiescence in the proposed dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. As I learned from my diplomatic colleagues in Vienna, von Papen and von Mackensen in Vienna and in Budapest in 1935, were spreading the idea of division of Czechoslovakia, in which division Germany was to get Bohemia, Hungary to get Slovakia, and Poland the rest. This did not deceive any of these countries for they knew that the intention of Nazi Germany was to take all.

The Nazi German Government did not hesitate to make inconsistent promises when it suited its immediate objectives. I recall the Yugoslav Minister in Vienna saying to me in 1934 or 1935, that Germany had made promises to Hungary of Yugoslav territory while at the same time promising to Yugoslavs portions of Hungarian territory. The Hungarian Minister in Vienna later gave me the same information.

I should emphasize here in this statement that the men who made these promises were not only the died-in-the-wool Nazis but more conservative Germans who already had begun to willingly lend themselves to the Nazi program. In an official despatch to the Department of State from Vienna dated October 10, 1935, I wrote as follows:

> "....Europe will not get away from the myth that Neurath, Papen, and Mackensen are not dangerous people and that they are 'diplomats of the old school'. They are in fact servile instruments of the regime and just because the outside world looks upon them as harmless, they are able to work more effectively. They are able to sow discord just because they propagate the myth that they are not in sympathy with the regime."

At this point in this statement I should set forth the following. When the Nazi Party took over in Germany it represented only a small part of the German population. It dominated all of Germany and rapidly assured itself of that domination by means of organization and terror, the details of which are an historical record and need not be set forth here. At the beginning of 1933, although a few of the Nazi leaders, such as Hitler and Hess and Goering, recognized the idea of world domination, they spoke little of it. At the beginning the great mass of the Party and the regime

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itself had for its open objective the domination of Southeastern Europe. Literally this meant to them at the outset absorption of Czechoslovakia and Austria and complete political and economic control of the other countries down to Turkey. They always excluded mentioning Turkey so as not to greatly disturb Great Britain. As the domination of the Germans increased within Germany as the military program progressed and as the German people increasingly became imbued with the Nazi spirit, and more rapidly than even the most fanatic Nazis had believed possible, their power increased incredibly within and without Germany. Within Germany there was an attitude of complete apathy so far as resistance was concerned. Without Germany in the smaller countries which felt themselves threatened, the fear constantly became greater. It was this growing sense of power and the realization of the fear and lack of measures of resistance from the outside that rapidly caused the Nazi idea to expand with respect to domination over Europe and in fact over the world.

In this connection it must also be borne in mind that most of the higher officers of the German Army during the first years of the Nazi regime lent their aid to the Nazi regime only because they believed that under such a regime they would be able to rebuild the German Army which they had not been able to do under previous German Governments and thus restore the power of Germany in Europe and in the world. At the outset it is probable that only a few of these Generals shared the territorial aggressive idea of the Nazis, but increasingly as the Army saw its power growing from the lower ranks to the upper they became imbued with these aggressive designs just as much as the Nazis.

For a time France and Italy endeavored to counter these moves by Germany, described in the preceding paragraphs. In 1934, Barthou, the very able and discerning French Foreign Minister, endeavored to promote an East Locarno Pact to guarantee the territory of all the Eastern and Southeastern European countries and to provide a guarantee against external aggression by mutual assistance pacts supported by France and Russia. France also continued her efforts to foster an economic accord between Austria and the other Danubian powers which had previously been members of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, while Italy sought to organize a more limited economic bloc of Austria, Hungary and Italy.

The Nazi German Government made every effort to prevent the carrying through of these accords. To Yugoslavia, for example, Germany made promises of support for Yugoslavia's ambitions with regard to Italian territory, particularly Trieste, as well as to a share of Austria. Germany's object was by sowing discord between Yugoslavia and Italy to prevent France from reaching an agreement with both of them and hence to frustrate all hopes of bringing an East Locarno Pact into being. In October 1934, I reported from Vienna, as follows:

> "...The Foreign Minister called attention to the reports which they have with respect to the intensive diplomatic activities of Germany in Warsaw, in Belgrade, in Sofia, and in Budapest. They have information, he told me, from a very reliable source that the present German policy is to create hopes and unrest, particularly in Belgrade and Sofia, so that when King Alexander goes to Paris he will face the French with a situation which will make it impossible for them to reach any agreement with Italy. The Wilhelmstrasse believes, according to the Minister's information, that if Barthou has no success at Rome the present French Ministry will

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have to resign on his return and a stronger left Ministry formed, with which the Wilhelmstrasse can reach some agreement. The Foreign Minister said that he did not think the Germans would succeed in this, or that a failure of the French-Italian conversations would necessarily result in a change in the French Cabinet. He did say, however, that the French-Italian agreement would be difficult because he had just learned this morning that King Alexander had been very successful during his Sofia visit which ended just a few days ago..."

To offset any moves in the direction of economic cooperation among the Danubian States, Germany made lavish but frankly insincere promises of economic support, on condition of cooperation with her. During my tour of duty in Germany, a Nazi economist named Deutz (I believe this is the correct spelling of his name) sought me out frequently. He did not occupy a very high position in the Government but was used as one of the active instruments by high Nazi leaders in Southeastern Europe. He made frequent trips to Yugoslavia, to Hungary and also on occasion to Rumania. For some reason which I could never fully determine he sought me out frequently and on returning from these trips he would tell me frankly what he had been doing and of the promises he had made of economic gains as reward for cooperating with Germany. At the same time, he, of course, cynically told me that Germany had no intention of carrying through these promises and remarked: "how dumb these people are to believe in such promises".

At the same time that Germany held out such promises of reward for cooperation in her program, she stirred up internal dissensions within these countries thsmselves and in Austria and Czechoslovakia in particular, all of which was designed to so weaken all opposition and strengthen the pro-Nazi and Fascist groups as to insure peaceful acquiescence in the German program. Her machinations in Austria I have related in detail, as they came under my direct observation, in a separate affidavit. In Czechoslovakia they followed the same tactics with the Sudeten Germans. I was reliably informed that the Nazi Party spent over 6,000,000 marks in financing the Henlein party in the elections in the spring of 1935 alone. In Yugoslavia she played on the old differences between the Croats and the Serbs and the fear of the restoration of the Hapsburgs in Austria. It may be remarked here that this latter was one of the principal instruments and most effective ones which Nazi Germany used as the fear in Yugoslavia, in particular, of a restoration of the Hapsburgs was very real. In Hungary she played upon the agrarian difficulties and at the same time so openly encouraged the Nazi German elements in Hungary as to provoke the Government of Hungary to demand the recall of van Hackensen in 1936. In Hungary and in Poland she played on the fear of Communism and communist Russia. In Rumania she aggravated the existing anti-semitism, emphasizing the important role of the Jews in Rumanian industry and the Jewish ancestry of Lupescu. Germany undoubtedly also financed the Fascist Iron Guard through Codreneau.

Such "diplomatic" measures reinforced by Germany's vast rearmament program had a considerable effect, particularly in Yugoslavia, Poland and Hungary, and sufficient at least to deter these countries from joining any combination opposed to German designs, even if not enough to persuade them to actively ally themselves with Nazi Germany Important political leaders of Yugoslavia began to become convinced that the Nazi regime would remain in power and would gain its ends and that the course of safety for Yugoslavia was to play along with Germany. This became so obvious from direct information which I had that I wrote in September 1934, from Vienna, as follows:

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"...The attitude of the Yugoslavs has been most disturbing. There is no question but that the Germans have complicated the already difficult problem existing between Italy and Yugoslavia by promising the Yugoslavs territorial and other advantages. There are a lot of people in Yugoslavia who feel that the present Government in Germany will stay, that it will be able to force its will on the rest of Europe and that their best bet is to play with Germany for they will get most out of it in that way in the end. This section of opinion in Yugoslavia believes that Austria will eventually succumb to Germany and that when this comes Yugoslavia will get a good slice of present Austrian territory and in addition have German support against Italy which will eventually lead to her realizing what now seems unrealizable aspirations in other directions. This sentiment in Yugoslavia explains the benevolent attitude shown towards the Nazi refugees from Austria after July 25. Yugoslavia is therefore definitely playing the dog in the manger. She will not break with France for the present and burn her bridges there, nor with the other States of the Little Entente, but she is definitely playing with Germany and it would appear that at the moment is inclined to place more dependence of Germany than on French help. The attitude of Poland has naturally encouraged Yugoslavia and what they believe to be the wavering attitude of Hungary is an additional element of encouragement to them..."

In Hungary the same attitude was becoming increasingly obvious. In the same letter I wrote from Vienna in September 1934, with respect to developments in Hungary, I quote as follows:

"...In Hungary the revisionist feeling is stronger than perhaps in any of the other Succession States, and it is this feeling which has the major influence in shaping Hungarian policy. Hungary has been flirting with Germany for some time as you know, but doing it very discreetly. The Hungarians feel very friendly towards Austria. They much prefer to see Austria independent. They don't want German domination in Austria or Southeastern Europe. They infinitely prefer the status quo, even without the treaty revision, to German domination in Austria and eventually over them. But they fear Germany and they are afraid that the present Government in Germany will be able to maintain itself, and this means in their minds definite German penetration to the Southeast. The events of June 30 and July 25 caused a real revulsion of feeling in Hungary and strengthened the feeling that they wanted to see Austria remain independent, but the feeling of fear of Germany has more recently made headway again.

"Kanya, the Foreign Minister, was in Berlin, I think now several months ago, and I know that he saw Hitler, Schacht, Neurath, and Blomberg. He came back to Hungary with the feeling that the present regime would be able to maintain itself, and strengthened therefore in his policy of maintaining an equivocal position. Hungary therefore must be considered among the States constantly wavering and endeavoring to carry water on both shoulders..."

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Poland, prompted by her territorial designs on Teschen, and fearful of being caught in a war between Germany and Russia, almost openly began to follow the German line, and particularly with respect to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. In the fall of 1935, I reported from Vienna in this connection as follows:

> "...The part which Poland is playing at this time and has been playing for some months is a very dangerous one and, in the opinion of many, not a creditable one. Poland owes her existence to France and England, and it was Czechoslovakia, whose country they now want to help divide up, who helped to make possible the new Poland. In her eagerness for prestige and additional territory she is willing to turn on her old friends and to play a rather sorry role...
>
> "...The Czechoslovakian Minister here informs me that Czechoslovakia has an arbitration treaty with Poland which in the first paragraph covers all disputes which might arise. When some time ago the Poles arbitrarily dismissed some twenty Czechs from responsible positions in Poland and no arrangement of the difficulties could be found, the Czech Government proposed arbitration, and to this day the Polish Government has not replied and refused to take any action. The Poles have an air line between Warsaw and Vienna which passes over Czechoslovakia, and when that was instituted the Czechs agreed with the reservation that when they wished to institute a line over Poland the Poles would agree. The Polish line has been in operation for some time, and when the Czechs recently wished to institute a commercial line over Poland the Poles refused to give permission. The Czechs retaliated by taking action which stopped the Polish Vienna-Warsaw route. It is well known that the Czechs are giving the Polish minorities in Czechoslovakia schools, etc., while the Poles are refusing to do anything of this kind for the Czechs in Poland. It seems to be a deliberate dog-in-the-manger policy which cannot give any confidence in the Polish procedure..."

The effect was to make these countries apathetic to the annexation of Austria and cooperative in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. I reported in October 1935, in this respect as follows:

> "...Yugoslavia, because of the fear of her minorities, prefers Anschluss to Hapsburg restoration in Austria, in the vain hope that this might avoid catastrophe for her. Anschluss would not avoid catastrophe for Yugoslavia, but only postpone it and make it more sure. Hungary remains fundamentally pro-German, due to the false idea that her revisionist hopes will get satisfied in that direction sooner than others. She does not realize that the revisionist satisfaction which she hopes to get from Germany would only be the forerunner of later loss of sovereignty. The fact that there are Hungarians who realize that this turning to Berlin is the sure road to ruin does not keep Hungary from putting her foot on this road.
>
> "Because Czechoslovakia has entered into a military agreement with Russia, and Rumania is about to do the

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same, and Yugoslavia is considering it, Berlin is trying to convince Poland and Hungary that this is a Soviet threat to them. The real object, of course, is to get their cooperation in the disintegration of Czechoslovakia and the fastening of the yoke on Austria as the first step towards progress to the Southeast..."

As the Nazi leaders of Germany realized, however, that these limited and uncertain gains were not sufficient to insure the success of her program, they did not lessen their rearmament at home so as to increase terror and fear. Austria and Czechoslovakia might easily have been saved and her neighbors persuaded to combine with them in mutual self defense if England and France at that time, with or without Italy's assistance, had shown adequate evidence of resisting the German program. Nazi leaders at that time were most insistent and persistent in endeavoring to determine the reactions to their program in Italy and in France and to a certain extent in the United States. They were eager to know to what degree these countries would resist their program. They had no regard as to what the smaller countries of Europe might feel or think or do. Their physical power was already so great that that was no longer a matter of concern to them. I recall conversations with Nazi leaders at this stage, when I happened to see them in Germany on trips from Vienna to Berlin, during which they showed a childish eagerness to get my reaction to what they were doing and when I told them that they were precipitating a war in which Germany would be defeated and her power in Europe destroyed, not for generations but perhaps for centuries, they laughed in my face and said that England and France and we would do nothing and they knew it.

Germany succeeded in preventing any such combinations by creating divisions and by persuading France and England to acquiesce, as the price of peace, in the German expansion in Southeastern Europe, in exchange for precarious security in the West.

While Italy openly opposed efforts at Anschluss with Austria in 1934, Italian ambitions in Abyssinia provided Germany with the opportunity to sow discord between Italy and France and England and to win Italy over to acceptance of Germany's program in exchange for German support of Italy's plans in Abyssinia. The Nazis made little effort to conceal their motives in supporting Italian colonial adventures. In the summer of 1935, I was informed by a person whose name I do not recall at this time but who was thoroughly informed as to all developments in Germany, that the Nazis were eagerly awaiting an Italian-Abyssinian war to give them a free hand in Central Europe. I reported at the time:

"...He emphasized that in the party it was definitely reckoned with that war between Italy and Abyssinia was inevitable, and that this would cause disturbances in the European situation which the regime felt it must be free to reap all benefit from..."

Germany, of course, did take advantage of the situation to force Austria into the July 11, 1936 accord, which, as I have explained in a separate affidavit, was the first critical step in the disintegration and eventual downfall of Austria.

The Nazis fully realized, however, the necessity for the neutralization of France and England, as a part of their strategic preparation for war, and they left no stone unturned to achieve it. Almost from the beginning of the Hitler regime, the Nazis sought to make a deal with France. The terms of the deal with France were

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security for France in the West in exchange for freedom of action for Germany in the East. Very soon after coming to power, Hitler announced that apart from the Saar, Germany coveted no territory of France and thereafter he often repeated these assurances, particularly on the occasion of each new treaty violation or act of aggression in the East. Acceptance of the deal would of course reduce France to a second-rate power. To gain French acquiescence, the Nazis made powerful appeals to all classes of French society. To the left, they played on the profound pacifist sentiment of the masses. To the right, they emphasized the fear of communism, fears which took several forms, either that the Nazis, after the reoccupation of the Rhineland, were invulnerable in the West and could be stopped in the East only by the Red army, or conversely (after the purge of the Russian army in 1937) that Russia could not fight Germany, but intended to let France and England exhaust themselves in a war with Germany and then arise in the end the only victor.

To England, the Nazis made substantially the same arguments, and appealed in addition to those who disapproved of French military hegemony and the alleged inequalities of the Versailles Treaty. As an evidence of their alleged desire to reach a permanent understanding with England, Germany "accepted" a naval limitations treaty and dangled before the eyes of the British Government the prize of a Locarno Air Pact.

In order to assure wider acceptance of these arguments, Germany did not hesitate to attempt to arrange to involve England and France elsewhere in order to give Germany a freer hand in Eastern Europe. Germany actively supported Italy in both her Abyssinian and Spanish adventures, thereby embroiling Italy with France and England. By means of an understanding with Italy announced in 1936, and by the formation of the anti-Comintern Pact with Japan at about the same time, Germany created such potential dangers for England in the Mediterranean and in the Far East as to discourage England from continuing to maintain the commitments undertaken by her in Eastern Europe.

These German measures with respect to France and England were surprisingly effective. The French Ambassador in Berlin, M. Francois Poncet, who was married to a member of one of the powerful industrial families of France, was persuaded that German military might could not be matched and as I learned from friends in the French Foreign Office, sent home many defeatist reports. As early as the fall of 1935, I learned from these same friends and others that France was preparing to abandon its commitments in the Southeastern p rt of Europe in exchange for promises of security within her own borders. The Nazis appeared to have equal success in undermining British sentiment. The "conversion" of Lord Lothian and the attitude of the London Times beginning in 1935 are a matter of historical record. The attitude of such conservatives was naturally reflected in British diplomacy.

Germany was ready. She had completed her rearmament program. She had sown discord among her intended victims in Eastern Europe.

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She had won tacit English and French acceptance for German expansion in the East in exchange for a promise of peace in the West. Germany was ready now to march. The rest is written history.

/s/George S. Messersmith

Subscribed and sworn to before me, William L. Brewster, a Vice Consul of the United States of America, duly commissioned, and qualified, in Mexico, D. F., Mexico, this 30th day of August, 1945.

/s/ William L. Brewster

William L. Brewster
Vice Consul of the United States
of America

Service No. 6809
Tariff No. 38
No fee prescribed.

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TRNASLATION OF DOCUMENT 2544-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

I, Rudolf DIELS, 45 years of age, testify under oath as follows: When H itler became Chancellor of the Reich on January 30th I933, I was a Superior Government Councillor (Oberregierungsrat) in the police section of the Prussian Ministry of Interior. There I was in the section: Political Police. Therfore I know the happenings within the police, as they occured during the time after Hitler's seizure of power, from my own experience.

When Hitler became Chancellor of the Reich, H ermann Goering became provisional (Kommissarischer) Prussian Minister of the Interior and thereby my superior. As such he was the head of the centralized Prussian police administration. This organization constituted the strongest power (Machtfaktor) aside from the army.

The perfectly primitive Nazi conception of the conduct of a state was, that one had to annihilate or render harmless all adversaries or suspected adversaries. The inferiority complex of the Nazis towards everything they did not know, e.g. legal institution, experts and so on has much to do with that.

As for that, it was a natural matter for the new Nazi Government and the party, which had come into power, to annihilate their adversaries by all possible means. These actions started after the REICHSTAG fire. They were executed by various party groups, especially by the SA; for such criminal purposes the government also tried to make the most of certain official government agencies. The methods applied were as follows: HUMAN beings, who deprived of their freedom subjected to severe bodily mistreatment or killed. These illegal detentions (Freiheitsberaubungen) took place in camps, often old military barracks, stormtroop quarters of fortresses. Later on these places became known as concentration camps, such as Oranienburg, near Berlin, Lichtenburg, Papenburg, Dachau in Bavaria, Columbiahouse Berlin, etc.

During this period of time, numerous politicians, deputies, writers, doctors, lawyers and other personalities of leading circles were arrested illegally, tortured and killed. Among the killed, there were the Social Democrat STELLING, ERNST HEILMANN, the former Police President of Altona OTTO EGGERSTEDT, the communist Schehr from the RHUR territory, and numerous parties and denominations, amongst them Conservatives, Democrates, Catholics, Jews, Communists and Pacifists.

These murders were comonflaged by the expression: "shot while trying to escape" or "resisting arrest" or similar things. Approximately 5-700 people perished during this first wave of terror (from March until October I933approximately).

I myself and my co-workers, old civil servants Not-Nazis, tried to resist this wave of terror.

There was no legal possibility left any more, to undertake anything in order to stop these illegal arrests, because the Reich Cabinet had suspended Civil Rights by decree of February 2 8th I933. On account of this fact, it was also impossible for the inmates of the concentration camps to appeal to any court. Such a state of affairs had never existed before, not even during extraordinary times. The word "protective custody" as used at that time for concentration camps etc. was an irony. There were a few cases of real protective custody, in which I put people behind safe walls, in order to protect them against terrible excesses.

The number of illegal cases attained on ever-increasing extent. When Heinrich H immler took over the reins of power as the highest Chief of police in Prussia under Goering, these actions were really organized by the State proper. The first, great, STATE- ORGANIZED terror project

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under his leadership was the blood purge of June 30th 1934, at that time SAleaders, Gener als, leading Catholics and others were murdered. He also arrested people again, who had been released from concentration camps before that time. This at a time, when actual ly a certain tranquillity in the country had set in already.

Read by myself, approved
signed and sworn to:
signed in the presence of:

(signed) RUDOLF DIELS
(signed) Robert M.W. Kempner
DR. ROBERT M.W. KEMPNER
EXPERT Consul tant fot the Judge Advocate General

swor n to in the presense of:

(signed) William E. Miller
WILLIAM E. MILLER
Ist Lt. J.A.G.D.

Nov. I3 I945

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2 544-PS

I, PAUL W. FREEDMAN S/Sgt 33799I22, hereby certify that I am thoroughly Conversant with the English and German languages: and that the above is a true and correct translation of Documdnt 2544-PS

PAUL W. FREEDMAN
S/Sgt 33799I22

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AFFIDAVIT

Statement of
Gesandter Paul Otto Gustav Schmidt

I, PAUL OTTO GUSTAV SCHMIDT, being first duly sworn on oath, state:

1. I was an interpreter in the German Foreign Office from 1923-1945. Prior to 1939, my duties consisted of interpreting and keeping the minutes of discussions at diplomatic conferences. Beginning in 1924 my primary assignments at diplomatic discussions included the following:

1924	Conference of Stressemann and Herriot at London concerning Dawes Plan.
1924-1927	German-French trade negotiations in Paris.
1925	Locarno meetings.
1926	Meeting of League of Nations Assembly, Council and economic committees.
1927	World Economic Conference at Geneva.
1929	Hague Conference for final approval of Young Plan.
1930	Paris trade negotiations in reference to Saar, and other economic conferences.
1930	International cartel meetings.
1931	Laval visit to Berlin.
	Six Power Conference in London on economic matters.
	Visit of Bruening and Curtis to London.
1932	Geneva Disarma ment Conference.
1933	League of Nations Assembly; other conferences in London.
1933-1935	Meetings of German and French trade delegations.
1935	Visit of Eden and Simon to Berlin.

I was first called to interpret for Hitler in connection with the 1935 visit of Simon and Eden to Berlin. In fact, I served at virtually every meeting at which Hitler and Ribbentrop participated, and was with Goering when important visitors called and when he represented Germany in diplomatic conferences abroad. In recognition of these services, I P.O.S. was made councillor of Legation in 1935, Minister II Class after Munich and Minister I Class after Compiegne. Since 1939, I have been Director of BRAM (Buero des Reichsaussenministers), and in 1944 I was made Chief of the POW and Civilian Internee Section.

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2. Whatever success and position I have enjoyed in the Foreign Office I owe to the fact that I made it my business at all times to possess thorough familiarity with the subject matter under discussion, and I endeavored to achieve intimate knowledge of the mentality of Hitler and the other leaders. Throughout the Hitler regime, I constantly endeavored to keep myself apprised as to what was going on in the Foreign Office and in related organizations, and I enjoyed such a position that it was possible to have ready access to key officials and to key personnel in their offices.

3. The general objectives of the Nazi leadership were apparent from the start, - namely the domination of the European continent, to be achieved, first by the incorporation of all German-speaking groups in the Reich, and secondly, by territorial expansion under the slogan of "Lebensraum". The execution of these basic objectives, however, seemed to be characterized by improvization. Each succeeding step apparently was carried out as each new situation arose, but all consistent with the ultimate objectives mentioned above.

4. The attempted putsch in Austria and the murder of Dollfuss on 25 July 1934 seriously disturbed the career personnel of the Foreign Office because these events discredited Germany in the eyes of the world. It was common knowledge that the putsch had been engineered by the Party, and the fact that the attempted putsch followed so closely on the heels of the blood purge within Germany could not help but suggest the similarity of Nazi methods both in foreign and in domestic policy. This concern over the repercussions of the attempted putsch was soon heightened by a recognition of the fact that these episodes were of influence in leading to the Franco-Soviet Consultative Pact of 5 December 1934, a defensive arrangement which was not heeded as a warning by the Nazis.

5. The announcement in March of the establishment of a German

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Air Force and of the introduction of conscription was followed on 2 May 1935 by the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between France and the Soviet Union. The career personnel of the Foreign Office regarded this as a further very serious warning as to the potential consequences of German foreign policy, but the Nazi leaders only stiffened their attitude towards the Western Powers, declaring that they were not going to be intimidated. At this time, the career officials at least expressed their reservations to the Foreign Minister, Neurath. I do not know whether or not Neurath in turn related these expressions of concern to Hitler.

6. The re-entry of the German military forces into the Rhineland w as preceded by Nazi diplomatic preparation in February. A German communique of 21 Feb 1936 reaffirmed that the French-Soviet Pact of mutual assistance was incompatible with the Locarno Treaties and the Covenant of the League. On the same day Hitler argued in an interview that no real grounds existed for conflict between Germany and France. Considered against the background statements in MEIN KAMPF offensive to France, the circumstances were such to suggest that the stage was being set for justifying some future act. I do not know how far in advance the march into the Rhineland was decided upon. I personally knew about it, and discussed it, approximately 2 or 3 weeks before it occurred. Considerable fear had been expressed, particularly in military circles, concerning the risk of this undertaking. Similar fears were felt by many in the Foreign Office. It was common knowledge in the Foreign Office, however, that Neurath was the only person in government circles consulted by Hitler who felt confident that the Rhineland could be remilitarized without armed opposition from Britain and France. Neurath's position throughout this period was one which would induce Hitler to have more faith in Neurath than in the general run of "old school" diplomats, whom he (Hitler) tended to hold in disrespect.

7. Although Italy did not consult Germany prior to commencement

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of its war against Ethiopia, the Nazi policy makers were pleased with this technique for handling international affairs. They saw also the possibility in this war to draw Italy away from Britain and France toward Germany, as well as the possibility of its undermining the collective security system of the League of Nations. The career officials in the Foreign Office were very much concerned with the possibility of strong sanctions being applied, particularly if the war should be seized as an opportunity to apply pressure on the Fascist dictators. In this conflict, Germany gave assurances that it would assist Italy, economically, to the utmost. This was done in the beginning of the discussions regarding sanctions. I am unfamiliar with the details of the assistance granted, but it is probable that these matters were settled through the German commercial attache in Rome or by means of trade delegations.

8. Plans for annexation of Austria were a part of the Nazi program from the beginning. Italian opposition after the murder of Dollfuss temporarily forced a more careful approach to this problem, but the application of sanctions against Italy by the League, plus the rapid increase of German military strength, made safer the resumption of the Austrian program. When Goering visited Rome early in 1937, he declared that union of Austria and Germany was inevitable and could be expected sooner or later. Mussolini, hearing these words in German, remained silent, and protested only mildly when I translated them into French. The consummation of the Anschluss was essentially a party matter, in which von Papen's role was to preserve smooth diplomatic relations on the surface while the Party used more devious ways of preparing conditions for the expected move. The speech delivered by Papen on 18 Feb. 1938, following the Berchtesgaden meeting, interpreted the Berchtesgaden agreement as the first step toward the establishment of a Central European commonwealth under the leadership of Germany. This was generally recognized in the Foreign Office as a clear phrophecy of a Greater Germany which would embrace Austria. (6202).

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9. The facts stated above are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. This declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion. After reading over this statement I have signed and executed the same at OBERURSEL/Germany this 28 day of November 1945.

(Signed) PAUL OTTO GUSTAV SCHMIDT

PAUL OTTO GUSTAV SCHMIDT

Subscribed and sworn to before me at OBERURSEL/Germany this 28 day of November 1945.

(Signed) ROLF WARTENBERG

ROLF WARTENBERG.
1st Lt, INF.

(6213).

28 Nov. 45.

[redacted]

3309-PS

H1169 - 0046

AFFIDAVIT

STATEMENT OF OTTO MEISSNER.

I, OTTO MEISSNER, being first duly sworn on oath, state :

1. I was Chief of the Presidential Chancellory from 1920 to 1924 under President Ebert; from 1924 to 1934 under President von Hindenburg; and from 1934 to 1945 under Hitler.

2. At the same time Chancellor Bruening took office, the right wing parties, and in particular the National Socialists had been gaining votes in all recent local and regional elections. It was doubtful whether the Reichstag with its strong left wing representations corresponded with the feelings of the German peopl and there consequently existed a serious threat that the National Socialists might come into power nationally. This was a possibility which President von Hindenburg was reluctant to acknowledge. He had fear that Hitler's appointment would lead to domestic oppression of other parties and parts of the population and to difficulties in foreign policies. Everybody knew that the risk of war in the event of Hitler's accession to power was involved in Hindenburg's reticence. Beyond doubt, the dominant theme in Hindenburg's thoughts throughout the period leading up to Hitler's appointment as Chancellor - - and in particular after the period of Bruening's fall - - was the problem of how to handle the National Socialists, in particular whether they could be kept out of power - or, if not, what the conditions were under which they could be admitted to the government. Hindenburg hoped that a right wing coalition government might be formed, in which the Nazi threat would be absorbed. On the other hand Hindenburg feared the possibilty that the Nazis might rise to power by force.

3. The attitude of the Papen cabinet toward the National Socialists was not uniform. Some of the ministers such as Guertner, the Minister of Justice, Schwerin von Krosigk, the Minister of Finance, Freiherr von Braun, the Minister of Food and Agriculture, and, at the beginning, also Schleicher, who had become Reichswehrminister, believed that the correct line would be to draw nearer to the National Socialists with the aim chiefly of taking some National Socialists as ministers into the Reich Government. On the other hand, Papen himself and Freiherr von Gayl, the Minister of the Interior, believed a strictly defensive position was necessary against the Nazis and against the setting up of semi-military formations. Schleicher wavered somewhat between these two viewpoints. It is important for understanding of the events of this period to keep clearly in mind the fact that Papen and Schleicher did not see eye to eye with each other on this question of handling the National Socialists and that, originally Papen was more opposed to giving them power than Schleicher.

4. Hindenburg, at this time, was of the opinion that the National Socialists strength was ephermeral only and would disappear as the economic situation improved. Moreover, he was unwilling to entrust the National Socialists with government and did not change his mind when, in contrast to Papen's hopes and expectations, the elections of July 1932 brought an increase in National Socialist votes.

The first meeting confirming this question between Hindenburg and Hitler occured on the 13 August 1932, following a personal request by Hitler transmitted to me by Hiler's adjutant, Brueckner. This meeting was held in Hindenburg's study, and, aside from Hindenburg and Hitler, only Goering and myself were present. Hitler outlined in a long speech his general ideas and his political aims, emphasizing that he wanted come to power by legal means, discussing at length the domestic reforms he hoped to achieve, as well as declaring a desire to regain Germany's sovereignty in the military field and over the whole extent of German territory. At this conference he stressed explicitly that he wanted to achieve all these aims only by pacific means, through negotiation and persuasion. He stressed repeatedly that in order to achieve these aims and to work successfully he needed to have full power, that he would be unable to carry these plans with coalitions and promises by rival groups. He therefore rejected any division of power with other parties. Hindenburg stated that because of the tense situation he could not in good conscience risk transferring the power of government to a new party, such as the National Socialists, which did not command a majority and which was intolerant, noisy, and undisciplined.

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At this point, Hindenburg, with a certain show of excitement, referred to several recent occurrences - clashes between the Nazis and the police, acts of violence committed by Hitler's followers against those who were of a different opinion, excesses against Jews and other illegal acts. All these incidents had strengthened him in his conviction that there were numerous wild elements in the Party beyond effective control. With regard to foreign policy, Hindenburg stated that conflicts with other states had to be avoided under all circumstances. After extended discussion, Hindenburg proposed to Hitler that he should declare himself ready to co-operate with the other parties, in particular with the right and center and that he should give up the one-sided idea that he must have complete power. In co-operating with other parties, Hindenburg declared, he would be able to show what he could achieve and improve upon. If he could show positive results, he would aquire increasing and even dominating influence even in a coalition government. Hindenburg stated that this also would be the best way to eliminate the videspread fear that a National Socialist government would make ill use of its power and would suppress all other viewpoints and gradually eliminate them. Hindenburg stated that he was ready to accept Hitler and the representatives of his movement in a coalition government, the precise combination to be a matter of negotiation, but that he could not take the responsibility of giving exclusive power to Hitler alone. In his reply, Hitler stated that it was not his intention to place party members in all ministerial jobs and leading positions, but that he would take in experts and experienced civil servants. He was adamant, however, in refusing to put himself in the position of bargaining with the leaders of the other parties and in such manner to form a coalition government. As was announced in the communique following this meeting, Hindenburg and Hitler failed to reach any agreement concerning participation in the government by the Nazis.

In the period which followed Hindenburg had further discussions with Hitler and Goering. Altough Hitler continued to insist on his demands for undivided power and upon his appointment as Chancellor, he made some concessiions insofar as he emphasized repeatedly that he did not intend to give all ministerial positions to members of his party, but would appoint tested experts quite without reference to Party membership, and he would leave the appointment of the Reichswehrminister to Reichs President as Commander in Chief of the Army, and, if the President desired, he would also leave the Foreign Minister von Neurath in his position, as an indication that no fundamental change in foreign policy was intended.

I myself also remain in contact with the National Socialists through Koerner, an intimate friend of Goering's, who later became State Secretary in the Four Year Plan. In general, these negotiations and contacts gave the impression that, although outwardly the National Socialists insisted on their demand for full power, they were nevertheless interested in getting into the government without breaking off all contacts with the Reichs President.

This is not unimportant for understanding the development which led to the replacement of Papen by Schleicher. Hindenburg and Schleicher agreed that Hitler's demand for full power would have to be resisted, but that his inclusion in a coalition government of the Reich, which would be formed on as broad a basis as possible, was desirable and should be aimed at.

The negotiations recounted above and contacts with Gregor Strasser had led Schleicher to the belief that he would be able to achieve this. Papen seemed unsuited to such a task. Dissolution of the Reichstag and new elections had not diminished but only increased the National Socialist poll of votes, and Papen was without support in the Reichstag. He thereupon tended his resignation.

5. Papen's re-appointment as Chancellor by President Hindenburg would have been probable if he had been prepared to take up an open fight against the national socialists, which would have involved the threat or use of force. Almost up to the time of his resignation, Papen and some of the other ministers agreed on the necessity for pressing the fight against Nazis by employing all the resources of the State and relying on Artical 48 of the Constitution, even if this might lead to armed conflict. Other ministers, however, believed that such a course would lead to civil war.

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para 5. cont'd

The decision was provided by Schleicher, who in earlier times had recomended energetic action against the National Socialists - even if this meant the use of police and army. Now, in the decisive cabinet meeting, he abondoned this idea and declared himself for an understanding with Hitler.

The gists of Schleicher's report - which was given partly by himself - partly by Major Ott, who adduced details statistical material - was that the weakened Reichswehr, which was dispersed over the whole Reich, even if supported by civilian volunteer formations, would not be equal to military operations on alarge scale, and was not suited and trained for civil war. The police, in particular the Prussian police, had been undermined by propaganda and could not be considered as absolutely reliable. If the Nazis began an armed revolt, one must anticipate a revolt of the Communist and a general strike at the same time. The forces of these two adversaries were very strong. If such a war against two fronts should take place, the forces of the State would undoubtedly be disrupted. The outcome of a civil war would be at the least most uncertain.

In his, Schleicher's view, it was impossible to take the risks implied in such a policy. In case of failure, which he believed likely, the consequences for Germany would be terrible. All present in the cabinet meeting were deeply impressed by Schleicher's statement, and even those who Had been in favour of energetic action against the National Socialists now change their mind, so that Papen felt himself isolated.

In the interview which Papen had with Hindenburg after this meeting on November 17th, 1932, Papen did not conceal his deep disappointment over Schleicher's altered position. Although Hindenburg asked him to make a new attempt to form a government, Papen stood on his decision to resign and Hindenburg gave in.

6. The weakening of Schleicher's position as Chancellor is best understood by referring to the foregoing review of the situation which led to hie elevation to that position - namely, the fact that Papen was dismissed because he wanted to fight the National -Socialists and did not find in the Reichswehr the necessary support for such a policy, and the fact that Schleicher came to power because he believed he could form a government which would have the support of the National-Socialists. When it became clear that Hitler was not willing to enter Schleicher's cabinet and that Schleicher on his part was unable to split the National-Socialists Party, as he had hoped to do with the help of Gregor-Strasser, the policy for which Schleicher had been appointed Chancellor was shipwrecked. Schleicher was aware that Hitler was particularly embitted against him because of his attempt to break up the Party, and would never agree to co-operate with him. So now he had changed his mind and decided to fight against the Nazis - which meant that he now wanted to persue the policy which he had sharply opposed a few weeks before, when Papen had suggested it. Schleicher came to Hindenburg therefore with a demand for emergency powers as a necessary prerequisite of action against the Nazis. He deemed also to be necessary the dissolution, and even temporary eliminations, of the Reichstag, which was to be done by decrees of the President on the basis of Article 48 - the transformation of his government into a military dictatorship, and a government to be carried on generally on the basis of Article 48.

Schleicher first made these suggestions to Hindenburg in the middle of January 33 but Hindenburg at once evinced grave doubts as to its constitutiionlity. In the meantime Papen had returned to Berlin, and through arrangements with Hindenburg's son, had had several interviews with the President. When Schleicher renewed his demand for emergency powers, Hindenburg declared that he was unable to give him such a blank check and must reserve for himself decisions on every individual case. Schleicher, for his part, said that under these circumstances, he was unable to stay in government and tended his resignation on 28th January 1933.

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Para 7. In the middle of January, when Schleicher was first asking for emergency powers, Hindenburg was not aware of the contact between Papen and Hitler, - particularly the meeting which had taken place in the house of the Cologne banker, Kort von Schroder. In the second part of January, Papen played an increasingly important role in the house of the Reichs president, but in spite of Papen's persuasions, Hindenburg was extremely hesitant - until the end of January - to make Hitler chancellor. He wanted to have Papen as chancellor once more. Papen finally won him to Hitler with the argument that the representatives of the other right wing parties which would belong to the Government would restrict Hitler's freedom of action. In addition Papen expressed his misgiving that, if the present opportunity should again be missed, a revolt of the National Socialists and civil war were likely.

Many of Hindenburg's personal friends, such as Oldenburg - Januschau, worked in the same direction as Papen, also General von Blomberg. The President's son and adjutant, Oskar von Hindenburg, was opposed to the Nazis up to the last moment. The turning point which changed his mind came at the end of January. Then, at the suggestion of Papen, a meeting had been arranged between Hitler and Oskar von Hindenburg in the house of Ribbentrop. Oskar von Hindenburg asked me to accompany him, and we took a taxi, in order to keep the appointment secret, and drove out to Ribbentrop's house. When we arrived we found a large company assembled; among these present were Goering and Frick.

Oskar von Hindenburg was told that Hitler wanted to talk to him under four eyes, and as Hindenburg had asked me to accompany him, I was somewhat astonished that he accepted this suggestion and disappeared in another room for a talk which lasted quite a while - about an hour. What Hitler and Oskar von Hindenburg discussed during this talk I do not know.

In the taxi on the way back Oskar von Hindenburg was extremely silent, and the only remark which he made was that it could not be helped - the Nazis had to be taken into the Government. My impression was that Hitler had succeeded in getting him under his spell. I may add the amusing fact that early next morning Schleicher telephoned and asked me what had been discussed with Hitler the evening before; this shows that all our precautions to keep the matter secret had been of no avail.

For a very long time I had taken a distinctly negative attitude toward the accession of Hitler to power and up to the end did nothing to dispell the doubts which the Reich's President felt about the wisdom of making Hitler Chancellor. (I had an exchange of letters with Hitler about this, which were published in the papers of the press.) I want also to add that I was eliminated from these negotiations by Papen, who negotiated with the Reich's President under four eyes and who barely kept me informed about his discussions with the Reich President and his negotiations with Hitler and Goering. This was in distinct contrast to the way in which on previous occasions governments had been formed, - as, for example, at the time of Bruening's dismissal, when Hindenburg Schleicher and I spent considerable time going over various names suggested as possible candidates for the position as Chancellor before the name of Papen was definitely decided upon. In view of this difference, what I know now in regard to the last manoeuvres to place Hitler in office comes from the Reich President himself.

8. I also had no part in Pap n's negotiations on the personnel which should compose the new government. Only after this issue had been settled did I receive the list and the order to write out the formal documents of appointments and to prepare the swearing of the Chancellor and of the new Reich's ministers. On the other hand, when I saw that despite his hesitations Hindenburg had decided to accept Papen's proposals, I gave up my opposition.

9. The facts stated above are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. This declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion. After reading over this statement I have signed and executed the same at OBERURSEL/Germany this 28 day of November 1945.

(Signed) _____
OTTO MEISSNER

Subscribed and sworn to before me at OBERURSEL/Germany this 28 day of November 1945.

(Signed)._____

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(Excerpt)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3312-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Das Archiv, Vol. 48, page 1614, SI 133.38

"In appreciation of his valuable cooperation the Führer made Ambassador Franz von Papen a member of the NSDAP and bestowed upon him the GOLDEN HONOR BADGE of the Party."

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 3312-PS

10 December 1945

I, Gerhart H. Seger, Civ., D 258957, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document No. 3312-PS.

GERHART H. SEGER,
Civilian,
D 258957

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3319-PS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Foreign Office
Inf. XIV

Anti-Jewish action abroad
Number 137 secret
1 enclosure

Berlin, April 28th, 1944
Am Karlsbad 8

SECRET

Subject: Anti-Jewish action in foreign countries.

In conjunction with wired circular (Drahterlass) Multex number 196 of February 17th, 1944.

To the German Embassy in Ankara, Madrid, Paris the Office of the Reich Plenipotentiary for Italy, Fasano
the German Legation in Agram, Bern, Budapest, Bukarest, Helsingfors, Lisbon, Sofia, Stockholm
the Office of the Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark in Kopenhagen
the German Consulate General Tangiers
the Athens Office of the Special Pleniptentiary of the Foreign Office for the Southeast
the Belgrad Office of the Special Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Office for the Southeast
the Office of the Foreign Office in Brussels
the Representative of the Foreign Office with the staff of the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Dutch territories in The Hague.
the V.A. at the Reich Commissioner Eastland in Riga

- each separatily -

1. The Reich Foreign Minister has ordered the creation of the Inf. Stelle XIV (Anti-Jewish action abroad under the leadership of the Envoy I.K. SCHLEIER. Its task is to deepen and to strengthen the anti-Jewish information in foreign countries.
This will be done by the collection of all experts of the departments and working units of the Foreign Office who are interested and take part in the anti-Jewish information in foreign countries. It will also be done in close cooperation with all offices which are engaged with anti-Jewish work, but are outside the Foreign Office, and with German missions in Europe.

Besides the co-workers who are directly assigned to the Inf.-Stelle XIV:

Commercial political department
Cultural political department,
News- and press department,
Radio political department,
Inland II
America - Committee,
England - Committee,
Deputy for the information system,
furthermore
one permanent representative of the Reich Main Security Office
one representative of the Office of Reichsleiter Rosenberg and the provisional Director of the Institute for the Research of the Jewish problem, Frankfurt.

It is intended that other offices engaged or interested in anti-Jewish work will also send permanent representatives to Inf. XIV.

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2. It is necessary for the execution of the task charged to Inf. XIV that the missions send on all material available to them, about Jewish or anti-Jewish occurrences as completely as possible and by the quickest means. Not only material from the concerned country is wanted, but special emphasis must also be put on the procurement of documents which concern the countries with whom Germany is at war. This material must and can be procured almost exclusively via neutral countries.

The material collected at Inf. XIV will be edited in an appropriate way and will be put at the disposal of the missions for the best and greatest possible utilization.

It is the duty of the missions to make use of the material they receive in any and every possible way:

as basis for discussions for the members of the mission,
in the press,
in the radio of the country concerned, with measures which are at the disposal of the current information (Aktiv-Information).

3. Individual reports about certain incidents of Jewish or anti-Jewish nature which come in from foreign countries will be forwarded by Inf. XIV to the departments of the office which are concerned with suitable suggestions for the purpose of further propagation.

The press department utilizes this material as much as possible in the news agency reports, such as the German News Bure (DNB), TO-EP and National Press Service (NPD).

The radio political department utilizes the reports in German and foreign language news broadcasts directed to foreign countries.

It is the task of the press and radio consultants of the missions to check all material coming in to them in order to find out, whether there are any anti-Jewish reports and whether and how these might be utilized in the press and in the radio of their respective country.

Inf. XIV will draw the special attention of the missions to reports where special emphasis is put on their propagation; this will be done from time to time by wired circular.

Besides these current news reports over press and radio, the mission will, from time to time, receive a collection of the material which comes in from all missions and which has a certain value and possibility for utilisation, beyond the present moment.

Besides reports about actual individual incidents, the missions will currently receive documents from Inf. XIV on certain subjects, either as unfinished documents or as finished comments and articles. This material is also to be utilized in the best possible way.

The missions are asked to report soon, how many copies of the material they want to receive each time, so that the material leaving by courier will be sent off from the beginning with the number of copies which are necessary for the practical work of the missions.

4. Current reports are to be made about the practical utilization of the material in foreign countries; corroborating documents are to be enclosed, as far as this is possible.
Special value is placed by the Reich Foreign Minister on this way of reporting.

5. In order to collect within the missions all questions connected with the anti-Jewish action in foreign countries, a member of the mission is to be appointed consultant for Jewish questions; however, this should not

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be the consultant for culture, if possible.
(Compare wired circular Multex number 1936 of February 17th.)

A wored report is requested as to who has finally been appointed consultant for Jewish questions of the mission. It is the task of the consultants for Jewish questions to put the material which arrives from Inf. XIV at the disposal of all those consultants of the missions who might be able to utilize it; furthermore, to take care of the collecting of the Jewish or anti-Jewish material in the domain of the mission and conveying it to Inf. XIV; as well as to supervise the collection and conveying of the reports and documents about the execution, and/or success to Inf. XIV.

6. An archive will be created at Inf. XIV, where all documents about Jewish and anti-Jewish happenings which are within reach of the Foreign Office and of the missions will be received, collected, and evaluated, according to plan.

It is a special duty of the missions to convey the complete material collected in their office district to the archive. Details about the material to be collected can be taken from the enclosure. Of course, the material collected in the archive is also to be utilized for the purposes of the missions. On the basis of the documents, Inf. XIV will send to the missions from time to time, evaluation reports about individual personalities or incidents.

7. Financial means necessary for the procurement of Jewish or anti-Jewish material must be taken from the funds put at the disposal of the missions.

8. The missions are asked to inform the consular authorities under them appropriately and to incorporate them into the work.

signed STEENGRACHT

Enclosure to decree number 137
(secret) of 28 April, 1944, Inf. XIV

Jewish and anti-Jewish archive of the Foreign Office.
(Inf. XIV, anti-Jewish action abroad)

I. The archive is organized in the following way:
1) Personnel archive: containing all documents about Jewish and anti-Jewish personalities, including articles and reproductions of speeches of these circles of persons.
2) Archive of objects: containing all incidents concerning the Jewish question, asserted according to individual incidents. The reports of the missions about the Jewish question and about anti-Jewish measures in the individual countries belong here; reports or documents about certain individual questions, for instance
Jews in economy,
Jews in cultural life,
Palestine White-book, and similar things.
3) Pictorial archive:

II. The following material may be used for this archive:
From the press: All newspaper- and agency reports (the latter even then if not utilized in the press) about all incidents of Jewish and anti-Jewish nature.
Speeches of Jews and antisemites. General articles and reports about Jews. National measures against the Jews and against antisemites. Jewish newspapers and magazines. Anti-Jewish newspapers and magazines. Comic papers with anti-Jewish tendencies.
Pictures: Photographs (if possible, original copies with glossy surface, but reproductions from newspapers, magazines, and books, too, if necessary of Jews and antisemites. Photographs about incidents of Jewish and

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anti-Jewish nature (Jewish manifestations, celebrations etc, anti-Jewish manifestations, demonstrations and others).

Radio: Listening reports of the national sender of the country concerned, as far as they touch Jewish or anti-Jewish incidents.

Cultural politics: All magazines, books, posters, leaflets, stickers with Jewish and anti-Jewish tendencies.

Discussions of Jewish and anti-Jewish books and movie pictures, Jewish or anti-Jewish quotations from the literature of the concerned country with exact specification from which book and from which spot these quotations have been taken.

Besides these sources which are the most important ones for the procurement of material for the archive, the following might be taken into consideration:

Notes of members of the missions, of other Reich Germans and of foreigner about discussions which are about Jewish or anti-Jewish personalities or incidents; reports of other offices to which the missions have access about such occurrences.

Procurement of personal statements of Jewish and anti-Jewish personalitie (complete life history, if possible). Incidents about Jews in the economical l life of the country concerned.

Provided it is possible and not connected with special expenses, it is requested to send in the material in at least two copies.

However, reports and notes of the missions are to be sent in five-fold, so that the necessary working copies can be forwarded to the interested departments without any further loss of work and time.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT
Cont'd. 3319-PS

Foreign Office
Inf. XIV
Anti-Jewish Action Abroad
No. 73/44

Berlin W 8
Wilhelmstr. 74-76.
March 4, 1944.
"Receipt stamp)
:"German Legation":
: 17 March 1944" :

SUBJECT: Work conference of Consultants for Jewish questions and Aryanization advisers.

By direction of the Reich Foreign Minister (RAM), a work conference of the consultants for Jewish questions and Aryanization advisers will be held at Krummhübel i. Rsgbg. at the beginning of April. The following messages have been wired to those missions to which no Aryanization consultant of the Reich Security Main Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt) has been assigned:

On Feb. 17, 1944:

"In accordance with a special order, anti-Jewish information program abroad is to be strengthened by every means. For clarification of all questions connected with procurement of material and utilization of information, the holding of a work conference has been ordered. This will be arranged in collaboration with the RSHA, probably for 3 and 4 April. Place of conference will follow.

Request reply by wire as to which specialist there, who is familiar with the Jewish question in that country, will be sent to the conference.

Schleier."

And on Feb. 26, 1944:

"With reference to wireless directive dated 17 Feb., Multex No. 196.

Expert on Jewish questions must be prepared to give a brief report to the conference, lasting not over 10 to 12 minutes, on the effect of the anti-Jewish information program abroad thusfar, possibilities for their intensification, possibilities for procurement and distribution of material, and to offer, as well, suggestions and proposals for the further work.

It is intended to exhibit during the work conference from 3 to 4 April as complete a display as possible of anti-Jewish propaganda material from all to the countries of Europe. It is therefore requested that a complete collection of all anti-Jewish propaganda material to be found in that country, whether of local, German, or other origin, be sent to Inf. XIV, before 25 March. This includes books, periodicals, brochures, posters, handbills, stickers, post-cards and the like.

Schleier."

To the German
Legation in Bucharest
(Trans. note-at bottom of p. 1).

The Aryanization consultant at the local mission will be invited directly to the RSHA to participate in the conference.

It is requested that the Aryanization consultant be notified of the contents of the two wireless messages quoted above, that all material available there on the Jewish question be placed at his disposal, and that he be informed of all desiderata, proposals and suggestions for the intensification of the anti-Jewish information service abroad, so that he will be in a position to give a brief report at the conference.

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I should like to request that the material needed for the exhibit planned for the conference be dispatched in time to be at Information Office XIV by 25 March at the latest.

By direction

(Signed) v. Thadden

(Illegible initials)

Foreign Office
Inf. XIV
No. 118/44
1 Enclosure

(Receipt stamp:)
:German Legation:
:Bucharest :
:3 May 1944 :
:No. 2803 :

Berlin W 8
Wilhelmstr. 74-76
20 April, 1944

Contents: Work conference of specialists for Jewish questions of the German missions on 3 and 4 April 1944.

There is enclosed for your information a copy of the minutes of the work conference of the consultants for Jewish questions of the missions which was held at Krummhübel on 3 and 4 April of this year. On account of their secret nature, the statements made by Counselor of Legation v. Thadden and SS Hauptsturmführer Ballensiefen of the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) have not been entered in the minutes.

In accordance with Multex No. 246 of 28 Feb. 1944, most of the missions sent in for the conference, sometimes with request for their return, collection of anti-Jewish propaganda material from the countries concerned, such as books, periodicals, posters, handbills, etc. It is planned not to return this material, but, rather, to include it in the comprehensive Jewish archives that are being built up and that are also at the disposal of the missions. The archives are being set up in Krummhübel in order to insure their safety from war damage. In view of the importance to the anti-Jewish information work of a complete collection of all pertinent material, it is requested that the return of the material furnished by your office be dispensed with.

(Signed) (Schleier)

To
German Embassy, Ankara
Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Greater German Reich for Italy in Pasano
German Embassy, Madrid
German Embassy, Paris
German Legation, Lisbon
German Legation, Bratislava
German Legation, Sofia
German Legation, Stockholm
German Legation, Zagreb
German Legation, Bern
German Legation, Bucharest
German Legation, Copenhagen

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Confidential

Work-session of the consultants on Jewish questions of the German missions in Europe

KRUMMHÜBEL, 3 and 4 April 1944.

Greetings by ambassador Prof. Dr. SIX, who gives the chairmanship to ambassador SCHLEIER. In his opening-speech he deals with the tasks and aims of the anti-Jewish action abroad. Ambassador Schleier points to the faith of the Führer in the racial principle of the people. This means repudiation of all foreign influences, and therefore the fight of National Socialism against the disintegrating and destructive activity of Jewry.

The hatred of Jewry for us was the result of this fight. Ambassador Schleier commemorates the first victims of the fight of international Jewry against the German people, Wilhelm GUSTLOFF and Ernst v. RATH. That fight represents a considerable part of the great struggle of the German people. The Führer therefore gave instructions to take up the fight against Jewry at an intensified rate and to explain it's part in the present war. He said, that roots of anti-Jewish tendencies existed in England and America.

The question was, what possibilities existed for the European German Missions for the conduct of anti-Jewish activity. The work to be done would have to take place from the inside to the outside and vice-versa. Reports about the behaviour of Jewry in the country in question and about existing anti-Jewish tendencies in the country, would be necessary. Anti-Jewish propaganda in neutral countries was particularly difficult, but of the utmost importance, as there were possibilities that they might spread from there to England or America. The neutral countries, though, were also important as observation-posts. Press-excerpts, radio reports, notes about events in enemy countries and the Jewish camp, which are reported by subjects of the host-countries, as well as beginnings of anti-Jewish tendencies must be carefully collected and registered. Those reports must include all the spheres of life, which are influenced by the Jews.

This material would be collected and worked out by "Inf. XIV" and then handed over to the missions for exploitation through the press and radio, by handbills, pamphlets and through the channels of whispering-propaganda. The publication would be done by the Press, Radio and Culture-political department.

Ambassador Schleier then developed a few concrete projects. So, for instance, the idea was being entertained, to organize a travelling exhibition on rails or motorized. He planned, furthermore the publication of an anti-Jewish sheet-calendar, particularly for the States of South-Eastern Europe, as well as the creation of a great archive about all the problems of the Jewish question from the personal and factual view-point, which was to be accompanied by a collection of pictures.

Ambassador SIX speaks then about the political structures of world-Jewry, which he explains as an ideological and historical result of social development since the French revolution. The figures available in 1933, showed 17,000,000 confessional Jews. The real source of strength of Jewry in Europe and America was the Jewry of the East. It constituted the starting-point of the migration-movement from the European to the American area. Eastern Jewry advanced slowly from the East to the West and showed in that connection not only a religious but also a social inclination. Jewry had ceased to play its biological and at the same time its political role in Europe. Jewy occupied a leading position in the countries of the enemy-powers in their fight against National-Socialism and against the German people. The Jewish question had not been accentuated in Soviet-Russia, we know, however, by experiences made in the conduct of war, that the Jew now as before plays an important part in the hierarchy of Bolshevism.

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Jewish infiltration maintained itself in the Soviet Union.

The second important country in this connection was England. There Jewry played a traditional part. Because of the pluto-cratic structure of England it had been possible to place Jews within the leading class, which influenced to a large extent the policy of the leading class during the 19th century. That inter-relation step was an important factor for the evaluation of the present situation.

The co-operation of English and American Jewry played a decisive part at the outbreak of the war. There are about 7,000,000 Jews in the United States. Their position was founded on an economic basis. The democratic ideology proved to be fertile soil for the progressive influence of Jewry. The strong Jewish infiltration into the leading classes of the 3 powers fighting against Germany, was a factor of the greatest importance.

Ambassador SIX turns then to Zionism. Zionism meant the return of all Jews into their home-land and land of origin, Palestine. The idea was to assemble them there politically and biologically, the whole question of that return was, however, politically overshadowed by the Arabian question. The creation of a homeland (HEIMSTÄTTE) had been promised to the Jews after the war by the Balfour-declaration of 1917. The Jewish element had spread itself in Palestine at the cost of the Arabs.

The physical elimination of Eastern Jewry would deprive Jewry of its biological reserves. It's present structure was characterized by it's association with the three World-Powers. That association became obvious in the Soviet-Union through the ideological combination of Jewry and Bolshevism in England by the penetration of the leading class and in the United States by the occupation of decisive key-positions in high-finance. The Jewish question must be solved not only in Germany but also internationally.

Embassy-counsellor v. THADDEN speaks about the Jewish-political situation in Europe and about the state of the anti-Jewish, executive measures. The speaker gave an outline why the Zionist Palestine solution or other similar solutions must be rejected and the deportation of the Jews to the Eastern-territories, carried out. Then he sketched the present state of anti-Jewish measures in all European countries.

The speaker then relates the counter-measures taken by world-Jewry against the German anti-Jewish measures in Europe.

The talks closed with the following request to the representatives of the missions:

1.) Suppression of all propaganda even camouflaged as anti-Jewish, liable to slow down or handicap the German executive measures.

2.) Preparation for the comprehension among all nations of executive measures against Jewry.

3.) Constant reports about the possibility of carrying out more severe measures against Jewry in the various countries by using diplomatic channels.

4.) Constant reports about signs of opposition actions by world-Jewry, in order to enable us to take counter-measures in time.

(As the details of the state of the executive measures in the various countries, reported by the consultant, are to be kept secret, it has been decided not to enter them in the protocol.)

SS Captain (Hauptssturmfuehrer) Dr. Ballensiefen, reports about experiences made during the execution of the anti-Jewish measures in Hungary in connection with the political events there.

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Prof. Dr. MAHR, deals in his speech with the anti-Jewish action abroad conducted on the radio. He demands the intermingling of German radio broadcasts to foreign countries with anti-Jewish propaganda-material, as well as the influencing of radio installations of countries near to us or allied with us, in the same spirit; at the same time safeguarding the sovereignty of the countries in question. Good material must be procured for the internal German radio.

Miss Hauhsmann, (Dr.), speaks about the anti-Jewish action abroad in the press and about the importance of press-pictures in the service of the anti-Jewish action abroad. The need of photographs for the press at home and abroad was great. The co-operation of the missions was necessary in the procurement of anti-Jewish pictures. Important was also the discussion of anti-Jewish films in the press. Dr. Hauhsmann then points out the practical possibilities for publicizing anti-Jewish material in the foreign press, in which activity the main weight would have to be borne by the Press-consultants of the missions.

Dr. WALZ, treats current anti-Jewish information. Real peace among the nations was impossible, as long as the Jewish problem was not solved, one way or the other. Information-activity had to take into consideration the prevailing mentality of the nations, which were to be influenced in an anti-Jewish sense. In the case of pamphlets, foreign examples should be initiated. Until now there was lacking an anti-Jewish film, which did not deal with known Jewish personalities, but which treated the little Jewish merchant and the Jewish intellectual in their daily activities.

Embassy-secretary (LS) Dr. KUTSCHER speaks about propaganda-theses within the frame-work of the anti-Jewish action abroad. Every propaganda must be ruled by certain directives. Those theses were to be considered as such directives for the information activity. They had to be adapted to the currently prevailing local circumstances. They were intended for internal use. LS. Dr. Kutscher then formulates a few fundamental principles: The Jews are the instigators of this war. They drove the nations into the war, because they are interested in it. The Jews are the misfortune of all the peoples. - A Jewish victory would mean the end of all culture (Example Soviet Union) - Germany does not only fight the Jews for itself, but for all European culture. - The Jew dug his own grave by causing this war. The aim of those phrases was to bring certain facts to the attention of the people until they were finally convinced of them.

Service leader (Dienstleiter) HAGEMEYER, speaks about the international anti-Jewish congress and it's tasks. His aim was to collect all the European Forces, which had occupied themselves with the Jewish question. The congress must be set up politically. The composition of the guests was a decisive factor. Particular value must be attached to the attendance of European scientists. The speaker asked the missions to help him select the guests, who should be invited to the congress.

Now follow the reports of the representatives of the various missions about the Jewish-political situation in their countries and the possibilities of a.) the procurement of anti-Jewish material, b.) the execution of anti-Jewish information by radio, press, general means of information (pamphlets, posters, leaflets, stickers, post-cards, whispering propaganda) and the exectors of that kind of work.

Dr. Klassen (France) next presents a lengthy historical resume of the development of the Jewish problem and of anti-Semitism in France, and points out differences in the treatment of Jews in the Northern and Southern zones. In the Northern zone steps had been taken toward the Aryanization of Jewish concerns, and Jewish publications had been suppressed. According to French legislation for Jews, Jewish writers and actors were not forbidden to work but they could not own or manage a newspaper or a theater. Jews had vanished from Government positions. An Institute for Jewish Questions was founded in France in 1940. An anti-Jewish exhibition met with great success. Apart

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from a few anti-Semitic clericals, the Catholic Church gave far-reaching support to Jewry in the sense of the democratic ideology. A few anti-Semitic films had a discouraging effect. The film medium should therefore be more widely used. The information activity must stem from the French tradition and be represented as the affair of the French. Useful starting points might be found among the followers of Diat and of French Fascism. The situation in French North Africa was well suited to exploitation.

Dr. Beinert (Spain) reports that in Spain the Jewish question is not regarded as of present consequence from a racial standpoint. After the expulsion of the Jews in the Fifteenth Century, the Jewish question was regarded as a closed historical problem. The scope of anti-Jewish information is very closely limited, therefore. It must not appear as German propaganda and can not appear as a large-scale campaign. It would be effective, on the other hand, to bring to the fore specific, impressive instances, especially with reference to economic aspects.

Dr. Matthias (Portugal), too, stresses the difficulties faced by anti-Jewish information activity in Portugal. There is no Jewish problem, in our sense of the term, in Portugal. For one thing, the migration of the Jews from central Europe, which began before 1933 and was particularly strong after 1933 and during the French Campaign, did not essentially alter the picture in Portugal, since Portugal was primarily merely a country of transit for the Jewish emigration. Secondly, the original Jewish problem, that is to say, the difficulties that resulted from immigration of Jews into Portugal in very early times, found its solution, in the course of centuries, in a way that does not represent a clearing up of the Jewish problem in our sense, but that wiped out the traces of Jewry as a racial component of the people.

The procurement of anti-Jewish material from the U.S.A. would be possible, but involved high costs.

Vice Consul Dr. Janke (Switzerland) points out that while the majority of all Swiss are anti-Semitic by healthy instinct, there is lacking a realization of the actuality of the Jewish question. The influence of Jews is much less than in the other countries under democratic-plutocratic regimes. An anti-Jewish information activity would have to be handled with great care and without revealing its German origin, in order not to challenge the severe statutory restrictions and evoke mistrust of Germany. The sharp censorship, also, must be taken into account. For this reason, the work must be camouflaged. Possibilities to be considered are anti-Jewish tracts, which should be constantly altered in format; also the exploitation of Jewish scandals, compilation of a list of all Jewish persons playing a leading role in the enemy countries, and the spreading of jokes about Jews. The inviting of Swiss personalities to attend the anti-Jewish congress would meet with difficulties.

Consul Dr. Meissner recommends, in connection with the anti-Jewish information work in Italy, exposure of the strong Jewish participation in illegal transactions (black market, sabotage, etc.) stating that, for the rest, the activity should appeal to Italian intelligence and should have a serious basis. It might be effective to publish an illustrated pamphlet objectively presenting Jewry as the catalytic agent of decay. Consideration could be given to Preziosi and Farinacci for an invitation to the congress.

Mr. Delbrueck (Sweden) points out the difficulties of anti-Jewish information activity in Sweden. There had been no Jewish problem in this country before the campaign against the Jews in Denmark and the resultant heavy migration of Jews to Sweden. The Jewish immigration had led, however, to a reaction of distaste. It could therefore be taken as the starting point for anti-Jewish information activity. Care would have to be taken, certainly, to avoid in this anything that would smack of German propaganda. Only a few pro-German newspapers were available. Anti-Semitic propaganda literature must be printed in Sweden exclusively. Placards could not be used because there are no organizations at hand for it. Nor could postcards with anti-Jewish witticisms be used. No anti-Semitic propaganda could be made over

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Swedish radio. The participation of fanatic idealists in the congress was entirely feasible.

Mr. Christensen (Denmark) states that the collection of material is possible now without more ado. Pictorial material could be obtained from the Royal Library in Copenhagen. As concerns information activity, the press can be used for "press release" ("Auflageartikel") articles. This would make it however obvious, that it was German propaganda material. The propaganda in Denmark must be carried out by the Danes and not by a central German agency.

Mr. Weilinghaus (Rumania) reports that the Jewish question in Rumania has been approached only from the economic and the general political standpoint, with the racial and ideological aspects consistently neglected. The Rumanian Government is taking a cautious attitude toward the Jewish question. It depends a great deal upon the military situation. It is therefore necessary for us to proceed cautiously with our work. The Rumanian Government has informed us that propagandistic handling of the Jewish question would be undesirable. So that the whispering campaign remains our chief tool. Because anti-Jewish articles are not accepted by the rest of the press "Porunca Vremii" remains our only anti-Semitic organ. The material used in this newspaper is then printed separately in a large number of copies for distribution. There is, in addition, the possibility of falling back on old material that was approved before the more stringent censorship provisions went into effect. Finally, articles could be introduced in the provincial press, since the provincial censorship officials are generally less alert. The anti-Bolshevist propaganda which the Rumanians desire and support, furnishes an effective opportunity to it. In view of the present political situation, the speaker (Referent) does not recommend, for the present, the issuing of an invitation to Rumanians to attend the anti-Jewish congress.

Superior Govt. Councillor (Ob. Reg. Rat) Dr. Hoffmann (Bulgaria) declares that the procurement of anti-Jewish material is entirely feasible. The information activity could not be based on ideological grounds. Bulgarians should be approached in regard to the Jewish question by appealing to their acquisitive instinct and their nationalist feeling. The Bulgarian Government has adopted a completely loyal attitude in the Jewish question. It is to be made clear to the Bulgarians that the Bulgarian Jews have no understanding of Bulgarian aspirations. The radio can be utilized to a limited extent. Leaflets should not arouse suspicion by too exaggerated a format. It is recommended that Sobranje deputy Andrejeff be invited to the congress.

Mr. Korselt (Slovakia) emphasizes that the anti-Jewish information activity can be continued only after resumption of the measures against racial Jews (Rassejuden), since otherwise the people would get the impression that the government was acting inconsistently. The anti-Jewish and anti-Bolshevist campaigns of enlightenment must be combined.. Anti-Semitism must be employed to counteract the well-advanced Pan-slavism, by pointing out that not the Slav, but the Jew rules Russia. To the Slovak intellect the Jew appears as an intelligent and congenial representative of urban life. As a countermeasure, the international ramifications of Jewry must be demonstrated by means of convincing statistics and factual reports. It would seem to the purpose to depict the Jews in moving pictures and in children's literature. There is a possibility that a representative may be sent to the congress.

Mr. Posemann (Turkey): Early last year the Turkish Government carried out a blow against the Jews in connection with an attempt to solve the problem of minorities. Very vigorous procedures were used in the carrying out of this action. Suspicions of Allied circles that anti-Jewish measures alone were concerned were countered by Turkey with references to simultaneous measures against the minorities. At any rate, Turkey abandoned further measures towards a solution of the problem of minorities and therewith of the Jewish problem. For this reason, no anti-Jewish propaganda can be carried on under our direction at the present moment, since it is not desired and would be a burden on Turkey's present foreign policy. There are no anti-Jewish publications in Turkey, aside from carvicatures and comic books about Jews. A dawning realization of

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the extent of international Jewish domination can be seen in the translation of the "Protocol of the Elders of Zion" and of Ford's book, The International Jew. The marketing of these brochures and their distribution has been promoted by the Embassy. For the time being, only work within this narrow range is possible, since, as has already been emphasized, anti-Jewish propaganda that was obviously German-inspired might give rise to unfavorable political complications for us. In closing, Mr. Posemann made reference to the increasing difficulty with which any foreign propaganda could be introduced into Turkey. It was entirely out of the question that a leading Turkish personage would take part in the projected international congress.

In conclusion Dr. Schickert discussed the topic, "Science and the Jewish Question". Propaganda alone, he said, was not enough. One must bring out facts that are not generally known. The Jewish problem must become, in its full seriousness and depth, a subject for discussion in polite circles. This was dependent upon a scientific treatment of the Jewish question. It is necessary that scientists abroad be influenced in that direction.

After the representatives of the missions had presented their reports, Minister Schleier gave a resume of the results of the work conference, making special reference again to the question of procurement of material and to the work of the experts on Jewish questions attached to the missions as distributors of material to the representatives of press, radio, education, politics and business. It was important for the work of Inf. XIV that all speeches and expressions of opinion of a fundamental nature concerning the Jewish problem be brought together. Such collected material must also include, among other things, anti-Jewish comic papers, photographs of Jewish personalities, pictures of events and publications and pictures of Jewish life. A regular reporting of success achieved and tasks accomplished was indispensable to assure control of the work and to stimulate it constantly. As concerned the anti-Jewish international world congress, the specialists on Jewish questions (Referenten) would soon have to make up their minds about the question of inviting official and prominent representatives. A study should be made of the advisability of inviting outstanding foreign personages living in Germany.

Some words addressed to the specialists on Jewish questions:

Prof. Mahr suggests that duplicates of handbooks and reference books be obtained and sent to Krummhübel for the projected archives. He recommends, further, the addition of lists of Freemasons of high degree, journalists, writers and business men who had Jewish relatives. Finally, he urges publication of a diplomatic handbook of Jewish world politics, which might also be published in the English and French languages. Consul Meissner alludes to the Jewish problem in Japan and East Asia, referring particularly to the numerous German Jews in Shanghai, and Minister Schleier adds a few supplemental observations and corrections. Legation Counsellor v. Thadden expresses three wishes to the missions: a) in making reports on the Jewish question, proper limits should be observed, b) reports are of no value unless they specify names and places, c) in regard to delivery of materials, all special desires must be made know. Vice Consul Janke expresses the wish that the list proposed by Prof. Mahr be limited to England, the U.S.A., and the Soviet Union. He also brings up the question of financing the anti-Jewish information work abroad. Mr. Hagemeyer desires to support the setting up of the lists, in particular with regard to the Soviet Union. SS-Hauptsturmführer Ballensiefen suggests that the lists be supplemented by the inclusion of Jewish organizations. Mr. Posemann requests that anti-Jewish reports relative to Turkey be very carefully handled in the German press, in order not to break any political porcelain. Mr. Richter makes reference to the Union of South Africa and Australia as sources of material. Vice Consul Janke refers to the influence of Jews upon the International Red Cross in Geneva.

Minister Schleier speaks the final words and brings the conference to a close with a Siegheil! to the Führer.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT
CONT'D 3319-PS

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PARTIAL TRANSLATION

Inf. XIV

Anti-Semitic Work Abroad

WORKING CONFERENCE

of the Specialists for Jewish Questions with German Diplomatic Mission in Europe on 3 and 4 April 1944

in Hotel Sanssouci, at Krummhuebel (Rio Engoeirhe Mountains)

(Tel.: 394 and 395)

- - -

Daily Agenda

3 April:

6900 hours Minister Prof. Dr. Six:

Welcome

Minister Schleier, head of Inf. XIV:

Opening of the conference

Mission and goals of anti-Semitic work in foreign countries

Minister Prof. Dr. Six:

The political structure of World Jewry.

Legation Councillor Dr. v. Thaeden:

The political situation in Europe with regard to the Jewish question; a survey of the current position with regard to anti-Semitic governmental measures.

(Marginal note: HPTSTF. Ballenstein)

Prof. Dr. Maehr:

Anti-Semitic work in foreign countries by radio

Dr. (Miss) Haussmann:

a) Anti-Semitic work in foreign countries through newspapers

b) Newspaper photographs as a means of anti-Semitic work in foreign countries

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Dr. [illegible]:

Information about anti-Semitic activity

Superior Legation Councillor (VLR) T[illegible]r

Economies and anti-Semitic work abroad

(Note of translator: this item has been crossed out)

Legation Secretary Dr. [illegible]:

Propaganda theses within the scope anti-Semitic work abroad

Dr. Colin Ross:

Anti-Semitic work abroad and in America

Dr. [illegible]:

Anti-Semitic work abroad and Great Britain

(Note of translator: the last two items have been crossed out)

Chief of Service (Dienstleiter) H[illegible]:

The international anti-Semitic Congress and its mission.

1300 hours ..... Breakfast together

1530 hours ..... Reports of the Specialists for Jewish

Questions with diplomatic mission about the possibilities of

a) procuring anti-Semitic propaganda material

b) carrying out anti-Semitic propaganda via radio, newspapers, general [illegible] of propaganda (pamphlets, posters, leaflets, stickers, post cards, rumor propaganda), and the agents for carrying out this work.

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Country: Name:

France ..... Lr. [illegible] l a s s e n

Spain ..... Mr. J u r e t s c h k e

(Note of translator: above are crossed out, and the following hand-written notation substituted: "Seinert, Head (?) of the German Labor Front, Madrid")

Portugal..... Lr. [illegible] t t h i e ,

Switzerland... Vice-Consul Dr. J a n k e

Italy..... Consul Lr. [illegible] e i s [illegible] n e r

Sweden..... Dr. [illegible] e l b r u e c k

Denmark..... Dr. V o [illegible] l e r

(Note of translator: above name crossed out and "Christiansen" substituted)

Rumania..... Dr. [illegible] e i l l i n g h a u

Bulgaria .... SS-Obersturmbannführer [illegible] i e r m a n n

(Note of translator: above name crossed out and "O.K.H. Hoffmann" substituted)

Croatia..... Prof. Dr. [illegible] [illegible] a (President of the German Scientific Institute)

Slovakei .... Dr. [illegible] o r [illegible] e l t

Turkey..... Dr. P o s [illegible] a n n

April:

0830 hours .....

Movie:

a) Wochenschau

b) Les Corrupteurs

(Place of movie shows will be announced later !)

immediately afterwards
about 1030 hours..... Instruction of anti-Semitic propaganda material mailed by the diplomatic missions in the various countries.

immediately afterwards
about 1130 hours ..... General discussion about the reports delivered the previous day

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Minister Schleier:

Final words and summary of the results of the Working Conference

The afternoon will be available for individual Discussion between the Specialists of the Foreign Office, the guests and the Specialists for Jewish Questions of the Diplomatic Mission.

1900 hours ..... supper together

immediately afterwards ..... correctly get-together

Miss Stein will be available at the hotel to participants in the conference for receiving telephone calls or other communications, and for making telephone calls out of town.

ROSTER OF PARTICIPANTS

I. In charge of the Working Conference:
1) Minister Schleier, head of Inf. III

II. Inf. III:

2) Privy Councillor Leithe-Jasper
3) Prof. Dr. Mahr
4) Ss-Untersturmfuehrer Heuchert
5) Ass.I. Metzinger

III. Representatives of the Departments and Work Sections of the Foreign Office:

Commissioner of Information ..6) Legation Councillor Dr. Kutschner

American Committee..... 7) Dr. Colin Ross
British Committee ..... 8) Dr. Scherber

Germany (Inland) II..... 9) Legation Councillor Dr. v. Thadden

Department for Commercial Policy 10) Superior Legation Councillor (VLR.) Tannenberg

Department for Cultural Policy 11) Minister Dr. Six
12) Dr. Richter
13) Dr. Walz

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Department of Information and Press.. 14) Dr. (Miss
H a u s s m a n n

Department for Broadcasting Policy 15) Dr. A h r e n s
(Note of translator: Above name has been
crossed out and "Prof. Dr. Ahr" substituted)

IV) Representatives of Diplomatic Mission:

Country:	Name:
Bulgaria .....16)	SS-Obersturmbannführer Biermann

(Note of translator: above name has been crossed out and that of Superior Government Councillor (O.R.R.) Hoffmann substituted)

Denmark..... 17) Dr. V o g l e r
(Note of translator: above name has been crossed out and that of Christiansen substituted)

France..... 18) Dr. K l a s e n

Italy..... 19) Consul Dr. Meissner

20) SS-Obersturmbannführer
L o s s h e i m e r

(Note of translator: the above name has been crossed out)

Croatia.....21) Prof. Dr. W a l z (President of the German Scientific Institute)

Portugal ..... 22) Dr. M a t t h i a s

Rumania..... 23) Dr. W e l l i n g h a u s

Sweden..... 24) Dr. D e l b r u e c k

Switzerland..... 25) Vice-Consul Dr. J a n k e

Slovakia..... 26) Dr. K o r e l t

Spain..... 27) Dr. J u r e t s c h k e
(Note of translator: Above name has been crossed out and that of Leinert substituted)

Turkey..... 28) Dr. P o s s e m e y e r

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V The following will participate in the Conference as guests:
(hand-written notation: Inf.(XIV)

29) SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Dr. B a l l e n s i e f e n (of the Reich Main Security Office - Reichssicherheitshauptamt)

30) Chief of Service (Dienstleiter) Hans H e g e n e y e r (Head of the Principal Office "Supra-national Powers with the Commissioner of the Fuehrer for the Supervision of the entire Spiritual and Ideological Training and Education of the NSDAP)

31) Dr. Klaus S c h i c K e r t (Head of the Institute for the Study of the Jewish Question)

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Foreign Office
Cultural political Leader Office (Kult Pol Fu Lt)

~~1136~~ (crossed out) 731g(in pencil) Gen II J

G 771/44 (in pencil)
Berlin, 20 April, 1944

S E C R E T

German Legation
Bukarest
2, May 1944
G 771/44 (in pencil)

(illegible)

(stamped)

We send you the current anti-Jewish information material in the enclosure. The material is partly of an older date, as we originally intended to work on it here from a special point of view. For reasons of expediency, the material is now sent out in the enclosed form; we ask for a suitable evaluation in the corresponding channels. The material will be forwarded regularly in the future.

By order

Richter

May 2nd (in pencil)

To the
German Legation
Bukarest

Richter

To Mr. Geheimrat von Kantran (in pencil)

in this building

Pa/We
I. To the
Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service (SD)
--Attache group--

June 13th 1944

Berlin.
Subject: Decree of the foreign Office concerning anti-Jewish action in foreign countries.
Reference: None.
Enclosure: 1 (attached)

I am enclosing a copy of a decree of the Foreign Office concerning the creation of an information office XIV(anti-Jewish action abroad) and ask you to acknowledge it.

By order:

(illegible signature)

SS-1st Lieutenant
Criminal commissionar

2. To the file

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H1169 - 0069

Foreign Office

Number: Inl II 2777 (in pencil) G1810/93 33/43 (in pencil)

Berlin W8, 12 October, 1943
Wilhelmstreet 74-76

S E C R E T

German Legation
Bukarest
Received: 18 October 1943 (stamped)
Diary Number G 1910/43
Answer--------(illegible

Copy

Sent to the
German Legation
In Bukarest,

---Please acknowledge---

By order:

n.Thadden

The Chief of the Security Police
and of the Security Service(SD)
IV B 4 b-2314/43 secret (82)

S E C R E T

Berlin 23 Sept.1943

Special Delivery Letter
To

a. All (administrative) offices of the state police.

b. The commander of the Security Police , and the security Service, Central Office for the regulation of the Jewish question in Bohemia and Moravia, in Prague.

c. The Commander of the Security Police and of the Security Service, in Prague.

d. The Commander of the Security Police and of the Security Service in the occupied Dutch territories, in the Hague.

e. The commander of the Security Police and of the Security Service for the domain of the Military Commander in France, in Paris.

f. The Deputy of the Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service for the domain of the Military Commander in Belgium and Northern France, In Brussels.

g. The Commander of the Security Police and of the Security Service in Metz.

h. The Commander of the Security Police and of the Security Service in Strassborg.

i. The Commitment Command (Einsatrkommando) Luxembourg. In Luxembourg.

j. The Commander of the Security Police and of the Security Service , in Oslo.

k. The Commander of the Security Police and of the Security Service in the General Government , in Cracow.

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l. The Commander of the Security Police and of the Security Service East (Ostland) in Riga.

m. The Commander of the Security Police and of the Security Service Ukraina in Kiev.

n. The Chief of the Commitment group B, in Smolensk.

o. The Commanders (Kommandeur) of the Security Police and of the Security Service in Carinthia(Kaernten) and Carnicia(Krain) in Veldes.

p. The Commander (Kommandeur) of the Security Police and of the Security Service in Lower Styria, in Marburg.

By was of information

To

a. The Superior SS-and Police Leaders in the Reich and in Bohemia and Moravia.

b. The Superior SS-and Police Leaders with the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Dutch territories. in The Hague.

c. The Superior SS-and Police leader in France, In Paris.

d. The Superior SS-and Police Leader with the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Norwegian territories, in Oslo.

e. The Superior SS-and Police Leader, State Secretary for the Security system, in Cracow.

f. The Superior SS-and Police Leader North (101) in Riga/

g. The Superior SS-and Police Leader Niddle (102), in Minsk.

h. The Superior SS-and Police Leader South (103) in Kiev.

i. The investigator of the Security Police and of the Security Service.

Subject: Treatment of Jews with Foreign citizenship in the sphere of German power.

Reference: Decree of 5 March 1943, wired decree number 53579 of 24 March 1943 and wired decree number 91535 of 18 May 1943- IV B 4 b 2314/43 secret (82)

In agreement with the foreign Office, all Jews who remain in the sphere of German power after the end of the so-called home bringing action (Heimschoffungs ktion) and who have the citizenship of the following countries might now be included in the evacuation measures.

1. Italy
2. Switzerland
3. Spain
4. Portugal
5. Denmark
6. Sweden
7. Finland
8. Hungary
9. Roumania
10. Turkey

Since the evacuation of these Jews to the East cannot yet take place at the present time, a temporary stay is provided in the concentration camp Buchenwald for Male Jews over 14

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years of age and in the concentration camp Ravensbruck for Jewesses as well as children.

The necessary measures are to be carried out on the following dates:

a. For Jews with citizenship immediately,

b. For Jews with Turkish citizenship on 20 October 1943,

c. For Jews with citizenship of other countries mentioned above on 10 October 1943

Roumania
(in pencil on right side)

A special application for protective custody is not requested for the transfer to the concentration camp, but the concentration camp headquarters are to be notified that the transfer to the concentration camp is taking place in the frame of the evacuation measures.

The regulations of the above mentioned decree of 5 March 1943 are in force for the management of the property and for the taking along of baggage.

As far as the evacuation of Jews with foreign citizenship which has already been ordered in the decree mentioned above has not yet been carried out, it is to be made up for immediately.

Concluding I want to point out the fact that Jews who are married to spouses with German or German related (artverwandt) blood are to be excepted from all measures now as before. After the execution of all measures a final report is requested. (latest date November 1st 1943)

Additional remark for the commander of the Security Police and of the Security Service for the occupied Dutch territories:

Attention is drawn to the special regulation of the same day, as far as those Jews in Holland are concerned who have Roumanian citizenship.

By order
signed MULLER

	Foreign Office Inl II 2777Secret (in pencil) Received October 5th 1943 Endorse (/-fold)?? (stamped)
The ReichsfuehrerSS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior (stamped)	Certified: RASENACK (signed) Chancellery Clerk

Inl II 9947 Secret (in pencil)

The Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service
VI B 4 b-2314/43 Secret (82)-----

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H1169 – 0072

Berlin, October 2nd, 1943

To the
Foreign Office
To be delivered to
Legation Counsellor(Legationsrat)
von THADDEN
in Berlin W8
Wilhelmstreet.

Sent with request for acknowledgement:
The individual exemptions which are thought to be necessary by your office will be treated seperately, as agreed with the signer of this in earlier discussions.

By order:
Signed: HUNSCHE

Certified:
ROSENACK
(signed)
Chancellory clerk
Ra

The Reichsfuehrer SS
and Chief of the
German Police
in the Reich ministry
of the Interior
(stamped)

Copy

The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern territories

Berlin W35 Mar, 42
Rauchstr. 17/18

No. I/602/41 Secret
DIII 238

Secret!
Receipt stamp
Foreign Office
D III 260 g
Received 13 Mar. 42

To the
Foreign Office
Berlin W8
Wilhlmstr. 72-76

Subject: Deportation of Rumanian Jews on the Bug.

With reference to the conference with Legationsrat Rademscher and Lieutenant Colonel(Obersturmbannfuehrer) Eichmann and my expert Amtsgerichtsrat Dr. Wetzel, I send you in the enclosure a copy of the agreements of Tighina of 30 Aug 1941 with the request for acknowledgement. I point out especially number 7 of the agreements. I have already taken a position in my letter of 5 Mar. 1942.

By Direction
/s/ Dr. Braeutigam

Seal Authenticated
/s/ signature
Government inspector

Copy
Secret

Enclosure to Gen Qu II/1542/41
Top Secret

COPY

Agreements
about the security, administration, and economic exploitation of territories between
The Dniester and the Bug (Transnistria) and the Bug and the Dnieper(Bug-Dnieper-territory).

The following serve as a basis for the agreements:
The Fuehrer's letter of 14 Aug 41 to Chief of State (Staatschef) ANTONESCU.

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The answering letter of the Chief of State of 17 Aug 41.

The letter of the Chief of the German Army mission to the Royal Rumanian General Staff of 24 Aug 41.

To the mutual German Rumanian Agreements in the town hall at Tighina and the necessity of examining all questions to be treated from the viewpoint of the mutual waging of the war which was emphasized there as an introduction by Major General Hauffe.

1. Determination of Responsibility

The following are responsible:

a. In Transnistria Rumania for security, administration and economic exploitation ; for traffic and communication system see number 3
The decision of the Fuehrer about the new Northern border suggested by Chief of State Marshall Antonescu is to be obtained through diplomatic channels.

b. in the Bug-Dnieper-territory:

Germany for administration and exploitation;
Rumania for security.

2. Rumanian Security Troops

Strength and organization of Rumanian security troops are so measured that the planned missions can be fulfilled. Presumably the following will be employed for this:

One army high command(seat in Transnistria, probably Odessa) 2-3 Corps commands, in any case one of them in Transnistria and one in the Bug-Dneiper territory, some 7 infamtry divisions and 2 cavalry brigades
The tatical employment as well as the entry of the Rumanian security will take place according to the directives of the Commander of Army Group South (Oberbefehlshaber der Heeresgruppe Sued). For this the assignment of the Rumanian billeting environs in the Bug-Dnieper territory by Army Group South is necessary in order to be able to start with preparations for communications lines and quartering.

An exact determination of th Northern border in the Bug-Dnieper territory is not possible because of the operations now under way; the Rumanian occupation will, however generally not be employed north of the line Uman Tescherkasy.

A special agreement about the tactical subordination of the Rumanian security troops in the Bug-Dnieper territory will follow. Fundamentally, however, the Rumanian troops there will be placed under the command of the Rumanian Corps Command with exception of emergency cases in which the local German agencies can requisition the nearest Rumanian troops directly.

The drafting of the civilian population in Transnistria for security-and police service under the supervision of the Rumanians is desired; the units of this civilian police service shall, however if possible not be armed.

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The "German liason command" (DVK) remain as before with the Rumanian command authorities but they remain subordinate to the German Army Mission.

3. Traffic and Communications System in Transnistria.

a. Railroads and inland navigation

Both traffic means are in the first place at the disposal of the mutual operational troops and of the occupation troops and are administered by a German transport commander.

Repair and administration of both traffic means is the affair of the German military agencies who can give responsibility for parts of the rail network to the chief of the Rumanian rail system. The Rumanian agencies will support the German agencies in construction and maintenance of the railroads.

A German transport command for Transnistria will be established in Odessa which will have a Rumanian liason command for the protection of Rumanian interests.

In Odessa, Katowsk and Golta-Perwomajsk German railroad station commands will be established with one Rumanian liaison officer for each.

Single transports demand a report to the Transport command.

The following sections will be put into operation by the Germans:

Balta-Odessa which will be changed to normal guage track by track.
Odessa-Nosanosensk (broad guage)
Balta-Golta (broad guage)
Repair (normal guage) of the sections tiraspol Rasdelnaja and Rybniza-Balta on the part of the Chief of the Rumanian rail system is desired.

A special agreement for the material support for the repair of the Dniester railroad bridge at Tighina will follow

b. Sea transports

Sea transport on the Black Sea unites the allied navies of German and Rumania directly.

c. Highways and bridges

Highways and bridges are maintained by Rumanian Agencies (including protection from snow drifts and ice). The highways important for operations will be made known shortly to the Royal Rumanian General Staff. A special ruling will follow about possible granting of German snow plows. Employment of improvised snow plows and anticipatory Rumanian troops and of the civilian population is necessary. The German Army mission will make its engineering officers available as advisors in all highway and bridge building problems,

d. Telephone communications

Telephone communications are basically to be installed and operated by Rumanian agencies, operations communications are most urgently to be kept in mind. The construction of the line Bacau-Odessa,Nicholajew and Odessa-Otschkow-Nicolajew has

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been determined by a special regulation (Colonel Stenzel--Lt. Col. Etschberger) on 28 Aug 41.

The communication officer of the German Army Mission is avilable for the regulation of mutual communications demands in Transnistria.

A special agreement will follow about possible supply of the Rumanian agencies with copper wire as well as making available a copper line from Chisinau via Balta to the Rumanian corps command in the Cherson u Bug-Dnieper territory.

e. The security of traffic routes and communication lines is the responsibility of the Rumanian occupation troops.

4. Administration and Economic exploitation in Transnistria

The administration in Transnistria will be set up and directed by the Rumanian Chief of administration; he is--in the interest of the mutual conduct of the war--bound in decisive questions b the directives of the military commander in Transnistria.

-- higher German war administration official will be assigned upon request to the Chief of the Rumanian Administration of Transnistria for advice and support.

The economic exploitation of Transnistria is the affair of the Rumanian Agencies. A "liaison agency of the German Armed Forces in Odessa" will be set up for the protection of the demands of the mutual conduct of thewar, the tasks of which are:

a. Care of German Troops in Transnistria for this purpose "German Armed Forces Garrison Commands"-- presumably in Odessa, Katowsk and Golta-Perwomajsk-- will be set up along side of the railroad station commands

b. To support the Rumanian agencies for economic exploitation in the seizure and distrubution of means necessary for mutual operations and to determine mutually the means necessary to conduct the war in accordance with the following directives:

The stocks of all sorts are to be determined mutually.
The Rumanian occupation troops the administration and the popul tion will receive their portions.
The remainder will be placed at the disposal of the mutual operations.
In case operative interests demand it, the demands of the operative troops have priority over the demands of the occupation troops the administration and the populace.
In this matter it is essential to same tonnage space, that is, to abtain stored property of all sorts frm the operational areas as soon as possible and to harness industry etc. for the conduct of the war.

5. War Booty

That which Rumanian troops have won remains Rumanian boots; that which German troops have won-German booty. 4 German booty camps in Transnistria will be given over to the trusteeship of Rumanian agencies. A part of the War boots in Transnistria has been

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given to the Quergeimeisters.
They have a certificate for that. Also this booty is to be taken over in trusteeship by Rumanian agencies.

6. German agricultural officers in Transnistria.
The German military special officers of the A.O.K. 11 for agriculture who are active in Transnistria are to be replaced by Rumanian agencies as soon as possible.

7. Deportation of Jews from Transnistria.
Deportation of Jews across the Bug is not possible at present. They must, therefore, be collected in concentration camps and set to work, until a deportation to the east is possible after the end of operations.

8. The Rumanian border line agreed upon remains on the Dniester. Army Group South takes over the closing of the Eastern and Northern bountries of Transnistria.

9. Accounting of diliveries.
The accounting of deliveries of all kinds from Transnistria will be clarified by the Rumanian and German agencies competent for this.
It is essential at present to register all achievements carefully and to request receipts.

For the Royal Rumanian Grand General Staff
/s/ Tatarnu
Brigadier General

For the High Command of the German Army
/s/ Hauffe
Major General

file memo

According to information today from director General Lecca, 110,000 Jews are being evacuated from Bukovina and Bessaribia into two forests in the Bug River Area. As far as he could learn, this action is based upon an order issued by Marshal Antonscu. Purpose of the action is the liquidation of these Jews.

Bucharest, October 17, 1941
(Signature illegible)

1. To be discussed with Vice Minister President Antonescu.

Confidential

Bucharest, October 16, 1943

Consultant for Jewish Questions
1. To the Chief of the Economic office
of the Auslandsorganisation (AO) of the NSDAP
party member Musmacher
Bucharest.

Subject: Expulsion of Jews from firms owned by citizens of the German Reich
Previous correspondence: known
Inc.: 1 To be returned.

With the request that it be returned, I am sending inclosed herewith a statement prepared by the Government Commissioner for Jewish Questions concerning Jews employed in firms owned by citizens o the German Reich. At my instigation, the Reich Commissar for Jewish Questions has been andertaken, on the basis of this list, to invalidate the labor books of all Jews working for these firms.

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Please return this lest when finished with it.

(signature illegible)
(Richter)
SS- Hauptsturmfuehrer

2) forwarded 5, Nov.
(initial) W

carbon copy to SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Party "ember Richter
Confidential
Note for Landesgruppenleiter Party "ember Kohlhammer
Bucharest, August 2, 1943
Subject: Removal of Jews from firms owned by citizens of the German Reich.

In the sense of our understanding concerning the immediate removal of Jews still employed in Bucharest firms owned by citizens of the German Reich, I have determined, in collaboration with Party "ember Richter of the German Legation, upon the following:

By referring to the lists at his disposal, Party Member Richter will immediately demand, through the Rumanian authorities, the withdrawal of the labor book from every Jew still active in Reich-German firms. The action itself will be started by the Legation and will thus be lent an official character and coordinated with the intentions of the Economic Councelor of the Nationsl Group (Landesgruppe)

(initialed)
M
/ H. Musmacher/
Economic Councelor of the National Group (Wirtschafteberater der Landesgruppe)

Carbon Copy from the
National Group in Rumanian
SS-Hauptstumfuehrer Richter
German Legation, Bucharest

6, August 1943

National Group Leader
(Landesgruppenleiter) (Strictly confidential)
Office II
of the organisation of the NSDAP abroad (Auslands-Organisation der NSDAP)
Dear Party Member Stempel,

I am forwarding to you, inclosing herewith, a confidential circular addressed to my closest colloborators and should like to ask that you bring it to the attention of Party Member Christian, also. I have given my Economic Councelor strict injunctions to desist unconditionally from the tolerance heretofore practiced and to take the sternest measures against German firms which still employ Jews. We have named these firms for years,now, and they always find ways and means to postpone the removal of the Jews. Upon my recommendation, the Consultant for Jewish Questions in the German Legation, SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Richter, will cooperate very closely with my Economic Adviser, so that the goal may be reached as soon as possible.

The German Envoy , v. Killinger, is at any rate, one hundred percent in accord with my action and I hope that we can have the German firms free of Jews in Rumania within a very short time.

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I greet you with

Heil Hitler
(Signature) Yours Kohlhammer
(Ludwig Kohlhammer)
National Group Leader
(Landesgruppenleiter)

Inc, as mentioned

Copy

National Group Leader (Landesgruppenleiter) Bucharest, Aug 5, 1943

For cognizanre
To my colleagues of the Offices and to the ranking Party representatives in Temeschburg, Arad, Hermannstadt, Kronstadt, Galatz, Braila, Czernowitz.

Subject: Removal of Jews from firms owned by citizens of The German Reich.

I pointed out at length, at last week's roll-call, that I no longer have any understanding, in the forth year of the war and under total mobilization for war, for the case;

a. if a German firm continues to employ a single Jew or

b. if it requests from German agencies permission to continue to employ one or more Jew.

As a person well acquainted with economic conditions here, I can not think of a single case where a German firm would any way jeopardize its existence by an immediate removal of Jews. If a German firm did lose some business or other now through the immediate discharge of its Jewish employees, that is really a very small sacrifice compared to the tremendous difficulties overcome and sacrifices made by those firms who had to carry out the dismissal of Jewish employees during the Jewish era of King Carol-Lupescu.

In almost all cases actual experience has shown that the earlier and more thoroughly Aryanization is carried out, the more quickly a reliable and sound business development sets in.

I can only give the following advice to anyone who still employs a Jew: Make up your mind to this: your Yid either became very ill yesterday, or he was drafted for the labor service.
Do, now, that which you will have to do anyway.
Whoever fails to carry out the removal of Jews immediately can no longer claim; in the forth year of the war, the right to be considered, treated, or addressed as the head of a German enterprise.

We dare not forget that untold thousands of our fellow Germans have lost all their property and become homeless because of Jewish criminal instincts and Jewish capital instigated, organized and are carrying out the despicable terror raids. We owe it to our sorely tried fellow countrymen in the heavily bombed regions to sever at once any connection we have with Jews.

Cases of so-called German firms which fail ruthlessly to get rid of the remaining Jewish connections within the next one or two months are to be reported to me.

Heil Hitler!
Signed Lugwig Kohlhammer
National Group Leader

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Top Secret

Translation
Ministerial Presidium
No. 311 256/R

Bucharest, Nov. 25, 1943

Directorate of the
Section for Liaison
with the Ministries

Mr Commissar General!

With reference to your letter , no.1126, of 24 November this year, we take pleasure in forwarding to you an extract from the stenographic record of the meeting of the council of Ministers on 17 November this year regarding the problem of the evacuation of the Jews from Transnistria.

Please be assured, Mr Commissar General, of our most favorable regard.
Secretary General:
By direction
signed Basarabeanu
To the Commissar General for Jewish Questions
Deputy Director General General
by direction
Signed with signature.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 275-PS

Dec. 13, 1945

I, WILLARD E. SKIDMORE, LT(jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document no. 275-PS.

WILLARD E. SKIDMORE
Lt. (JG) USNR
391590

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GB 502 Filed June 19

D 679

Nazi Proposal for Absorption of Hungary.

(Typewritten draft for a memorandum. It is undated, but one page is written on the back of an unfinished letter dated 11 March, 1944)

(Handwritten corrections made to the original typewritten script by Krallert, Weneck, Kaltenbrunner, Flotte and Urban, are given in brackets with their initials, viz., Kr., W., K., F., & U., the crossed out phrase being underlined)

TRANSLATION.

From the point of view of the Reich, an incorporation of the Hungarian area as a fundamental part of the old Habsburg sphere of power is in the long run inadmissible.

This aim can be achieved by force (by intervention - K.) or as the result of an evolutionary process.

In spite of the extraordinary geopolitical and economic importance of Hungary for the Reich, German foreign policy has made no serious attempt during recent years to gain an influence on developments in Hungary and to make use of this to attain the goal by means of evolutionary methods (apart, perhaps, from direct personal endeavours by the Führer to win Horthy over to the dismissal of Kallay and the elimination of the Bethlen influence. - K.)

Those Hungarians who look back, in the field of foreign policy, to a centuries-old tradition as a great power, incline fundamentally towards a conspiratorial policy. The complete lack of German attempts at influence has inevitably trained them to follow that policy of playing off one power against another which has now attained an intolerable character as the "proofs" have clearly revealed. (Underlining by W.)

+) Instead of recognising therein the necessity of seeking, in the numerous positive forces, bases for a solution which will both secure the total utilization of Hungarian potentialities for the prosecution of the war at the moment, and create for the future the prerequisites for the final aim striven for an attempt at a military solution by force now threatens. This will by no means lead (underlining by U.) to the complete fulfilment of the military and economic demands of the Reich in this area, and will, on the contrary, obstruct for ever the road to an evolutionary development (+ the whole paragraph is crossed out and the following substituted: I fear that the road to a future evolutionary development might be blocked by immediate military operations, without achieving for the present the seizure of the military and economic potentialities. - K.).

On the Hungarian side there stands against all this the fear of falling a victim to Bolshevism on the defeat of Germany, which is taken for granted. It is believed that the only way to exercise this danger is by an early adherence to the Anglo-American side. To this is added the deep dislike of the leading upper class towards us as the bearers of a social revolution which will, in the long run, make impossible the continuation of the feudal system of life in Hungary the beneficiary of which is this very upper class.

The consideration that a possible English intervention would have to be met in good time was one of the main reasons for the origination of the plan for a solution by force. (Indecipherable alterations have been made by K. and the whole paragraph has been struck out).

Against this, I consider - for reasons arising from the geographical situation alone, the probability of an attempt at an invasion to be very slight.

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(Firstly, because of the geographical situation and then because an undertaking so unpredictable does not tempt the English who are not minded to take risks. - K.) I believe, on the other hand, that the approach of Bolshevism will in itself soon make even those of the upper class forces which are most inimical to us, ready to negotiate, out of despair of the possibility of English aid and out of fear of the even greater Bolshevist danger.

The vitally essential demands of the Reich in this area are now as follows:

1) Complete exhaustion of all economic and especially agricultural, resources in order to safeguard the basis of Germany's and Europe's food supply, in view of the loss of the Ukrainian areas.

2) Employment of all reserves of man-power for carrying on the war and

3) complete relaxation of tension, in order to set free the Rumanian troops also, for use on the Eastern front.

The military action will create the following state of affairs, especially in the event of participation by the Rumanians and Slovaks:

1) A united defence front, such as has never been seen before - from the Communists to the Arrow and Cross party ("Pfeilkreuzler")

2) The impossibility of forming any government; at the most some mercenary persons would be found.

3) Horthy's immediate resignation.

4) Military, political and economic chaos.

The country - one centre of resistance, partisan activity on the greatest possible scale.

5) And this point carries particularly great weight when the present German military situation is taken into consideration - numerous German division will be tied down for an unlimited period.

The desired aims will therefore not be attained. The carrying out of the military action at the time of the cultivation of the land in the spring, in itself decisively damages the prospects for the harvest. Ownership of large estates and the activity of Jewish middlemen, neither of which can be eliminated at short notice, will further lessen results. The partisan activity that can be expected for certain, finally destroys any hope of an increase in productivity.

The Hungarians have for centuries had experience in the organization of national resistance. Even the efforts of the old monarchy, which went on for twenty years - from 1848 to 1867, making use of all means of power, resulted in total failure. On the contrary, they decisively contributed to the creation and intensification of Hungarian national chauvinism. A recruitment of the Hungarian reserves of manpower for the German war effort is out of the question under these circumstances. On the other hand, continuous partisan warfare will ensue in the area occupied by us. As a result of the clash of the two opponents, warfare on a large scale would ensue in Transylvania and would presumbaly last a long time.

Even assuming the more advantageous case of a final Rumanian victory, the losses the Rumanians would have suffered and the necessity of suppressing northern Transylvania would make the employment of Rumanian troops in the East impossible for some months at least, if not permanently. We would, therefore, not see our present hopes fulfilled, would probably close the road to a later appeasement and final solution and would also evoke far-reaching reactions in the fields of strategy and of foreign politics. The zones of unrest created behind our front

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our enemies, with an operational intention, would be closed to form a belt reaching from the Adriatic to the Baltic Sea, if a mutinous Hungary and a Transylvania in a state of war were added to them. Simultaneously, we thereby cut those supply routes, the safe functioning of which is vitally necessary to the southern wing of the Eastern front. If the Soviet intention of cutting, one after another, the supply routes that run parallel to and outside the Carpatians until the last railway line is cut, succeeds, then the supply lines through the Carpathian basin will alone be the basis for further resistance. But, also, those supply lines into the Balkans which are today the only safe ones and which would be vitally necessary in view of the possibility of a war against Turkey or a (of a - K.) landing in the Balkans, (there - K.) would be endangered.

Almost equally important are presumably the political effects abroad. The German attitude on the Transylvanian question, once again executing a volte face, would entail such a loss of prestige even in friendly foreign countries that no one could have faith in (doubts would arise as to' - K.) our ability and our will for a New Order in Europe. The effects must be disastrous (will be oppressive - K.) even in friendly nations such as Bulgaria, where it would be feared that a possible German agreement with the Serbs or Greeks might one day result again in the loss of Macedonia or Thrace. Thus we would drive the Bulgarians too into the arms of the Anglo-Americans in the endeavour (who will endeavour - K.) to make it possible to retain (to obtain a guarantee from them for (Sewoff) - K.) the territories they have gained, by changing sides in time.

The effects to be expected in Finland, the Baltic States etc., would be quite similar.

I am therefore convinced that the intended military coercive measures (intervention - K.) will not only not (will not necessarily - K.) attain any of the (the - K.) aims set, but will create new and unforeseeable difficulties (situations that are difficult to get a bird's eye view of - K.) in the fields of strategy and of foreign politics. A successful attempt at a new order on an evolutionary basis on the other hand (however - K.), would mean:

1) An internally consolidated Hungary, friendly to Germay,

2) Horthy's remaining in his position as a "historical" personality, who would continue to guarantee the functioning of the national institutions.

3) The Honved and the security units would remain entirely in step and would thus be at the disposal of the Reich's military requirements.

4) The total economic draining of the Hungarian area is fully guaranteed.

5) The elimination of all arguments on Rumania's part that she needs troops in Transylvania, makes these troops available for the East and can postpone the present Transylvanian problem to a later date by clever promises.

6) Therefore, not only will Hungarian and Rumanian troops be gained, but numerous German divisions will be spared.

7) A distribution of German troops throughout Hungary, which might become necessary for the purpose of security and against a British invasion, can be carried out unhindered, by means of troops in training, in the same way as has been done in Rumania.

These far-reaching results can be attained by comparatively simple means.

The point of departure would have to be a personal message from the Fuhrer to Horthy who, as is known, is (has been - K.) always most strongly

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(strongly - K.) impressed by the personality of the Fuhrer. The go-between for this message could be a diplomat such as von Papen who is not only known as an honest broker, but who enjoys moreover the personal confidence of Horthy. This message would have to refer to the debit balance of the government (Kallay's - K. which had been hostile to Germany and express the thought that the full employmer of Hungary's potentialities for Germany's and Europe's aims could alone assure Hungary's future existence. The condition and the guarantee for the carrying ou of these demands would have to be created by a complete change of regime (in any case with German occupation -K.). Following on this, the Regent will legalize a new government on the broadest (a broad - Kr.) basis from the right wing of the Government throught the Party for Hungarian Renewal and the Hungarian Nationa Socialist Party to the Arrow and Cross Party (Underlining by V.)

The Putsch-like carrying out of this change of government must be organized in such a manner that the entire public remains unaware of the actual connections, as a result of the authoritative decision of the Regent and that antagonistic forces do not get a chance to act. The putting into effect of this plan is guaranteed by the existence of plenty of suitable personalities with whom we have close connections through my collaborators (underlining by W).

(x) The most important of these men, who could take up leading posts in a new government, are:

Lieutenant-Fieldmarshal of the Reserve Ratz, a respected general who enjoys the confidence of the entire right-wing opposition, and who seems certain to be acceptable to the Regent as Prime Minister.

Lieutenant-Fieldmarshal Ruszkay, a highly qualified soldier of pure German descent, who enjoys the very highest respect of the officer class, and who, on taking over the Honved Ministry, would be a certain guarantee that Hungary's military forces would stand unconditionally at the side of the Reich.

The former Prime Minister Imredy, a man of great qualities as an economic leader and financial expert, who meets with very great approval, particularly among the Hungarian intelligentzia.

Major General of the Reserve Baky (deputy - Kr), one of the organizers of t Hungarian gendarmerie, who are generally and quite rightly looked upon as being t surest instrument for peace and order, and who have, at the same time, always been entirely sympathetic to Germany.

A number of popular party leaders of the right wing, as well as acknowledged experts, would also immediately be at our disposal (Passage from (x) sidelined by F.).

++Conclusion!

I dare say that such an attempt could, through my collaboration, bring about a government consisting of the above-named people within 3 days. The military undertaking (transports to the Eastern front) will make its own contribution towards this. The Trojan method remains assured, but so does our good reputation as well.

The discussions taken down on the 13.3. did not even become a "D-day."

It rests with the "(?) and the "proofs"! (++ - K.).

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DOCUMENT NO: D/682

The German Ambassador

Vienna, 26.1.1935.

A 236/35

(3 Copies for the Foreign Office)

To the
Führer and Reich Chancellor
Berlin.

Through the Foreign Office.

Contents:

The situation after the Saar plebiscite.

I returned here from Berlin on the 21st Jan, and had a talk on the 22nd Jan. with the Secretary-General, Peter, on the subject of the rumours which have been spread by the "Journal des dèbats" and "Oeuvre" according to which, I was supposed to have expressed the opinion, in connection with the Saar plebiscite, that, after the Saar, Austria must now be "liquidated from inside." I told the Secretary-General that the habit of certain French circles of poisoning sources of information is for us neither new nor surprising. I told him that the only thing that surprised me was the fact that the Austrian Foreign Secretary in Geneva had considered the rumours genuine and, moreover, that he had caused him, the Secretary-General, to have their authenticity confirmed by the French minister in Vienna, Puaux (communication of the Secretary-General to Herr von der Hagen of the 18.1.1935). After having made a statement to the Secretary-General that neither had I received a French journalist nor had I had any political conversation in the Saarland, I told him with a clarity which left nothing to be desired that, as far as the German Reich is concerned, there would be very little point in getting me to make continuous efforts here to achieve better relations, if the Foreign Secretary believes any French scandal more than my sincere efforts.

The success of this explanatory statement was not long delayed. The Foreign Secretary, Herr von Berger, whom I met the next day at a reception given by the Federal president, immediately involved me in a long conversation in order to explain to me how unpleasant the whole affair had been for him and to apologise for it. I asked him how he could imagine that sincere talks could take place, in order to pacify the Central European Zone along the lines of the Rome agreements, if the Austrian Government and its Foreign Secretary took up an entirely negative and stand-offish attitude towards the Germany of today? The friendly articles published in the Austrian press, on the Government's instructions on the occasion of the Saar plebiscite, could not, I continued, hide from us the fact that the Government has so far flatly refused to establish a connection with Germany which would correspond with normal or even friendly relations. I went on to say that the Austrian Government's opinion, (Adam's speech), that the result of the Saar plebiscite was a decision for "Germany" but not for National-Socialist Germany, was - as he could see from the rest of the world press - an obvious misrepresentation. Germany, I said, would go her way undeviatingly, but, obviously she had a strong desire to do her bit - particularly in the pacification of Central Europe. However, I was personally, very sceptical about the possibi of adhering to the Non-Intervention Pact proposed by Rome. It was obvious, I went on, that - considering the difficult position in which our mutual relations lay (the N.S.D.A.P. banned in Austria, the many thousands of Austrian emigrants in Germany) - the prerequisites for such a Pact would have to be settled in every respect, if Germany was not to be placed in an impossible position. It seemed to me, I continued, that above all, the Austrian Government's attitude to the official Reich-German doctrine of National Socialism, would have to be fundamentally changed, if by such a pact, it was desired to make an effort from the Austrian side also, to normalize our mutual relations. It seemed to me, I said further, that

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it would fit much more with the relations between our two countries and would be much more dignified if matters which concern us were to be discussed personally at first, instead of within the framework of a coalition of powers whose political aims are totally different from ours. Herr von Berger, admitted this freely and confessed that the political role, which is today forced on Austria was very repugnant to him. That he himself was a thoroughly German-minded man and that he had no other desire than to work politically for Austria's German mission. That as soon as Germany recognized that Austria was the second German state with its own ability to exist and its own sovereignty, he would swing the political rudder over and steer parallel to us. My objection that Austria's political connections in the other direction seemed to me to be already much too close for this, he rejected vehemently.

In order to deepen the conversation, I repeated my question as to whether he thought that his Government was really still willing, after the Rome agreements, to start bilateral conversations with us to settle our relations. Herr von Berger replied that he was ready for this at any time, and that he would welcome any conversation. About the procedure for the continuation of the Rome negotiations, he thought that the Non-Intervention Pact had to be considered as a framework which would permit of a series of bilateral pacts between the signatories. For instance, Austria would probably sign such a pact with Hungary.

In judging the conversation with Herr von Berger it will be necessary to start from the fact that the recent strengthening of the position of the Reich, as a result of Saar success, makes it desirable for the Austrian Government to approach the settlement of relations with the Reich, which it has so far avoided. At the same time, an attempt will be made - the Government's planned visits to Paris and London prove it - to achieve an international binding of Germany by means of the Non-Intervention Pact. Meanwhile, after the last speech of Joemboes, which confirms Konya's attitude, reported by me at the time, Hungary's intention to adhere to the pact only after she has gained equal military rights, is evident.

As this has a decisive influence on the attitude of Poland and Jugoslavia's attitude is still not clear, the conclusion of the Rome negotiations may well lie in the more distant future. Nevertheless, it seems to me to be of value to sound the Austrian Government's readiness to negotiate, over and above this conversation with the Foreign Secretary. That is why I have applied for an interview with the Federal Chancellor for the near future.

The congratulatory lists which were put out for signature in the legation, on the occasion of the Saar plebiscite, were signed by over ten thousand people. When, on the last day, the rush assumed the dimensions of a demonstration, the police closed the area of the legation and only let Reich-Germans through. In order to avoid unpleasant incidents, I then declared that the list was closed and published a note on the subject in the Austrian press, expressing thanks for the signatures. The highly gratifying interest of the widest Austrian circles in this national event, obvious from the signatures, was unfortunately suppressed in the German press in spite of the communiqué of the D.N.B. Next Monday the Reich-German colony in Vienna will hold a Saar celebration, under my direction, at which, among other things, the Führer film and the Saar film will be shown.

Papen.

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The Ambassador Extraordinary
and Minister Plenipotentiary.

Gk 5 11
Filed June 19

Vienna 31st January, 1935

Confidential!

My Führer,

I return once more to the further technical treatment of the Tschirschky case.

During our talk at the beginning of December, you very kindly offered to finish the Tschirschky business in a special way. I asked you on 13 December to let the matter follow the course of an ordinary trial. The idea behind this request was that Herr von Tschirschky should not reap advantages of any kind from his position with me; just as little could I wish, of course, that he should suffer any disadvantages because of his position with me.

I have heard in the meantime that you have entrusted Herr Heydrich with a special commission which relates to the very field in question. He is thus also concerned with the Tschirschky case, at least in the present stage of the proceedings of investigation.

Herr von Tschirschky, whom, incidentally, I have for the time being relieved of his duties, has now learnt from several sources which he - and I also, unfortunately - regard as authentic, that some persons belonging to the Gestapo have for a considerable time been planning to neutralize him.

In view of his own experiences in the summer of last year, he fears that, on the occasion of his now anticipated interrogation, he will be eliminated by certain lower organs of the Gestapo in one way or another, either on his way there or at a later date.

I consider it my duty to draw your attention in good time to the possible complications which may ensue from this state of affairs.

Should Herr von Tschirschky find it desirable, because of his above-mentioned apprehensions, not to appear on the date fixed by the Gestapo - these rumours have as mentioned above, unfortunately also spread to Austrian circles, owing to Berlin indiscretions - and if I had to dismiss him immediately for that reason, which I would have to do as a matter of course, the comments in the foreign press, which could be expected without doubt, would make my task here very difficult.

In the event, however, of Herr von Tschirschky going along on the appointed date and - a thing I hardly dare think of, much less say outright - in the event of his apprehensions being justified ine one way or another, owing to an unfortunate chain of circumstances, it can be expected that not only my position in Vienna would be untenable, but that, furthermore, the Reich and your name would suffer great damage.

In view of this importance of the case in the field of foreign politics, I would remind you of your erstwhile promise to let the matter take the "normal course of justice", and I would ask you to take the case in question - by means of a special order - out of the sphere of the mission entrusted to Herr Heydrich in order that the competent Public Prosecutor may take over the proceedings with his usual auxiliary organs.

I hope that I shall then not have to continue troubling you the whole time with this sorry business, especially as Herr von Tschirschky leaves my service on the termination of the trial.

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I would be particularly grateful for an immediate communication of your action in this connection, as the telegram received today fixed the n. date as February 5th. Should I not have received a reply from you by the 4.2. I shall communicate to the Gestapo telegraphically that I have contacted you direct on this matter.

(Signed) Papen.

To the Führer & Reich Chancellor,
Berlin.

Document No. D 684

The Envoy Extraordinary,
and Minister Plenipotentiary
on Special Mission.

Vienna, 5th February 1935.

P e r s o n a l !

Subject:- The Tschirschky Case.

As already reported yesterday by telegraph, I have conveyed to Herrn von Tschirschky the order of the 2nd of this month repeating the demand that he appear on the date fixed by the Gestapo - 5th February.

He then announced to me officially that he would not comply with this order, as he was convinced that he would be killed in one way or another. He will marshall the reasons for this refusal in a report which I will submit as soon as I receive it.

I yesterday finally relieved Herr von Tschirschky, whom I had already suspended for the course of the proceedings, of his post. It goes without saying that I shall break off all connections of an official nature, as soon as the handing over of files etc., has taken place to morrow.

I telegraphed to Herr von Neurath today, saying that Tschirschky has been dismissed the service of the Embassy. His diplomatic pass and other official identity papers will be sent back by to-day's courier.

With reference to reporting his dismissal to the Austrian government, I am afraid that if I report it abruptly tomorrow, the matter will attract public discussion. I believe that this scandal should be avoided and have therefore given Herr von Tschirschky sick leave for the time being, for the benefit of the public, and shall report his dismissal later.

I shall return to the Tschirschky affair and its connections with other current Gestapo questions in Vienna later in a detailed report.

After I had repeatedly asked that Herr von Tschirschky should be given a chance to clear himself before a regular judge of the charges laid against him, I am naturally exceedingly sorry that the affair is now ending thus. I left nothing undone to induce Herr von Tschirschky to take the course designated to him of letting himself be examined by the Gestapo. But if he remains firm in his resolve to avoid this examination, even though he knows that this means the ruin of his social and material position for himself and his family and if he has declared to me that, while an emigre he will do nothing which would be harmful to the Fuehrer and the country, I have nothing to add but the w ish that everything should be avoided that could make this affair an open scandal.

Signed. P a p e n .

To the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor,

B e r l i n .
By courier.

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H1169 - 0089

GB 509 Tibet June 19.

D 685.

F.G.Tschirschky und Boegendorff. Vienna, 5 February, 19 5

Your Excellency, Mr. Minister,

In an order dated 4.2.1935 expressed in writing that you, Mr.Minister, are relieving me of my official duties, quoting an extract from a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs which brings to your notice the Fuhrer's orders and you give me instructions to place myself at the disposal of the Gestapo on the 5th Feb., fixed date.

Although I am fully aware of the seriousness of the decision, I am unfortunately compelled, Mr. Minister to declare that, in the interests of the Fatherland, the carrying out the mission in Austria entrusted to you by the Fuhrer and Reichs Chancellor and last but not least, in the interests of my Family, I am not in a position to comply with the Gestapo demand to report to Berlin for interrogation.

The reason for this decision which is based on the attached special report shows that it has not been influenced only the human understandable desire to live which I hope you, Mr. Minister as well as for the Fuhrer and Reichs Chancellor will realize from this report, but owing to my sense of responsibility to the Fatherland, the leadership of the 3rd Reich and towards you yourself I cannot act otherwise. The seriousness of the meaning of my decision is apparent since I have made it, although I am aware that I have already caused you considerable inconvenience.

Allow me to express once again in writing the assurance that I will never act disloyally either to the Fatherland, to the Fuhrer and Reichs Chancellor or to you personally. I am whole-heartedly devoted to my beloved Fatherland and all my actions and efforts have in the past only served for its well being and ascendancy. Nothing will alter this in the future. As soon as I am convinced that no further harm can befall the Fatherland, I will return to the Reich in order to place myself before the proper Judge in the Sommer affair. As I have a clear conscience, I hope I shall carry the blemish which will apparently be put upon me for a short time only.

As a person who knows that honour is the highest possession a man can lose, I will, as soon as I see the possibility, call to account each one who has assailed or is assailing my honour.

Always your devotedly,

(Signed) Fritz Gunther v. Tschirschky.

To the Ambassador Extra-ordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister
Her von Papen,
Vienna.

5282.

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F . [redacted] von Tschirschky and Boegendorff. D 685

Report.

Annexe to the letter dated 5 Feb 1935 addressed to the Ambassador Extra-ordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister, Herr von Papen, Vienna.

Information has reached me, not only from one but from many sources both from home and abroad, that in Gestapo circles a large number of persons exist who consider me to be a reactionary and outspoken enemy of the National Socialist party. It is therefore necessary to make me harmless. In addition to that I am supposed to know too much. It is all the same whether through my disappearance from the Reich, damage or advantage results.

The first information which came to my knowledge found its first confirmation in the events of 30th June and my personal experiences in these days. I give only the following facts as proof of my conception of my experiences on 30 June:

1. FACTUAL INFORMATION.
(Up to and including 30 June 35)

I was arrested on 30.6 by two different groups which shows that the action against the Vice Chancellor originated from two official sources, who were working against each other. The incident was as follows:

When I returned to the Ministry in Vosstr 1 with Herr von Papen from the short visit to Minister President Goering, the building was completely occupied by S.S. people. After I had entered my office, a short reddish haired man appeared, who asked me whether I was Mr. von Tschirschky. Having replied in the affirmative he told me in a short and harsh manner that "You are under arrest, come along with me." As I had been informed by Herr von Papen on our way from Minister President Goering's palace in Voss Strasse that we would be arrested on account of the events of the 30th June, I did not ask the person who was arresting me for his credentials but answered him "I just came with Herr von Papen from Minister President Goering and am informed about everything, especially, that I am to be taken into protective custody. I am at your disposal". As a result of my explanation, the man started, looked at me in great surprise and muttered under his breath "How is that possible?". I did not ponder at first over these words and repeated, although I was rather taken aback at his rude manner, "I am at your disposal immediately. I only want to take leave from my chief." Whereupon the man explained curtly and decidedly "No, that is not allowed, you are not to speak to anyone any more, but must comply with my orders". Thereupon he got hold of a paper and read out both names, von Savigny and Baron Pereira, asking "Where are these gentlemen?" I thereupon said "Herr von Savigny should be in this house, a Baron Pereira does not exist here, and has never worked here, I do not know him either, but I do remember that a few days ago there arrived an obituary notice. I am firmly convinced that the person you are looking for is dead. If you wish I can get the obituary notice for you from the files". He listened to all I had to say, but did not believe my words and insisted upon making a further search himself. He then handed me over to another S.S. man posted at the door, with a machine pistol at the ready. About five minutes later, together with the gentlemen von Savigny and Hummelsheim, I was ordered by this man to accompany him under the escort of three S.S. men armed with machine pistols, in order to be taken away.

Arriving at the lower gate entrance I saw a motor car come up, out of which two men jumped hurriedly and entered the main hall of the Vossstrasse 1 building. One of the two men I recognised immediately as an official from the

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Criminal Police Department, with whom I had sat with about twenty minutes previously in the waiting room of Minister President Goering's Palace. He immediately came up to me, took hold of my arm and said "I am ordered to (or I have the order) take you into protective custody." Whereupon I replied in astonishment " Excuse me, I have already been arrested by this man", who was now standing half behind me.

A sharp interchange of words between these two men now took place. They showed each other their criminal police identity card, so fa r as I remember, the one belonging to the first man was a metal disc, and that of the second man was a red card. In the course of this exchange of words I exclaimed to the man, with reddish hair, who had first of all arrested me, that if a muddle already existed, I would prefer to be taken into protective custody by the man who came from the Minister President, as I had already seen him and his order appeared to be more trust worthy. This man repeatedly told me that I should go with him. The reddish haired man thereupon became very strict and exclaimed, " If you offer any further resistance I shall have to resort to arms". I replied that I was offering no resistance, but that he must understand that I was startled as I at least knew the other man by sight, whereas I did not know him at all. Whereupon the second broke in and said "There you are, you see that my orders are correct" and pushed me towards his car. The small reddish haired man, who was ve ry excited about the incident, dragged me back from the car and ordered the S.S. escort to get ready to shoot. I then addressed the second man, who had no armed guard whatsoever, and said, "It is senseless to cause a bloodbath here in front of the building on account of an apparent misunderstanding. I think it would be better if I went in the other car. But follow on in your own car and ascertain where I am being taken". This was finally done and the journey took us to the Gestapo building in the Prince Albertstrasse, through a courtyard to a back entrance. There another exchange of word s took place between the two groups of Criminal Police officials. I again joined in this debate and suggested as a way of clearing up the misunderstanding that a man from each group should see someone in the building of higher authority, and let him decide what should be done. To guard myself, and the other two gentlemen, there were still three Criminal Police official and four S.S. men available. This way out was accepted. The men eventually came back and explained that the misunderstanding was now cleared up, we could now be taken away. Whereupon we were taken by three S.S. men, not accompanied by the Criminal Police officials, on a longish trip through the building into the basement. There we were handed over without any comment and received the order from the SS. men, on duty there, to go over and sit on a bench against the wall, in the passage. We were then forbidden to talk to each other and so we spent a few hours sitting on the bench. It would go too far to give further details about the events which took place during this time. I will therefore only limit myself to the case of the shooting of a well known person, p ublicly stated to have committed suicide.

The person was brought in and taken past us into a cell running parallel to our corridor, escorted by three S.S. men, the leader of the detachment was a S.S. Sturm-Hauptfuhrer, short, dark and with an Army pistol in his hand. I heard the command "Guard the door". The door f om our corridor to the other was shut, five shots were fired and immediately after the shots, the Sturm-Hauptfuhrer came out of the door with the still smoking pistol in his hand, saying under his breath, " That swine is finished". Feverish excitement reigned round about, one heard frightened calls and shreaks from the cells. One of the S.S. men on duty, a comparative youngster, was so excited, that he apparently forgot the situation as a whole and informed me - illustrating with his fingers - that the person concerned had been liquidated through three shots in the temple and two in the back of the head.

2. FACTUAL INFORMATION.
(For the time after June 30th.)

(a) In Silesia, the former Gauleiter and Oberpraesident Brueckner had openly declared to the various personalities "It is preposterous that Herr von Papen and Tschirschky have not been murdered in Berlin. Had they been in Silesia,

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they would no longer be alive. Besides myself, the bloodhound Woyrsch would certainly have seen to it. This neglect must yet be rectified". In Tannenberg I spoke shortly after this to State Councillor Udo von Woyrsch who is known to me and whom I met accidentally, and after greeting him told him that such an utterance from a State official was monstrous. I take it that this matter would interest him as his name was also mentioned. As this conversation took place shortly before the departure of our train, it had to be broken off very quickly. Woyrsch informed me that he was very much interested and that I must again tell him a few more details about it all. Unfortunately I have had no further opportunity, so far, to speak to Woyrsch about that matter.

(b) The utterances of a Gestapo man, whose name is known, and who himself acknowledges having taken part in the action in the Vice Chancellory, show that he and a circle of his friends very much regret that Herr von Papen and I did not lose our lives on 30.6. Had not someone else interfered in time during the incidents in the Vice Chancellory, Papen and Tschirschky would also have been liquidated.

(c) Members of Hitler's bodyguard , whose names unfortunately cannot be mentioned, as they are themselves in danger of their lives, have expressed similar opinions amongst themselves and also to third parties. These utterances and discussions took place in the period between September and up to the middle of December. In connection with these discussions, these same men with the help of other S.S. men in the service of the Gestapo have discussed the matter as to what steps should be taken to rectify the neglect. Groups were formed, of which some, in spite of any objections that might arise with regard to foreign politics on account of my belonging to a diplomatic mission and of the repercussions resulting therefrom, were of the opinion that in any case I had to be murdered. The others declared, that the way was too dangerous as I was someone who knew a great deal and had also surely put away a lot for safe keeping abroad which would be brought to light. If one is already of the opinion that I must be murdered, then one must spread beforehand all sorts of tales about me in order to defame me.

(d) Towards the end of October I was informed that the Gestapo circles were very happy at last, in their opinion, to possess some real solid evidence against me in connection with a case, Sommer who had been apprehended for contravention of Article 175 and who is said to have had relations with me. But first of all, these matters should be utilised at a time suitable to the Gestapo, not to proceed immediately, but to gather first of all some further evidence.

(e) Already shortly after my arrival in Vienna with Herr von Papen, in the middle of August, persons from various Austrian and Reich German sources approached me with the question, which was incomprehensible at the time, whether I was not pleased to be further away from malevolent circles in the Reich. When I told them of my intention to go to the Reich in order to accompany Herr von Papen, I was given guardedly to understand, that I had better remain here. During the months of October and November these rumours increased considerably, and I followed up these matters energetically.

Up to then I had always thought that one still had the impression here, based on the press notices dating back to 30.6. that people in many Reich circles were opposed to me and that the Austrian emigrants had reported adversely about me.

As a large circle of real national socialists recognised my undoubted loyalty, the trust of these persons in me increased and they now reported to me direct, from which sources these reports directed against me originated and what was being said.

Emissaries of the Gestapo who had been sent to Austria spread various reports about me such as, for instance, "Beware of Tschirschky, he

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is an enemy of all National Socialists and in the end will only betray you to the Austrian Government". Another Gestapo man appeared in Vienna, approximately during the period between the 5th and 20th -12 and stated, "Tschirschky will very shortly be liquidated, as soon as he crosses the frontier he will be murdered". Again another one declared, " At last, proceedings can be taken against Tschirschky. He is also a homo-sexual person and when he enters the Reich, he will be liquidated". The same man spread reports here that Dr. Megerle would be transferred to the Embassy in Vienna. Very shortly afterwards the question Megerle was also raised in the Bund chancellory Department, which gave me definite proof of the correctness regarding the reports spread about me.

I could still give a whole series of other matters, but they would make the report too lengthy.

In conclusion, the reason why I do not feel obliged either to appear before the Gestapo or to return to the Reich at all, in spite of the extraordinary protect on pro ised me by the Fuhrer and Chancellor, I make the following declaration:

Alr eady during my activities in Berlin, information has often reached me that there existed in the Reich a Terror organisation which has sworn the oath of mutual allegiance until death. The men who are or who may be accepted in this brotherhood, are expressly warned and given the obligation that they belong to the F.E.M.E. and that they are in duty bound when carrying out their tasks to feel that they belong in a far greater degree to the brotherhood and are only bound to Adolf Hitler in a smaller degree. I could not have believed this monstrous thing, had the information not been given me about 6 months previously, by a man in the Reich - I wish to emphasise this explicitly, who is not opposed to the 3rd Reich, but quite the opposite, a man who in his innermost convictions believes in Adolf Hitler's mission, a Reich German National Socialist of many years standing, who himself at one time was to be won over into this brotherhood but who was able to withdraw from it cleverly. This man has assured me of his willingness to expose publicly the names mentioned to me of the members of this brotherhood, or to swear an affidavit to this effect in case these people should already be dead. He must only be assured that this Terrorist brotherhood can no longer be effective, especially as there are persons belonging to thi s brotherhood who are among the people who count as being the most trusted o f the Fuhrer and the Reichschancellor.

I am naturally firmly convinced that the Fuhrer and Reichschancellor is not aware of the fact that these pe rsons belong to the conspiracy. The logical consequences of thi s build up and the actions of this brotherhood prevent any one person from leaving it without falling himself a victim to the F.E.M.E.

I have had to give the last explanations so guardedly as I have not dared to give any names, even to my immediate superior Herr von Papen, so as not to incriminate you in case this report should fall into the wrong hands.

Vienna 5 February 1935.

(Sgd) Fritz Günther von Tschirschky.

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Doc. No. D 686

F.G. von Tschirschky and Boegendorff.

Vienna, 5th February, 1935.

Personal!

My Führer,

My report dated the 5th of February 1935 and forwarded to you by Herr von Papen, which gave you the reasons why I felt obliged not to obey the order issued by you to proceed to Berlin, was to let you know, my Führer, that this is not malicious refusal to obey the head of the State

This is to give you my express assurances that I shall never act disloyally either towards the people and the Fatherland or towards its Führer and Reich Chancellor, nor will I make use of my knowledge of many things for the benefit of unauthorised persons.

As soon as I have obtained the assurance that no harm can any longer be caused , the prevention of which may eventually be made impossible for you, I shall come to the Reich in order to give myself up to the regular judge on the question of the Sommer affair.

(Signed) Fritz Günther von Tschirschky.

To the Führer and Reich Chancellor
Berlin.

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GB 507 Filed June 19

TRANSLATION OF A LETTER FROM PAPEN TO HITLER.

Document No. D. 687

The Envoy Extra-ordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary on a Special Mission.

Vienna, 4th April 1935.

Personal!

My Fuehrer,

1. I have first to report on the development of the local N.S.D.A.P:

On 23rd March, a complete agreement was reached in Krems between Captain Leopold, (retd.) and Generaldirektor Neubacher. In accordance therewith, Neubacher subordinated himself to Leopold in every way and recognized him as Fuehrer for Austria. As soon as Schattenfroh is released from the concentration camp, he is to become deputy Fuehrer, while Neubacher, as the closest confidant of Leopold, will be consulted on all important questions. Furthermore, Leopold has nominated Werkowitsch to be head of the SA and Larsen to be his deputy. Major General Klupp, (retd.) will be taken into consultation in strict confidence. Furthermore Leopold expressed the desire that at long last, the continuous intrigues against him on the part of emigrees living in the Reich - of the type of Frauenfeld and his ilk - be stopped.

As has been reported to me - the arrested Gau Leadership of Upper Austria+ which was betrayed by Klaushofer and gaoled, has been re-organised in most districts.

The agreement reached on the question of Austrian Leadership can only be considered very pleasing.

2. On the internal political developments I report today in particular. They are brought into sharp relief by two original letters which came into my hands and which I would not like to withhold from you, my Fuehrer."

a. The Chief of Staff of the Tyrolese Heimwehr, Abel, writes:

".....I have long enough played the part of Cassandra to my superior, and have always been right. But when I see and feel that all these warnings have been given in vain, that the gentlemen in authority can work out their policy themselves - if one can still call it that - but they must also answer for it to our Heimwehr men, who are brave beyond all praise. My conscience will not let me participate in the present political trend any longer. Our mutual friend in Trieste (Steidle) is of the same opinion. Either our high and mighty gentlemen are smart enough to find at the last moment that North - South line whichcorresponds fundamentally to the old Tripartite Pact or Austria will be a thing of the past. and will inescapably fall victim to partition in the coming clashes.

The announcement of general conscription in the imperialistic - now no longer National Socialistic (?) - Reich, has been a bombshell amongst the Tyrolese Heimwehr. Every Heimwehr man speaks of the brave decision with the greatest respect. How poorly does the cackling of a Mr. Schmitz compare with this! And our Federal Prince is out boar hunting..... In the meantime, the national government is happily making rapid progress in the markedly Catholic section. But our government seems to be asleep.. ....."

b. Baron Gudenus, the closest confident of the Archduke Otto in Steenockerzeel, writes to me of my acquaintances on the 30.3:

+ (Factory owner Hinterleithner, Linz, SA-Fuehrer, Warmbser.) 5206

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".....I took many a cheerful impression back with me from Austria about the progress of our movement, but I cannot deny, that in some respects, the policy of our government worries me greatly. Of what use is it that the ringleaders of February and July 1934 - in as far as they get caught - are being sentenced whilst the government is too weak, too "slovenly" , or intentionally too tolerant, to prevent brown and red propaganda being carried on in the cinema, in the press and on the radio, and mainly by state officials or organs of the FATHERLAND FRONT - supported and paid by the financial and other means which are pouring in in plenty from Germany. What is that learned idealist Schuschnigg actually doing? Does he not notice that Papen and the other brown agents in his own country continually spit into the hand he so consistantly offers them? He must not imagine that he can thus maintain and save Austria, whilst Hitler rules in a Germany which is painted brown on the inside and the out side. The methods over there have - it is true - become more clever and more careful, but this makes them all the more dangerous! Terrible are also the continuous differences between Schuschnigg and Starhemberg and also the competion of their 'guards' and the remaining underground republican influence of the still existing Christian Social Clique, which has been rid of its decent members, - a band of suspicious intriguers and corruptionists, who are now secretly guiding the FATHERLAND FRONT... .....

The difficulties of the internal Austrian situation could hardly be described more clearly than in this letter.

3. The film "the Old and the Young King" was shown here for the first time a few days ago in the presence of Mr. Jannings. It provoked enthusiastic demonstrations. Particularly the scene where the king stresses the fact that " French Trash and Roman books "do not mean anything to Prussia", led to vociferous demonstrations. The police wanted to resort to a ban. Together with Mr. Jannings, we explained to them that, should this film be prohibited, we would resort to the complete exclusion of the whole Austrian film production from Germany. This worked. The film - except for the above mentioned part which was expunged - is being shown how and will be shown on the screen at Klagenfurt and Graz within the next few days. Yesterday I received Jannings together with a number of actors from the Burg Theater as my guests. He said he was very satisfied with his success, and we discussed indetail the plan of a film of Bismarck for the production of which I recommended Benelburg to him as the writer of the script.

Yours respectfully,

as ever,

P a p e n .

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Document No; D/ 703

Vienna, 10th May, 1935.

The Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary on
a special mission.

Strictly Secret:

Contents:-

Austria's re-armament.

As I learn reliably from Federal Army circles, a law has been prepared, regarding the re-armament of the Austrian Army, which is to be announced on the 1st June. It contains the order that the 1st to 6th Brigades will be transformed into divisions. A seventh division, with its headquarters at Klagenfurt, will be newly formed for Carinthia and Eastern Tyrol. Similarly, an 8th Division will be formed for Salzburg, with only one motorized Light Infantry Brigade and one motorized Cavalry Brigade, for the time being.

The establishment of the old brigades will not, for the time being, be brought up to strength, unless this is done quite slowly and to the extent of the means available. The Heimwehr will be re-organized into the "Landwehr", a kind of active force on Italian lines. For the latter task, Starhemberg is said to have received the promise of 6 million schillings from Mussolini.

This re-armament law is said to have been inspired by Mussolini, who would thereby like to create a fait accompli over the antagonistic attitude of the Little Entente and before the negotiations about the Danube Treaty.

At the same time, I have been informed of a very secret meeting, at which a big parade of the Heimwehr was planned for the 2nd July. Influenced by the re-armament law and the incorporation of the Heimwehr into the Army, Starhemberg is said to be going to have himself proclaimed "Reichsverweser" (Governor) on this day. It is said that Mussolini, having realized that the Danube Pact planned by him will contain neither promises of assistance, nor probably a practical non-intervention formula, is resolved to insure the position of the Austrian Government against Germany in this manner.

It remains questionable to what extent Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg can be got to support this plan, in which he is intended to take the post of Foreign Minister, whilst Fey wants to become Federal Chancellor. It seems to me that Schuschnigg and his supporters will probably not co-operate in this absolute dictatorship of the Heimwehr, but that they will give way to a fait accompli and force.

In the absence of the Military Attaché, would you please make this available to the Reich War Ministry as well?

(sgd) V. Papen.

To the

Führer and Reich Chancellor,
Berlin.

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Translation of 2248 - PS

The Envoy Extraordinary
and Minister Plenipotentiary
of the German Reich
on Special Mission.

Vienna, 27 July 1935.

Contents:
One year after the death of
the Federal Chancellor
(Bundeskanzler) Dollfuss.
Review and Prospects.

to the
Führer and Reich Chancellor,
Berlin,
by courier.

I have made a detailed report elsewhere on the commemorations which are being held in these days on the occasion of the anniversary of the death of Federal Chancellor (Bundeskanzler) Dollfuss. The display of commemorative celebrations would have been worthy of a great king. It must be pointed out that the government succeeded in making Dollfuss out to have been a martyr for the "Austrian ideology". They made use of the fact, demonstrated in the history of all periods that by creating martyrs, an idea, however small its solid background, can be carried forward enthusiastically and achieve a certain success. The celebrations of the 25th. July and the sympathy of world public opinion have furthermore shown that the German-Austrian problem still dominates the whole of European policy and that the question of a solution is still completely open. The Austrian press is today drawing up a balance sheet for the past year which is described as "a year of progress" in all spheres. Only in one respect could no progress be shown - namely in the relationship between the two states of German race. The Führer's speech of 21.5.1935 and Schuschnigg's reply are said to have shown that there is so far no bridge which could close the abyss between Berlin and Vienna. But that it is nevertheless valuable to be able to state that the regrettable conflict has not been intensified by either side. It seems to me appropriate to use this occasion ourselves to draw up a balancesheet too.

It seemed at first that the failure of the rebellion of July 1934 was bound to lead merely to a temporary change in the political methods employed till then. It was only during this year that it became apparent that the political reactions caused by the 25th July had increased, abroard as well as at home, to a degree which far exceeded our former ideas of a possible improvement from the German point of view.

The hope that the personal conversation between the Führer and Reich-Chancellor and the Head of the Italian State at Stresa (Stra) would lead to a settlement of German-Italian differences has been changed into the exact opposite by the threatening attitude taken up by Mussolini after the assassination of his friend Dollfuss and by the partial mobilisation of Italian Corps on the Brenner. It became apparent that the attempt to "re-establish normal and friendly relations" by sending me to Vienna was not an easy task after what had happened previously. Mistrust of the forcible methods of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P. - influenced, as it became more and more apparent from the past trials, by leading Reich-German personalities - was too strong; the impression caused by the terrorist methods and the death of the Bundeskanzler was too lasting in the widest circles.

The assumption of my mission met with a very reserved and pointed refusal - not on personal but on political grounds.

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Perhaps it would still have been possible, as I thought and reported in October and November of last year, to loosen the German-Austrian tangle by written agreements between Berlin and Vienna and to rob it of its far-reaching influence on the regrouping which is at present beginning to take place in European power politics. Mussolini, as was obvious during these months, was seeking something to take the place of the friendship with Germany and to act as a protection against the German threat, which he continued to see in the undiminished influence of German National Socialism on Austria even after July 1934 reported by the Viennese cabinet. The January Conference in Rome put Franco-Italian relations on a completely new footing. The whole of Europe spoke of the necessity of ensuring Austrian independence by a pact of non-intervention. The historic decision of the Führer to give the Reich back its freedom to arm could not have any but a strengthening effect on Franco-Italian relations, as indeed on the union of the western powers and the introduction of Russia into the European concert. The Stresa conference was the visible expression of this new grouping of the powers, which then reached its temporary consummation in the Franco-Russo-Czech pact.

The great historical speech of the Führer on the 21st. May of this year, and later the Naval Treaty caused a strong détente in the field of foreign policy with regard to England. But the clear and final defination of the attitude of National-Socialism to the Soviet Russian doctrine of the State and naturally redoubled Franco-Russian attempts to cripple us in the East and South-East without at the same time achieving a détente in the other direction by clearly renouncing the annexation or incorporation (Anschluss) of Austria.

Any attempt at a commercial and even more so at a political offensive by the newly formed Third Reich in the direction of South Eastern Europe must inevitably come up against a front formed by the whole of Europe. In the case of the British, it is the preoccupation with a general maintenance of European peace, in the case of the French, the struggle to maintain their hegemony in Central Europe, in the case of the Italians, worries about the Brenner and the effect on the Danube area, which they consider a territory for Italian expansion. With the little Entente it is the fear of a rolling up of the whole problem of existence; and if Yugoslavia is showing an interest today in the consolidation of our position in Austria, this is only as long as it can play us off politically against Italy. A full Anglo-German agreement fundamentally alters Great Britain's relations with France with reference to the regrouping of the European powers, Yugoslavia will be thrown back on its natural dependence on the French system of alliances. It is possible that the Abyssinian adventure may help to bring about such a change because of the threat to British Imperial interests. However, a compromise at the Negus's expense - even though it only takes place after the Italians have suffered considerable losses - appears more probable.

This realistic survey of the European constellation shows immediately that the German-Austrian problem can not - at least in the near future - be successfully approached from the direction of foreign politics. We must for the time being be content with not allowing Austria's International status to deteriorate for a later solution. In this connection, the danger of a non-Intervention Pact with bi-lateral Treaty of Assurance seems to be successfully avoided. The maturing of a solution was and still remains dependent on nothing but the state of German-Austrian relations.

The German nation has for centuries had to pursue a real path of suffering, to secure its unity. With the dawn of National-Socialism and the founding of the Third Reich by the final overthrow of all State particularism, a unique and never to be repeated opportunity seemed to be given to complete Bismarck's work and to bring the problem of the relations between Germany and Austria nearer to a solution, as a dynamic result of internal events in Germany.

This opportunity has been finally destroyed, as we know today, by the application of the method of actions known as the "Hawk Policy". It is astonishing how little German public opinion itself is informed of the far-reaching results of this policy of a responsible adviser, who obviously had the best intentions, but knew nothing about the real situation in and around Austria. Otherwise wide circles would not still eagerly expect a rapid reconciliation and solution of the German problem today. The experience we have gained in this painful year therefore forces us to seek a new path.

To form a clear judgment, one must get a picture of the influence of the German-Austrian policy of the last few years on internal politics as well. The People with a really "Greater-German" point of view were neverrtoo numerous in Austria. And though, with Adolf Hitler's victorious course and historic performance, the NSDAP gained so many new members in Austria too, the reasons for this lay far more in the reaction to the incredible maladministration of the Reds, to the bad economic position, and to parliamentary incapacity as well as in the feeling of external weakness and dependance on the former enemy powers. But the more the successes of National Socialism in re-establishing the unity and former world importance of Germany became evident, the more did two things happen: on the one hand, the instinctive wish grew to get under the shadow of the German Reich which was being recreated; and, on the other hand, the elimination of particularism in the German Reich brought the militant Christian Socialists and the born Russian-haters to the fore. Chancellor Dollfuss who always thought along much more pro-German lines than his present admirers do, wavered between the two poles like an unsteady reed. In an attempt to protect himself from the idea of an Anschluss, he set out to eliminate the worst Austrian deficiences. The putting down of the Red February revolt gave his government an undoubted step up. It had become the start and hour of birth of the "Austrian Idea". All the more so, as Austrian National Socialism proceeded in this dilemma to place itself on the side of the Red workers, thus putting the Austrian army in the position of being the saviour of the state from terrorism and Marxism, a position which could not be shaken by anything any more.

It was therefore not surprising that after Dollfuss's death, he was endowed with the aureole of a martyr for the new Austrian Idea. The Austrian regime, in its struggle against any influence of ideas from Germany and owing to its fears with regard to its bread and butter had meantime learnt much from the methods of German National Socialism Interesting parallels could be drawn, if one would only give aclear picture of the initiation of National-Socialist legislation in all fields. The first great event in internal politics was the constitution of the corporations of the house of federal legislation on the 30th. November - an attempt to give the formation of the estates a legal formulation. Although much is only fragmentary one cannot fail to see that the new framework of the State thus constituted, directed by a Draconian executive, has given the government a position of power which today can be broken neither by coups d'etat nor by economic means. There are no doubt many strong differences of opinion within the Austrian government, but it would be completely wrong to hope that their exacerbation could increase the chance of German intervention.

The National-Socialist Party of Austria - even though it is reduced to a small but reliable nucleus - has undoubtedly behaved admirably, insoite of all oppression, persecution and martyrisation. But the impetus of even the most enthusiastic protagonists must in the long run suffer as a result of the almost total spiritual and material severance from the Reich, and as a result of the impossibility of receiving orders from the Reich and the Führer about the handling of the internal opposition. The maintenance of a national opposition full of life and fighting-spirit is actually undoubtedly in the special interests of the Reich - even if this opposition is purely an Austrian domestic question, which is actually taking place now to the advantage of both sides.

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All efforts should be made and continued to counter the new Austrian ideology by exerting a far-reaching ideological influence in the direction of the historical task of all Germans in Europe. This subject is debated much too little among the German public. All traditional bonds which remind people of the great common historical struggles for the German idea, and particularly the relations of the Austrian armed forces should be fostered in every way. The superiority of German intelligence, the achievements of German technology and science must show the Austrians that the "Fatherland Front" is completely mistaken in teaching that the cultural world-renown of the German spirit is based on Austria. I repeat the request which I have already made so often that, in this connection, the question of the limitation of journeys be re-examined, since it is inextricably bound up with the spiritual fertilization of this country.

Cultural problems assume particular importance. The way in which Germany deals with politico-religious difficulties, the clever hand which eliminates political catholicism without touching the Christian foundation of Germany, will not only have a decisive effect on England or Catholic Poland, one can rather say that the solution of the German-Austrian question stands or falls with it.

Beyond these questions, it will be of decisive importance along what ideological lines the [illegible] policy of the Third Reich pursues the German-Austrian question from the point of view of constitutional law.

The "New Austria" has come to a standstill in the particularist world of ideas and has sacrificed the supremacy of the Nation to it. The dream of restoring the Holy Roman Empire from Vienna is all the more grotesque, the more Mussolini uses this idea of the Austrian Imperial romantics to further his idea of a new "imperium romanum" at the cost of the German Nation. Habsburg legitimism seen in the light of these actual facts, is after all nothing but the tactical resort of a weak government. All this has nothing to do with historical re-creation, but this does not mean that it will not be brought on to the stage at the psychological moment by the wire-pullers behind the policy of a European balance of power. Even if one were inclined not to deny the Austrian particularist opposition (as a solution which would ease the position with regard to foreign politics) a certain degree of justification, the German should nevertheless never tire of pointing out that these circles are causing the loss of all national initiative ; that with the support of a government party (Fatherland Front) built from above, a militant Catholicism and an army which is full of enthusiasm for Mussolini, they are simply denying the supremacy of the nation as a whole. How differently did Bismarck act when he prepared the little German solution and yet showed that he was determined to sacrifice part of Prussia's independence to the supremacy of the interests of Germany as a whole. (Bismarck, letter of 22.9.63). For him Prussian particularism was no end in itself, and even at the foundation of the second Reich, in which Prussia had played a leading part, he never stressed this Prussian role. It was only in this way that he managed to win Bavaria over at that time.

National-Socialism must and will overcome the new Austrian ideology. If in Austria today it is objected that the NSDAP is only a centralised Reich German party, and is therefore unfit to transfer the idea-content of National-Socialism to National groups with a different political constitution, one can justifiably retort that the national revolution in Germany could only have been brought about in this way, and in no other. But once the creation of a national community was completed in the Reich, National-Socialism was sure to be able to become the herald of German National unity beyond the frontiers, in a much wider sense than is possible under the present party system, at least outwardly.

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Spiritual progress as against Austria cannot be achieved today by a central tendency. Once this fact is clearly formulated by the Reich too, this will be the quickest way to breach the "New Austrian" front. A Nürnberg party rally, under the name of "the German day" as formerly and the proclamation of a "National-Socialist Peoples' Front" would be a stirring event for all beyond the frontiers of the Reich. With such an attack we would also win over Austrian particularist circles. The legitimist Count Dubsky writes as their representative in his pamphlet on the "Anschluss": "The Third Reich will include Austria, or it will not exist at all. National-Socialism will have to win it over - or collapse if it is not capable of solving this problem".

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21 Nov 45.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT No. 2248-PS.

I, Leslie A. Hill, M.C., Major, Northumberland Hussars, R.A., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2248-PS.

Leslie A. Hill,
Major,
Northumberland Hussars, R.A.

(1398)

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D 689

The Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the German Reich on Special Mission

Vienna, 12th August 1935.

G 3 504 Filed June 19

No. A 1892.

Contents:

Inspection of the Consulates of Linz and Salzburg. Opening of the Grossglockner road.

(Three copies for the Foreign Office).

I returned today from a fortnight's tour, the purpose of which was to inspect the consulates and visit the provinces of Upper Austria, Salzburg and Styria. This journey has given me a new and valuable insight into spiritual and economic conditions in these areas.

On the impressions I received from my visit to Linz and Salzburg I have already reported personally on the 1st of August. My conversation with the provincial Hauptmann, Dr. Gleisner, who, by the way, is a Bavarian by birth and is the first of the generation to live in Austria, dealt with the whole German-Austrian problem. The provincial Hauptmann gave me the impression of being of above average intelligence, and I quite believe that the surmise that he will yet be seen in other decisive State positions will prove right. On my question as to how far his own opinion concerning the possible restoration of normal relations coincides with that of the Austrian government, he answered very frankly, pointing out that the Federal government cannot bridge the present very sad gulf between the German Reich and Austria as long as they are of the opinion that the position of Catholicism seems to be threatened by the National Socialist doctrine. Despite my various objections regarding the present position in Germany, which was brought about at least in part by political Catholicism, which shows a strong similiarity to the activity of Austrian political Catholicism, Dr. Gleisner stuck to his opinion. He concluded his exposition with the words: "Mr. Ambassador, I declare to you quite openly that the Austrian government has only one problem, which is to maintain our course until the cultural position in Germany is clarified."

Count Revertera, the Director of Security, spoke in a very conciliatory manner. He said he is trying to secure for the national opposition the possibility to exist, even though it is banned. (Action Reinthaler, Hueber). He said that it was necessary for the national opposition to become an Austrian affair and to break away clearly from the German party. - I also had an opportunity to speak about some cases of particularly severe punishment, on which Count Revertera gave hopes of a benevolent revision.

In the evening I had assembled the representatives of the Reich German colony around me on the Postling berg. As soon as my arrival in Linz became known, people assembled to greet me in the most friendly manner. The consul told me that my visit has given a new incentive to national circles.

In Salzburg, the Reich German colony had assembled in considerable numbers - about 800 persons - and an excellent atmosphere prevailed among all the participants, who sent their greeting to the Fuhrer. As a result of the readiness of the security directorate to assist, flags and music were allowed and only the Horst Wessel song was forbidden. My visit to the provincial Hauptmann, Dr. Rehrl, left me with the impression that I was dealing with a sensible, politically moderate man, who is working earnestly for reconciliation with Germany. Dr. Rehrl repeatedly expressed to me his special thanks that the Fuhrer had, at the last moment, allowed some German cars to participate in the inauguration of the Grossglockner road. The promises of the Austrian government to exhibit both the German national emblems at the inauguration ceremonies on the Grossglockner were kept. The arrival of the Munich cars, driving in

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close column, with their Swastika pennant, was greeted everywhere with great joy by the population.

The ceremony of inaugurating the road has been reported elsewhere. The members of the Government avoided making any provocative remarks concerning the German relationship, so harmony was not disturbed. The Plenipotentiary General for German motor roads, Dr. TODT, whom I met next day at the Grossglockner, will report on the road itself. The non-arrival of the German car racers who had been announced was commented upon by the population with particular regret. How much it had been wished that a German car should win is proved by the demonstrative and roaring applause which went on for minutes on end, when, at the distribution of prizes, the Munich driver, Kohlrausch, was handed the third prize. As this applause could not be denied in the radio broadcast too, it has already given rise to disagreeable comments in a few newspapers.

The building of this road is without doubt a first class work of culture, in which Reich German constructional firms took the main and decisive part. The Chief engineer of the Reich German firm which built the tunnel at the highest point offered to inform me of the position of the explosives chambers in this tunnel. I sent him to the military attache.

In all places and among all persons to whom I talked, I found the greatest interest in developements in Germany. In Salzburg my presence gave rise to spontaneous demonstrations in favour of the Reich. In Kammer on the Attersee, which I made my last halting place, 500 National Socialists assembled in the evening with music to greet me. It was only with the greatest difficulty that it was possible to explain to these people that any demonstration would involve imprisonment or even severer punishments for them. In spite of the fact that the crowd preserved marvellous discipline and only shouted "Heil" or sang folk songs, some guests in the hotel felt induced to telegraph to the Federal Chancellory: "the German Ambassador has caused a great Nazi demonstration to take place".

All told, I got the impression that morale in the Alpine provinces through which I travelled is excellent in spite of all sacrifices and oppression and that hopes for the rise of the Third Reich and a common destiny are unbroken. The lack of information about the actual state of affairs in Germany is noticeable everywhere. Something can be done about this only if the attempt to come to an arrangement with the Austrian government along the lines I am following succeeds, an arrangement according to which part of the German Press and of German literature will be permitted to enter the country.

(Sgd) PAPEN.

To the
Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor,
Berlin.

By Courier.

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H1169-0106

D 690

The Envoy Extraordinary
and Minister Plenipotentiary
of the German Reich on
Special Mission

Vienna, 21st August 1935.

No. A. 1956 Secret

Contents:

Jugoslavia and the Habsburg Question
Military Discussions

(Three copies for the Foreign Office)

The explanation given by Baron Aloisi on the occasion of the breakdown of the Paris talks, namely that Italian policy in the Danube area will be conducted in the future with still greater initiative and that new discussions are to be expected shortly on the question of the Danube pact, - caused the Jugslav envoy here Nastasijevic, to pay me a visit yesterday.

Mr. Nastasijevic had just returned from a personal conference with the Prince Regent Paul. He said that the present illness of the Prince Regent is caused by an ulcer on the upper arm and is quite unimportant. The Prince Regent, he said, continues to be very worried about the Habsburg question, particularly for the following reason: The Austrian Federal Chancellor asked the French charge d'affaires, Viscount de Montbas, to call on him a few days ago, in order to complain to him that great objections were being raised by the Little Entente against the return of the Habsburgs even privately. Monbas reported this to Paris, whereupon M. Laval sounded the Jugoslav government on the reason why a protest was actually raised even against the private return of Archduke Otto. "The Austrian government was very much concerned about it, and Paris urgently desired that it should be treated better".

From this attitude (M. Nastasijevic continued) the Prince Regent, again not without reason, concludes that the Quai d'Orsay would welcome the private return of the Habsburgs and view it as the first step in the coming restoration.

The Little Entente Conference, which takes place in Bled on the 29th of August, will, he said, again deal, at the wish of the Prince Regent, with the Habsburg question. It is belived in Belgrade that, should this happen, Czechoslovakia and Rumania will confine themselves to protests on paper. There is no point in concluding that "a mobilisation will take place, unless at the same time they are determined to march". But the only power which is ready for this is Jugoslavia.

Mr. Nastasijevic then asked me whether it was not possible for his government to come to a confidential military arrangement with the German Government for the particular eventuality. The Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Stojadisovic, had assured him that his policy towards Austria and Germany remained unchanged. The Jugoslav Government had so far not been informed of the French proposal for the draft of the Danube pact, and had only heard about this draft in a roundabout way.

In any case, it continued to be fundamentally opposed to this question.

I explained to Mr. Nastasijevic that the attitude of the German Government towards any negotiations on the Danube pact which might be taken up again was given precise formulation in the Fuhrer's+of the 21st May. Beyond this, the European situation, which had changed since the Spring, would make it even less possible for us to adhere to any pacts which would lead to the formation of military groups unfavourable to us.

The suggestion of confidential military discussions on possible measures to be taken in case of an attempt to restore the Habsburgs appears very

+ statement.

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significant to me. Even a rather vague military exchange of ideas would further strengthen the existing friendly relations and loosen the connections with the States of the Little Entente. As I assume that the Prince Regent put this question to Mr. Nastasijevic, in order that it should reach the Fuhrer through me in as confidential manner as possible I permit myself to beg you to read the matter in extreme confidence and to send me instructions, so that I can reply via the same channels.

(Sgd) PAPEN.

To the
Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor,
/Berlin.

By Courier.

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D 691

The Ambassador Extraordinary
and Minister Plenipotentiary
of the German Reich on a
Special Mission.

Vienna, 31 August 1935.

A 2034

(Three copies for the Foreign Office)

Contents:

An Englishman about Abyssinia and Germany.
The effect of the German - Austrian Press Communique.

A certain Mr Buxton stayed here recently on his way back to London from Abyssinia, and was presented to the Foreign Minister by the British Ambassador. Mr Buxton, a youngish man, is reported to be one of the greatest experts on Abyssinia, and was sent by the British Foreign Minister, Sir Samuel Hoare, to report specially. According to the reports about the talks that took place here, which I have heard from friendly diplomatic circles, Mr Buxton expressed his opinion that, in spite of their very up-to-date arms and in spite of all expedients, it would take the Italians three to four years to subjugate Abyssinia. Furthermore, the colonial exploitation of the minerals and oil would not be left to Italy. (in the meantime the report of an Anglo-American syndicate treaty with Abyssinia has already come to hand). England was forced to see a threat to her imperial position in the action of Italy and Sir Samuel Hoare would desire nothing more ardently than to move closer to Germany in this situation. Public opinion in England would unfortunately not permit this at the present time. The English public had for some time been greatly alarmed at the cultural situation inside Germany. This circumstance made it impossible for the Foreign Minister to have his way against the Francophiles in the Cabinet.

The decision of the Little Entente in Bled with reference to the measures announced against an intended Habsburg restoration have caused great excitement in the government here, as I was able to ascertain in a talk with the Federal Chancellor which I/today. The following rumourcirculated by very serious circles in Vienna, is significant of the extreme nervousness about the entire situation which is prevalent here: Germany, Hungary and Polandare reported to be negotiating a partition of Czechoslovakia.

With reference to the internal situation, I am able to report that the Press Communique announced between Germany and Austria is regarded in all diplomatic circles here as greatly easing the tension of the situation. It is stressed that this is the first joint [illegible] declaration of the two countries for a long time. Since the 26th of August the local press has, de facto, kept to the agreements in the main, and it is especially noticeable that even the popular press is publishing fewer fairy tales about Germany than before. The suspension of the veto on sports can be expected in the next few days. It is also worth mentioning that Reichminister Dr Kerrl's speech, delivered at the swearing-in ceremony of the new Bishop of Berlin, was everywhere published in the most prominent place and in full this speech is regarded as the happy start of an easing of tension in the cultural situation.

/Fhad

(Sgd) PAPEN.

To the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor, Berlin, by courier.

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Document No. D 692.

GK 502
Filed June 18

The Envoy Extraordinary
and Minister Plenipotentiary
of the German Reich on
Special Mission.

Vienna, 18th October 1935.

No. A 2391

Contents:- The Austrian Governmental re-shuffle.
(Three copies for the Foreign Office.)

Yesterday's cabinet re-shuffle resembles a bloodless insurrection by Prince Starhemberg and the Heimwehr. It becomes clear that Minister Fey heard early of his intended dismissal and that already yesterday afternoon he had the public buildings in Vienna occupied by the Viennese Heimwehr, which is loyal to him. The government countered this measure by simultaneously reinforcing the occupation by police. While the garrison of Vienna was kept in readiness, a number of transports of the Heimwhr from Lower Austria, which is loyal to Starhemberg were on their way to Vienna since the early morning already. This being known, the Viennese Heimwehr was finally prevented from intervening with arms, after Fey had issued the well known order, late in the evening to accept the situation. This evening a big demonstrative parade by approximately 10.000 Heimwehr men from Lower Austria took place, which was used to pay homage to the Federal Chancellor and Starhemberg. It can be assumed that no further incidents will occur. The background for the government re-shuffle, explained in my telegram yesterday, is being confirmed to me by the local diplomats and by many foreign journalists. Prince Starhemberg had tried to counter the sharp criticism which was being expressed openly everywhere of the line in foreign politics recently taken in Geneva, by dropping all dessenting ministers and secretaries of State. Even in high bureaucratic circles, whose guiding principle is only pre-occupation for their own posts, people were talking during the last ten days with increasing excitement of the cul-de-sac into which they had been manoevred by staking the fate of Austria solely on Mussolini's victory. English voices which speak very angrily of Austria's ingratitude and the impossiblity of helping her in future have made a deep impression here, where the people have looked to England for a long time. To this was added the rumour which is being spread these days that Mussolini had informed Laval that he could not guarantee the Brenner Frontier by himself and that France would at last have to express herself about the effective military help to be rendered.

In this connection the communique issued in Bucarest yesterday is causing a particular stir. As is known, the Rumainian government stated in Titulescu's absence that there had never been, nor would there be any negotiations about the passage of Russian troops. In this statement, one can see a victory of the British government against spasmodic attempts to re-inforce the French-Czech-Russian front by the accession of Rumania. How far Italian pressure has constituted to making Starhemberg reshuffle the governments can not be discovered with certainty. But I understand from a reliable source that Mussolini had urgently requested the strengthening of the Austrian government's authority and that Starhemberg is personally firmly convinced of Mussolini's final victory in the Italo-British controversy.

In spite of the Vice-Chancellor's clear victory and of the diligent efforts of the Austrian Press to make it appear plausible that the cabinet re-shuffle was carried out for reasons of internal consolidation, the feeling of moving towards completely uncertain develpoments prevails among the Austrian public, including the Heimwehr cirlces.

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From our point of view the change of affairs is only too welcome. Every new weakening of the system is of advantages, even if it at first seems in fact to be directed against us. The fronts are starting to move and it will have to be our takk to keep themmoving. The continuation of negotiations for compensation, which I had renounced since the Geneva Declaration, seems to be entirely superfluous for the time being. It will be a good thing to strengthen the increasingly excited public feeling against the Italian trend by clever and tactful handling via the press without, however, giving the government justifiable cause for having recourse to the desperate measure of starting a new propaganda campaign against us. I would be very grateful if the Reich Minister for Propaganda were to put a few experienced journalist s onto this work.

For the rest, we can confidently leave further developments to sort themselves out in the near future. I am convinced that the shifting of powers on the European Chess Board, will permit us in the not too distant future to take up actively the question of influencing the south eastern areas.

signed P a p e n .

P.S. It has been announced to night that some of the ministers dropped have been re-employed in new posts. Neustaedter-Stuermer is to go as Minister to Budapest. Secretary of State Karwinsky will also transfer to the diplomatic service. REITHER, the minister for Agriculture will again become provisional "Hauptmann" of Lower Austria.

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Doc. No. D. 693.

The Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary of
the German Reich on Special
Mission.

Vienna, 11th. Nov. 1935.

Diary No. 2644.

Contents:

Discussion with Ambassador Attolico,
Prince Hohenzollern on Rumania.

(Three copies for Foreign Office).

On the occasion of my presence at the Munich Festival the Italian Ambassador Attolico, asked to have a talk with me. Although the Ambassador's attitude is already known to you, I repeat the conversation as a further contribution for an assessment of his personality,

The Ambassador commenced by declaring that his mission was intended to restore German-Italian relations to their former friendly form. To prove that this desire was particularly a result of his own personal initiative, he mentioned the fact that he had himself composed the text of the inaugural speech he made on presenting his credentials, and it had only subsequently been approved by Mussolini. It was due to him also that Mussolini had changed his attitude on the question of the Eastern Pact, which he had at first been inclined to support. The Eastern Pact and the Danube Pact were the ideas of a bad and unnatural policy.

Attolico then inquired about my relations to the Italian Ambassador here, Preziosi. I told him that relations of a personal nature were very good, but that I greatly regretted that Preziosi was in the habit of referring to my efforts towards establishing normal relations here in Vienna as being " a hidden intrigue". I considered this policy of my Italian colleague to be extremely foolish. Attolico agreed with me and stressed that developments in Austria would have to pursue a "normal" course, i.e. that one would have to acknowledge the German character of this country and a policy to this effect as something that was natural. After I had explained to the Ambassador the attitude of the Reich government to the Austrian problem and had assured him that, in accordance with the Führer's declarations, no one in Germany was thinking of an Anschluss or of interfering in Austria's internal affairs, he interrupted me with the remark: "But you ought to give up the propoganda which you are still carrying on there ! ". I replied that no direct or indirect propoganda was being carried on by Germany in Austria, and that all these claims were nothing but pernicious libel. His colleague Preziosi seemed to forget that there was in existence an internal Austrian national opposition, which revolted against the onesided Italophile policy of the government with every fibre of its heart. This seemed to interest Attolico and he suggested that he would write to Preziosi to get him to send me his reports of purported German propoganda for examination. (I fear that Preziosi and Morreale will fight shy of doing this !). To his question as to how German-Italian relations, which are troubled only by the Austrian problem, could be improved, I answered that he could not expect Germany to tackle the complex of questions in this situation on her own initiative. We had no intention of exposing ourselves to the reproach that we want to utilize Italy's present difficult position to force a solution of the Austrian problem. Like him, the Ambassador, I was of the conviction that, in the long run, an Austrian government could only follow a policy which was 'natural". But if the Italian government itself wanted to contribute to the establishment of peace in Central Europe, then it would be advisable for it to use its influence in Vienna for the national opposition in Austria to be given some sort of share in the affairs of the country. Up to now she had unfortunately been active only in the opposite direction.

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Attolico concluded the conversation with the assurance that he would continue his work for a settlement of Italo-German differences. From this conversation I gained the impression that, at any rate, the Ambassador belongs to those politicians who have realised howbad Mussolini's policy towards Germany during the last 2 years was.

Prince Hohenzollern paid me a visit yesterday, on his way back from Sinaia. For a few weeks he had been the guest of his cousin, the king of Rumania. He told me that the king is finally resolved not to permit the realization of Titulescu's intended Rumanian-Russian ties under any circumstances. Titulescu's position at court had become very bad, he had not even appeared at Sinaia for the 60th birthday of the Queen-Mother. The king very much desired an improvement of relations with Germany.

The wife of King George of Greece who - while in the process of divorcing him - has been residing in Rumania for several months, does not contemplate returning to Athens with the reelected King. She regards the King's position as most unstable and above all dependent on General Kondylis, who will present his account at an opportune moment.

Prince Hohenzollern, whom I know to be an ardent patriot and supporter of the Third Reich, stated that it had given him great satisfaction to be able to render a service to German policy by convincing his cousin, the King, of the magnitude of the Russian danger. Should it appear desireable in Berlin to influence the King in any future matter, I would regard it as very advantageous to use Prince Hohenzollern for such a mission.

(Sgd.) PAPEN.

To the
Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor,
Berlin.

By Courier.

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GB 505 Filed June 19

TRANSLATION D 694

The Envoy Extraordinary
and Minister Plenipotentiary
of the German Reich on a
special mission.

No. A 2856

Contents

The development of the internal political situation
(Three copies for Foreign Office)

After the change in the Austrian government, the outlines of the new distribution of foreces are showing up a little more clearly in recent days. Many things point to the fact that, while this change has strengthened the position of Prince Starhemberg, his influence is far from sufficient for reshaping Austria along his lines. In particular, it appears that the young people who have been newly taken into the cabinet, such as the Minister for Agriculture, Strobl, the Social Minister, Prof Dobetsberger and his Secretary of State, Znidaric, cannot be considered without further ado as members of the Starhemberg clique, and that, on the contrary, they wish to go their own way.

Within the cabinet as well as outside it, the violent difference of opinion continues as to Austria's attitude with regard to the question of sanctions. As I learn from various Ministers, the statement of Baron Pfhigl in Geneva, which was inspired by the Foreign Minister, has met with severe criticism even in the cabinet. People are rather horrified at the cooling off of relations with England and at the failure of the attempt to settle the question of the life-claims of the Credit Bank, and they would prefer to get rid of Foreign Minister Berger today rather than tomorrow. As I reported, it is also true that the Ambassador in London, Baron Franckenstein, was asked to succeed Berger. He has meanwhile categorically declined to do so. Prince Starhemberg does not want to drop the Foreign Minister, who is devoted to him, without obtaining a practical reciprocal performance on the other side. He wants to take over the War Ministry so as to be able to control the entire executive as well as the Heinwehr, police and security department. Only if he was allowed to do this would he agree to the Federal Chancellor getting the Foreign Office as well, as is his wish. Otherwise, so people here aver, he wants to put up his diplomatic adviser, legation counsellor, von Alexich, for this post.

As is known, Counsellor of State Funder, with whom I had a long discussion recently, made a strong attack on the Foreign Minister already at the last budget discussion. He declared to me the day before yesterday that his dismissal had already been decided upon, but was difficult to put into effect at present, as they did not want to displease Rome. Moreover Christian Social circles, too, did not agree very much with the antagonistic attitude which the Foreign Minister was continously adopting towards Germany.

The opinions of Counsellor of State Funder, the chief editor of the "Reichspost", may be taken to be typical of the political views of a large section of the Christian Socialists and of their very influential wing of officials. In this connection, the two articles that were published last week on the question of the trials re foreign currency and on the discussion of German-French relations, are also worth noting. I have reported in detail about the first of these articles, and have stressed the tone which, in spite of all criticism, is conciliatory - in which a collaboration of Catholicism with National Socialism against mutual Bolshevist enemy is demanded. Regarding the Fuhrer's conversations with the French Ambassador, the view is held here that Austria is very much hoping for an improvement in German-French relations, in Germany's as well

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as her own interest. Counsellor of State Funder also discussed the possibilities of a German-Austrian understanding very frankly with me. He thought that the atmosphere had fortunately diminished extraordinarily in tension during the last few months, thanks to the press-agreement, and that one must take advantage of this progress in order to reach an agreement which in future would give Germany's and Austria's foreign policy a common denominator. It was in hist opinion much more difficult sucessfully to clear up the problems lying on the surface, such as the press, refugee questions etc., because too many forces both inside and outside Austria were interested in sabotaging such an agreement. But it should be possible to reach secret agreements which would make possible a mutual consultation in future on all questions of foreign policy that are of mutual interest.

Even though this idea of Herr Funder's does not appear to me to be realizable at present, it nevertheless proves to me how much his circles are occupying themselves with the problem of improving German Austrian relations.

Yesterday Minister Buresch paid me a visit. The point of his elaborations was to make clear to me that, now that he was a Minister without Portfolio and no longer burdened by the difficult department of Finance, he would have much more time to devote to the decisive problem of the German-Austrian question. He too stated that one could put great hope in the young minister who had newly joined the cabinet. He obviously has notions of forming a strong party of malcontents here, under the influence of the Christian Socialists, against the Starhemberg clique.

The latter actually still seems to think that Mussolini will complete his Abyssinian adventure without loss of prestige. The Polish Ambassador Gavronski, who a few days ago had a long discussion with Herr Maudel, the director of the Hirtenberg arms factory and the most intimate friend of Starhemberg, told me that Maudel exercises a really uncanny influence on Starhemberg. With all his Jewish resentment, directed against everything that is going on in Germany, he strengthens the Prince in his Italian policy. After the manufacture of munitions for Italy had to be stopped in Hirtenberg because of Italian protests, he, Maudel, had loaded the entire factory on to the railway, in order to continue work in Italy (incidentally an interesting situation for Austria's supply of munitions!). I have today, as I have so often done previously, protested against Starhemberg's latest escapade, the usual Sunday speech in Linz. The Secretary General replied with a sigh that unfortunately the Prince had an uncontrollable temperament!

The government's efforts to make conquests amongst the socialist labourer wings are being continued at high pressure. Not only does Starhemberg make resounding speeches to the working class population every Sunday but Dobretsberger and Zindaric are also very active in that direction. Meanwhile, well informed circles assure me that these efforts completely fail with the social-democratic labour masses. At the opening ceremony of the new, state-owned tobacco factory in Linz, a banqueting table and had also been put up for "Fatherland workers". Significantly it remained completely empty!

The League of Nations delegate, Herr Rost Van Tonningln, in an interesting lecutre last night praised Austria's financial reconstruction in many directions. Nevertheless it is no secret that this year's budget is anything but balanced. On the orders of the budget consultant, a deficit of 360 million Schillings was wiped out within 15 minutes by decreasing expenditure and increasing income. Naturally all this is a swindle on paper. No means are available for the programme to create work in the New Year, and a new appeal to the capital market is not possible this year. I am told by the President of the National Bank, Kienböck. In this difficult financial situation the refusal of the British to help in the matter of the Credit Bank is of course particularly painful.

The instability of both the internal and the external situation has led, as I have previously reported, to renewed activity by the friends of a restoration. In spite of the difficulties which this question presents in the fields of foreign

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and home policy, one must in no way underestimate its importance for future developments. It is certain that Prince Starhemberg is only taking up the Habsburg question in order to have his "finger in the pie". Apart from the fact that he himself cherishes great ambitions for the position of Regent, legitimist friends within the Heimwehr exist in Lower and Upper Austria only: in the Alpine provinces, on the other hand, the Habsburg question is mostly the domain of Christian-Socialist and clerical circles. Reliable sources have informed me of an exchange of opinions which has taken place on this question between the Federal Chancellor, the local Nuncio and the Holy See. The Federal Chancellor had let the Nuncio know that the mediation of the Vatican between Austria and the governments of the Little Entante was very much desired. The Austrian Government for its part was willing solemnly to renounce any territorial revisionism, Otto von Habsberg would be prepared to make a similar declaration.

The reply from the Secretary of State of the Holy See to the Nuncio in Vienna dated the 16.11, is said to have stated that, under the present conditions, the Vatican is not in a position to institute an official action of mediation, as at the present moment it must avoid anything that might be looked upon by Germany as being a clear exposition of the Vatican for a solution of the Austrian questi It was obvious that the Holy See had to avoid everything that might make the position of the German Catholics still more difficult. In detail it is stated in this letter: Italy is now as always to be had for a legitimistic solution of the Austrian question, but could not be brought in under present circumstances. The British Government had recently rather taken up the point of view of the Little Entente and was seeking to draw Yogoslavia into her sphere of influence. Britain could not tolerate any act which meant a strengthening of Italy's position in Central Europe. Even though the position of the Little Entente was doubtful, it yet appeared that Yugoslavia saw a casus belli in the question of a restoration. For the same reasons France too did not want to touch this problem at present. The Vatican therefore recommend that the Government here should abstain from bringing the question up at the moment, but should continue the tactics of strengthening the Austrian legitimist movement which had been successful to date, and in particular secure it a prominent position within the "Fatherland Front".

I learn from the Yugoslav Ambassador that the ambassadors of the Little Entente here met, and that they once again recommended to their governments that they should protest against the activity of the legitimists.

I hear from our friends in Linz that the director of security, Count Resertera, is continuing his efforts to bring about a reconciliation with the national opposition. Besides certain facilities for the imprisoned National Socialists, he is said to have made a proposal for an extensive amnesty. People are hoping that it will be realised at Christmas.

On the occasion of the session of the Diet on the 28.11., the Foreign Minister is going to give an extensive expose, and, as the Secretary General told me today, he will also touch upon the German-Austrian question.

As my exposition shows, the psoition on the whole is pretty confused. A further clearing up can probably only be expected when the political consequences of the Anglo-Italian conflict show up more clearly.

(Signed) Papen.

To the
Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor,
BERLIN.

by courier.

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D. 695

The Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary of
the German Reich on a Special
Mission

Vienna, 28th January 1936.

Confidential.

Contents:

The Question of the Restoration.

(Three copies for the Foreign Office).

My Jugoslav colleague, M. Nastasijevic, has just visited me to bring a letter to my notice which the Head of his government has sent to him for information.

It states that the French charge d'affaires in Belgrade (in the absence of the Ambassador, Count Dampiere) made an official demarche to him, Mr. Stojadinovic, on instructions from Laval, to ask that the Austrian Foreign Minister, Baron Berger-Waldenegg, should be received as soon as possible in Belgrade, Bled or wherever else it was convenient. It was urgently desired that the note of discord between Austria and Jugoslavia, which had arisen because of Schuschnigg's visit to Prague and the last Starhemberg speech, be eliminated.

M. Stojadinovic replied that he regarded the visit as inopportune at that time. Firstly, because such a visit had to end with some kind of result - which, however, could not be anticipated - and furthermore, because Starhemberg's speech was to be taken as an obvious affront to the policy of the Little Entente and the decision of Bled.

M. Nastasijevic told me further, in confidence, that the Little Entente had made a joint demarche in Paris because of Starhemberg's speech.

The Prince Regent Paul, who passed through Austria on his way to London, instructed M. Nastasijevic furthermore to inform me confidentially (with the request that I communicate the same to Berlin) that his own and the Belgrade government's attitude on the question of the restoration was as before an antagonistic one, and that the German government could rely on the firmness of this policy. In view of the present situation, he was also prepared to improve his relations with Hungary in every possible way. The only impediment was Herr Von Kanya, who - as had been known for a long time - was definitely against a Hungarian-Jugoslav rapprochement. They had full confidence in Gombos. It would therefore be profitable - in as far as Berlin was in a position to effect anything in the matter - to work for Kanya's dismissal. The Prince Regent Paul had, above all, expressed his fears about an entente of the "Catholic States, which he expected and foresaw, and into which Rome, Paris and Vienna were trying to push Czechoslovakia also. There were many apparent signs that such a policy was being carried on with 'full speed ahead'. Jugoslavia would thus be forced into a most uncomfortable position (Croatia). The sole aim of this policy was to separate Jugoslavia from Germany and to isolate the latter.

The Prince Regent will inform M. Nastasijevic of his London impressions on his return journey from there.

I would mention finally that my British colleague, Sir Walford Selby, visited M. Nastasijevic yesterday, in order to inform him on the occasion of a discussion about the funeral service of the late King, which took place today, that the British government was determined not to agree to a restoration of the Habsburgs under any circumstances. As, until now, the British Ambassador has always been most evasive on this matter and has always endeavoured to minimise its importance with regard to developements in the Danube area, this new declaration is striking, after all, and would point to a basic change in the attitude of the British Cabinet.

(Sgd) PAPEN.

To the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor, Berlin
By Courier.

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5211.

H1169-0117

Document No: D/696

Vienna, the 30th Jan, 1936.

The Envoy Extraordinary
and Minister Plenipotentiary
of the German Reich on a
special mission.

My Führer,

The bust which you had the kindness to promise me arrived a few days ago. This work by Professor Liebermann is really extraordinarily successful. That was also the opinion of all the people who saw it for the first time yesterday on the occasion of a grand reception, at the embassy here, to celebrate January 30th. Today we shall suitably inaugurate it at a memorial celebration for the 30th January by a performance of the Wehrmacht film.

With my heartiest thanks and with my old admiration, I remain,

Yours

Franz Papen.

To the

Führer and Reich Chancellor,
Berlin.

(5251)

H1169-0118

Translation.

Document No. D. 697

The Ambassador Extra-ordinary
and Minister Plenipotentiary
of the German Reich on a
Special Mission.

Vienna, 6th February 1936.

Dear Herr Wiedemann,

Further to my letter of the 15th of January, re the sale of assets of the Albertina, I enclose the note of an agent of the embassy with the request that you inform the Fuehrer of it, I shall go on keeping an eye on this matter.

With the best regards and Heil Hitler!

Your obedient

(signed in draft) P a p e n .

certified.

(signature) Chancellor.

Embassy Stamp.

5250

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H1169-0119

Doc. No. D. 698.

The Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the German Reich on Special Mission.

Vienna, 6th. February, 1936.

No. A. 745.

Contents:

Starhemberg's Report on His London Talks.
Kanya on His London Impressions.
Mussolini's Intervention in Vienna.

I have received, through an agent, a reproduction of the report made on the 31st January by the Foreign Minister Baron Berger to the Cabinet here, on the results of the London talks of the Vice Chancellor Prince Starhemberg.

The report, the genuineness of which I have no reason to doubt, is enclosed. Three conclusions from it are noteworthy:

1) Eden's repeated stressing of the fact that the principle of a system of collective peace and security form the basis of British European policy, and that in this system, regional pacts can be described only as necessary intermediate stages.

2) That the British policy, like the French, recommends to Austria to follow the path of a rapprochement with the Little Entente; but that the London Cabinet at the same time under no circumstances desires the exclusion of Germany, - indeed, that the German Reich must be given every opportunity "for effective participation in the new organisation of the Danube region".

3) The absolutely unambiguous disapproval on the part of British policy of all efforts of the Austrian government for a restoration.

It appears that, under the impression of this state of affairs the Vice Chancellor has given up the intention of discussions with Otto of Habsburg. The interview given by him on his conversations in Paris clearly indicates a complete withdrawal in the Habsburg question.

Yesterday I had an opportunity for a detailed talk with the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Herr von Kanya, on his way back from London. His description will perhaps supplement the personal impressions obtained by Baron von Neurath in London, and for this reason I repeat them here:

First of all Herr von Kanya had a conversation, lasting for over an hour with the King to whom he gave, in connection with statements by the representatives of the Little Entente, a full description of Hungary's position and aspirations. The King, who has for a long time been sympathetic towards Hungary, received the statement with great interest, and he, Kanya, gained the impression that the King was considerably less prejudiced about the German problems than his predecessor. Both the King and Sir Robert Vansittart expressed a favourable opinion on German Foreign policy, the caution and well weighed nature of which they characterised as serving the cause of European peace and as being the direct opposite of Mussolini's policy. The statements of Mr. Eden, who spoke surprisingly much and with concern about Germany's rearmament were less sympathetic. While Sir Robert Vansittart was aiming at at a compromise on the question of the British-Italian conflict and hoped for it in the Spring, Mr. Eden merely stated that England will not take any new initiative in the League of Nations and that it rested with Mussolini to create an opening for

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negotiations.

Titelescu, who was exceedingly active in London, as well as in Paris had also made, an attempt, in conjunction with Litvinov, to start talks with Hungary on the question of improving Rumano-Hungarian relations. Sir Austen Chamberlain had visited Kanya in order to submit to him a proposal by Titulescu which suggested certain economic advantages in exchange for political concessions. But Kanya declined to enter into any talks. He had also withdrawn from the performance staged by Titulescu in Paris and confined his display of courtesy towards the French government to sending in his card. It appeared to him that, after the ratification of the Franco-Russian pact, Mr. Litvinov and his friends would start a more energetic campaign, but, spoilt by good treatment in England, Litvinov now considered M. Titulescu only as a personality of minor importance.

I then asked Herr von Kanya about the impressions he had received in Vienna (he had a conversation with Baron Berger yesterday). He told me that, in connection with the London talks with Baron Neurath, but without mentioning him by name - he had asked Baron Berger yesterday whether Mussolini was pressing in Vienna for negotiations and reconciliation with Germany. Herr von Berger replied with a plain - "No".(Regarding the actual situation, see my further exposition), French pressure on Vienna remained, as before, extremely strong. It was known to him, - Kanya, - that a "formula of friendship" had been worked out for the renewal of the Czech-Austrian treaty of Arbitration which expires on the 1st of May, and that the Quai d'Orsay itself had drafted it. To this statement the Hungarian Foreign Minister added the remark that, amongst all Hungary's enemies the Czechs were the most inferior and the most hated. An attempt had to be made to work against the French pressure in Vienna. He had recently informed Mussolini that the French Military attache in Budapest was one of the greatest Haliar baiters. Similarly, he, Kanya, would, in accordance with the German conception, exert pressure on Mussolini too, in order to work in Vienna for the normalizing of German-Austrian relations.

He expressed himself this time much more sympathetically than before on the subject of the relationship to Jugoslavia. From another source I hear further that in London Prince Starhemberg urgently desired conversations with the Prince Regent Paul, but the latter declined. Herr Berger likewise made fresh advances in order to get into closer touch with the Jugoslav government. For this purpose, Starhemberg's Adjutant, Prince Windisch-Graetz recently wrote personally to the Prince Regent Paul. Mr. Nastasijevitch will soon inform me of the impressions of the Prince Regent, who will be going back through Austria the day after tomorrow.

During the last days of January, as I learn from reliable sources, a conversation took place between Baron Berger and the Italian Envoy, Preziosi, which was to help to allay the fears of the Federal government regarding the German-Italian rapprochement. In this conversation the Italian envoy replied to the question by Herr von Berger regarding the future security of Austrian independence and the re-creation of the Stresa Front, something as follows:

The sovereignty and independence of Austria formed, now as before, the basis of the Italian policy in the Danube area. Italy is striving, in fact, to reach agreement with Germany on questions of international and particularly Central European policy. But this was also in the interests of Austria. The Italian government did not, however, intend to enter into any agreements - either with Germany or with any other power - which might give the Federal Government cause for uneasiness. As long as Austria did not abandon the basis of the Rome Protocols, she could remain sure of Italian friendship and support.

As for the re-creation of the Stresa front, - this front was a thing of the past. In all probability new solutions would have to be found which would come about with the participation of the German Reich in the

H1169-0121

economic reconstruction of the Danube area. Should German National Socialism not renounce its Pan-Germanic aspirations after all (which actually concerned Italy only in respect of Austria and South Tyrol), then the re-creation of the Stresa Front in one form or another would perhaps be probable. In any case, the Italian Government had always stressed that it aspired to the separation of European questions from the Colonial controversies existing between the powers.

It would follow from this that Mussolini has really modified his attitude to the Austrian question, and that, meanwhile the Austrian Foreign Minister is endeavouring to conceal from others this moment of weakness.

I shall continue to watch the developement of the situation carefully in this respect.

(Sgd) PAPEN.

To the
Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor.

Berlin.

By Courier.

5283.

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H1169-0122

DOCUMENT NO: D/699

Copy

Papen.

(R.S.)

2 February, 1936.

At the session of the Council of Ministers on the 31st Jan., 1936, the Foreign Minister, Baron von Berger-Waldenegg, made the following report on the results of the London Conversations of the Vice-Chancellor Prince Starhemberg:

"It was clear from the beginning that the meeting in London of numerous ruling princes and leading statesmen would lead to a far-reaching exchange of opinions on those questions that are at present in the foreground of international politics. The Vice-Chancellor naturally used the opportunity of his stay in the British capital to direct all efforts towards fully asserting the aims of Austrian policy and towards securing effectively and permanently the vital interests of the Austrian State. As could not be otherwise expected, his conversations with the head of the Foreign Office, Eden, were of decisive importance. The first important conversation between the Vice-Chancellor and the British Foreign Minister took place already on Tuesday, the 28th January in the easy atmosphere of a social evening at Sir Philip Sassoon's house. These conversations already showed unequivocally that the British government, - at least in so far as Mr. Eden considered himself justified to speak in the name of the whole cabinet, - appears to have definitely decided to make the principle of a system of collective peace and security the corner-stone of the British Empire's political orientation. Although Mr. Eden repeatedly stressed that his conversation with the Vice-Chancellor was of an exclusively informative nature, Prince Starhemberg was able to establish at once that this was only a careful manner of speaking and that the head of the Foreign Office was giving expression to the line of British policy already laid down. This first conversation between the Vice-Chancellor and Mr. Eden at Sir Philip Sassoon's House already made it clear:

1. that the British Government intends, under all circumstances to retain the League of Nations, to strengthen its authority and to consolidate and widen the sphere of influence and competence of the Geneva Organization. Without idealizing or over-estimating the present form of the League of Nations, the British Government is consistently and resolutely pursuing a policy based on the covenant of the League of Nations.

2. That the British Government is striving for the realization of the system of collective peace and security within the framework and on the basis of the League of Nations Covenant. Regional pacts were, in the British conception, only necessary stages on the way to the realization of an international system of collective security.

3. That, from the point of view of practical politics, an effective guarantee of Austrian independence represents such a stage. As Italy is not, at the present moment, in a position effectively to guarantee the independence of Austria, the latter must continue to follow the path she has already embarked upon, which is that of a rapprochement with the Little Entente States, until the realization of a collective structure of the Danube region capable of surviving. The linking up of the Little Entente States with those of the Balkan Union and the support of the New Order in the Danube region by the Great powers (France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union would, in this respect, - namely within the framework of the League of Nations Covenant, - be the first to be considered) would be sufficient to prevent, from the start, any disturbance of the peace in this part of Europe.

In accordance with the decisions of the Federal Government on this point, the Vice-Chancellor represented the Austrian point of view

H1169-0123

to the British Foreign Minister, and strongly emphasised that only the legitimist conception can be used successfully against the disastrous influence of German National Socialism in Austria. This opinion was not however, shared by the head of the Foreign Office. Eden explained unequivocally to the Vice-Chancellor that the British Government had reached the conclusion that the idea of restoration and any kind of revisionism were, at the present moment, the undeniable obstacles to the realization of a system of collective security in the Danube region. Neither of the problems was in the foreground at present, and they had to be treated accordingly. The Government of the Austrian Federation would do well to abstain from anything that could hinder a far-reaching rapprochement of Austria to the Little Entente.

On Wednesday, the 29th January, the Vice-Chancellor was received by His Majesty King Edward in a half hour's audience, which, in substance, hardly went beyond the limits of a conventional visit. It is necessary, however, to establish in this case too that the British King on the whole represented the same point of view as was expressed on the previous evening by Mr. Eden. King Edward expressed his warmest sympathy with Emperor Otto, but stressed at the same time that the good of Austria lay in the temporary renunciation by the imperial house of the proclamation and exercise of its rights.

Following on the audience with King Edward, a second conversation took place between the Vice-Chancellor and Mr. Eden. The positive result of this conversation undoubtedly lay in the fact that the British government declared its readiness to participate actively in the guarantee of Austrian independence against any attack from outside. The negative result of the conversation was an almost forced declaration by the Vice-Chancellor, and indeed in the name of the Federal Government that Austria renounced, for the next few years, any attempt to raise the question of restoration or revision. The constant reference by the British Foreign Minister to the fact that the London Cabinet on no account desires the exclusion of Germany from the Central European system of peace and security also struck Prince Starhemberg as being not without significance. "We shall employ all our efforts," declared Mr. Eden to the Vice-Chancellor, "to provide the German Reich too with every opportunity to participate energetically in reorganizing the Danube area." The extremely reticent reply of the British Foreign Minister to Prince Starhemberg's question as to Great Britain's attitude to the National-Socialist demand for a plebiscite in Austria ("we have not yet examined this problem," were Mr. Eden's actual words), also gives one much food for thought.

H1169-0124

TRANSLATION OF 2247 PS

The Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary
on a special mission.

at present Berlin W 9

17 May, 1935

Lennéstrasse 9.

My Fuehrer,

Because of the necessity for resting your voice for Tuesday, I would consider it unreasonable to apply for a further discussion on the Austrian problem. I should therefore like to confine myself to explaining to you in résumé form the present position and the necessity for a resolution, with the request that you communicate a decision to me.

The news, which I communicated to you the day before yesterday, that the Austrian Government would proclaim its intention to arm through an autonomous act, and simultaneously on 2 June would announce a Starhemberg regency becomes more and more likely.

The demonstrations of the Heimatschutz (Home Guard) and of all militant formations, arranged to take place on the 2nd of June are announced through the press. It has been confidentially reported that demonstrations by farmers are intended. Herr von Hassell has reported about his interview with Mussolini that, since the Hapsburg question can not be solved because of the resistance of the Little Entente, "Austria will rightfully be satisfied with a monarchical restoration, even if it is not a Habsburg one, and will perhaps first introduce a regency à la Horthy". A complete Heimwehr dictatorship under Starhemberg would mean the total throttling of all pro-German tendencies, it would further purge the government machinery in this direction, and above all try to estrange the Army from German connections. How far such a regime could be successful in the long run is certainly questionable, but, in face of the apathy of the widest circles in Austria and the bad economic position, as well as the impossibility of the Reich helping financially, it will certainly remain in existence for a number of years.

With this, Mussolini would have attained what he obviously cannot attain through the Danube pact. The Little Entente will be satisfied because the German possibilities of influence will then be repelled finally, without the danger of an Italian invasion of Austria existing.

I suggest that we take an active part in this game. The fundamental idea should be to pit Schuschnigg and his Christian-social Forces, who are opposed to a home front dictatorship, against Starhemberg. The possiblity of thwarting the measures arranged between Mussolini and Starhemberg should be afforded to him, in such way that he would submit the offer to the government of a penal German-Austrian compromise of interests. According to the convincing opinion of the leader of the NSDAP. in Austria, Capt. Leopold, the totalitarian principle of the NSDAP in Austria must be replaced in the beginning by a combination of that part of the Christian elements which favors the Greater Germany idea and the NSDAP. If Germany recognizes the national independence of Austria and guarantees full freedom to the Austrian national opposition, then as a result of such a compromise the Austrian government would be formed in the beginning by a coalition of these forces. There should follow a gradual disintegration of the barriers erected between the two countries.

The rearmament of the army would have to be effected in close cooperation with the German army even if material aid from Germany would be limited. A further consequence of this step would be the possibility of the participation of Germany in the Danube pact, which would loose all its acuteness due to the settlement of relations between Germany and Austria. European situation and especially on our relationship with England.

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One may object, that Mr. Schuschnigg will hardly be determined to follow such a pattern, that he will rather in all probability immediately communicate our offer to our opponents. Of course, one should first of all explore the possibility of setting Schuschnigg against Starhemberg through "go betweens". The possibility exists. If Mr. Schuschnigg will finally say "No" and makes our offer known in Rome, then the situation would not be any worse by that, but on the contrary, the efforts of the Reich government to make peace with Austria would be revealed - without prejudice to other interests. Therefore even in the case of refusal this last attempt would be an asset. I consider it completely possible, that in view of the far spread dislike of the Alpine countries of the pro-Italian course and in view of the sharp tensions within the confederate government (Bundesregierung), Mr. Schuschnigg will grasp this last straw- always under the supposition that the offer could not be interpreted as a trap by the opponents, but that it bears all the markings of an actually honest compromise with Austria. Assuming success of this step, we would again establish our active intervention in Central European politics, which, as opposed to the French-Czech and Russian political maneuvers, would be a tremendous success, both morally and practically.

Since there are 2 weeks left to accomplish very much work in the way of explorations and conferences, an immediate decision is necessary.

The Reich Army Minister (Reichswehrminister) shares the opinion presented above and the Reich Foreign Minister (Reichsaussenminister) wanted to discuss it with you, my Fuehrer.

(Signed) von Papen.

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H1169-0126

Document No. D. 700

The Envoy Extra Ordinary
and Minister Plenipotentiary
of the German Reich on a
Special Mission.

Vienna 12th Feb. 1936.

No. A. 867

Contents:-

Prince Regent Paul on his impressions
of London and Paris.
(Three copies for the Foreign Office)

The day before yesterday, the Prince Regent Paul travelled back to Belgrad via Salzburg and Klagenfurt. During this time he gave his impression of London and Paris to the Jugoslav Envoy here in detail. By and large, the information which we had already received from another source was confirmed, namely that the whole attention of the Prince Regent was concentrated on creating safeguards against any resoration of the Hapsburgs that may be intended. Whereas, in this connection, he received the fullest support of the authoratative personalities in England, he had rather been dealt with reproachfully in Paris, where they had tried again to arrange a meeting between Prince Starhemberg and himself. He refused this point blank, and especially, too, a meeting with one of the brothers of the Empress Zita, who had been specially invited to President Lebrun's reception. When asked about the reasons for his assuming such an antagonistic attitude towards Austria, he replied that he regarded the policay pursued by the Great Powers on the Austro-German question as wrong. If it ever came to a clash between Germany and Austria, the Austrian army would - and this was his conviction - fight for three days at the outside and then go over to them. He therefore did not intend to sacrifice his Serbian soldiers for this if things happend thus.

He was very sceptical in his judgement of the activity of the Russians and M. Titulescu. It was quite probable that M. Titulesc was in the pay of the French or the Russians, perhaps both of them. It had been arragned with Minister Hodza, that, directly after his stay in Paris, he should travel to Belgrade for a talk. Only then would the return visit to Vienna take place.

I got the impression that the greatest satisfaction prevails in Jugoslav circles because, owing to the stubbornness of Jugoslav policy, it has now been possible to postpone the restoration question at least for a reasonable period. Undoubted credit for this is due also to the envoy Nastasijevic, with whom I worked in closest co-operation.

My Polish colleague has received information from Paris, according to which the right wing hopes - when the chamber has accepted the ratification of the Russian Treaty - to delay it in the Senate until after the elections. In this way it is hoped, under more favourable conditions to wreck this project after all perhaps.

v. Papen.

To the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor,

Berlin.
By courier.

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Doc. No. D 700. 707

The N[illegible]oy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary of
the German Reich on a Special
Mission.

Vienna, 12th. February 1936.

No. A. 891.

Contents:

Discussion with Prince Starhemberg.

(Three copies for the Foreign Office).

I have already reported about my detailed conversation with Prince Starhemberg in the telegram I sent today. He had invited me to visit him, in order to talk about the results of his journey to London and about the general situation. The Vice Chancellor admitted with remarkable frankness that the question of the restoration had had to be postponed for some time, as a result of the loud protests of the Little Entente, especially of Jugoslavia. He himself had never regarded it as acute. The reasons for his recent sponsoring of the Habsburg dynasty were to be found solely in the fact that the foreign - in particular the British - press had for a long time presented a completely false picture of his efforts.

He had discussed the European situation in detail with the leading statesmen in both London and Paris. While M. Flandin had promised him that a compromise acceptable to Italy would soon be reached, he had found two completely opposed trends in England. One of these also favoured a compromise, while the other one demanded Mussolini's head. I gathered from the lengthy statements of the Vice Chancellor on this subject that he had received an impression in London of the very great danger in which his friend and protector Mussolini stands. Compared with these trends, the French intentions of helping Mussolini were really only of a very platonic nature. In his English discussions he had also often heard the opinion expressed that the Italian manoeuvre must be brought to an end, so that the machinery of the League of Nations could then be employed against Germany. Little was said in in his presence about Germany in either capital, but when the subject was brought up, stress was always hard on the great concern about the final aim of German armament. When I asked whether German-Austrian relations had been discussed in this connection, the Prince maintained that, in reply to questions relating thereto, he had only said that, unfortunately, the relations were bad, and that, as a result of Italy's weakened position, there was concern about a renewed activity of Germany in the Austrian question; but he wished to stress that he had taken no part whatsoever in the discussions of the Little Entente, which had been conducted with a stressed front against Germany.

The conversation then swung to German-Austrian relations and to the possibility of an agreement. In this connection Prince Starhemberg stated the following: it appeared difficult to him to begin with the settlement of certain questions of detail, in view of the hardening of the position on both sides. It was therefore necessary to try to tackle the German-Austrian settlement on the basis of a bigger conception. He considered that states with an authoritarian regime were in the same threatened position with regard to the attack of the Jewish-Freemason front against Fascism. It therefore appeared to him practical to give to the discussions about German-Austrian settlement the stressed note of the necessity for establishing a unified front between Italy, Austria, Germany and Hungary. A discussion of this kind would not touch any questions of prestige at first, there would be a mutual rapprochment and it would probably be possible after all to work out a formula in the course of agreements, in which the countries could guarantee each other their mutual integrity, so that the Austrian wish for a safe-guarding of her independence would thus be satisfied.

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Doc. No. D ~~700~~.

I entirely agreed with the Prince in his conception of a joint threat from the Jewish-Freemason Bolshevist front, but expressed my doubt as to whether Mussolini would be willing to hold such a discussion in view of his French ties. The Vice Chancellor said that one need not announce it publicly; he was of the opinion that Mussolini would agree. In answer to my question as to whether Mussolini had commented recently in any way on German)Austrian relations, Starhemberg replied that he had informed Mussolini of the contents of our talk of the 10.1.36., but had not received any comments about it. He therefore intended to visit Mussolini personally in the near future, both in order to talk with him about his London impressions and in order to find a basis for anItalo-Austro-German settlement. This trip could not take place before the middle of March, as Baron Berger was unfortunately going to Italy for a short leave before then, when he wished to meet Suvich (presumably on the subject of Jugoslavia).

I told the Prince, as I had already told him in my first conversation, that, as far as the Austro- German settlement was concerned, we had absolutely no secrets from Italy. It was known in Rome that for the last year and a half I had siezed every opportunity here for normalising relations, so far without success. We had therefore let Mussolini know that we were looking forward with interest to his influence on the Viennese Cabinet. When during the course of the conversation, I expressed my astonishment to the Prince about the recent attempts of the Czech Prime Minister to make an economic Danubian treaty excluding Germany, he said that Austria had no part in these efforts. I told him that it was very desirable in any case that, at the impending Viennese discussion with Mr. Hodzar, Austria should stand clear of this way of doing things, in order to show her good intentions of not being made a member of an economic anti-German front as well. The Prince promised to work for this end.

I had gained the impression from the course of the conversation that the Prince does in fact feel rather concerned about the encirclement of Germany, instigated recently by Paris. He believes that an agreement made between Rome, Vienna and Berlin in good time could be thrown into the balance at the decisive and crucial moment of the Italo-British conflict. It remains to be seen what course his discussions with Mussloini about this subject will take.

(Sgd) PAPEN.

To the
Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor.
Berlin.
By Courier via Foreign Office.

5225.

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H1169-0129

DOCUMENT NO: D/702

Vienna, 21st April 1936.

The Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary of the
German Reich on special mission.

Contents:

Political Report.

(3 copies for the Foreign Office)

I finished my Easter furlough in Jugoslavia on Saturday already, in order to be present at the visit of the German military delegation to Vienna. As I already reported in my telegram No. 52, the sending of high officers of the German armed forces to the Prince EUGEN festival has made an excellent impression, not only in Austrian army circles, but also on the whole national population of Austria. It showed that the glorious tradition of united brotherhood in arms is perhaps the only bond which could not be severed, and that the revival of these memories is a valuable means for a settlement of the existing antagonisms.

To conclude the celebrations, I had invited the heads of the Austrian army to a breakfast with the German delegation this morning. I used this occasion to hail the personality of the great general as "the soldier of the Reich" and to point to the decree of Field Marshal von Blomberg, which ends with the words that Prince Eugen's deeds were only for Germany's sake.

The Hapsburg question has, contrary to all German reports, not played any role these days, as I have already reported in the above mentioned telegram. I find it very unfortunate in this connection that the German press has accused the King of Spain of playing against us the game of bringing back the Hapsburgs. The King assured me, in a long conversation, of his very strong sympathies for the new Germany and for the Führer's daring resolve to throw off the last fetters of the Treaty of Versailles. It was his great wish to have a conversation with the Führer, when he visits Berlin in the summer, as he plans to do, and he asked me to find out how this wish would be received in Berlin. Even though I have no exaggerated opinion of the value of monarchs, who, like him, left their country in the lurch, I nevertheless believe that, with the many connections which the King maintains in England, France and Italy, and with the sympathy which he has always shown towards Germany, his wish should be granted. I take the liberty of asking for instructions to this effect.

The Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg left for Milan yesterday to deliver a political speech there. Several of my agents maintain that a meeting with Mussolini or Suvich has been planned. The reason for such a meeting may be the shift in the inner political situation, which was to be noticed in Austria during the last weeks. It is certain that, with the introduction of general conscription against the will of Prince Starhemberg, his position has become much weaker, and that Schuschnigg as well as the army are working very strongly to condemn the Heimwehr to insignificance. A clever move by the Chancellor in this connection is the declaration that his storm troops will in future be only an ideological army. With this, he has taken the first step towards the dissolution of the armed units and the further elimination of the Heimwehr.

On the other hand, it can be noticed that the work of the Freedom Union, supported by all elements of the Christian-Social parties, is making further progress. The hopes of this group already go so far

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(5254)

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today, as to include being able to reform the government in the summer, from which Starhemberg will be pushed out and in which they hope to reach an agreement with the national opposition by the inclusion of national personalities. All this is also connected with the repercussions of the Phoenix affair, the filthiness of which, sickens the Federal Chancellor and the exposure of which, has given strong encouragement to the national elements.

What the German press is spreading about Sir Austen Chamberlain's stay and conversations tallies only to a limited extent. Sir Austen has repeatedly emphasized that he solely wants to obtain a personal picture of the difficulty of the Central European problem and has been very reserved about making any statements. According to the reports of the Secretary General of the Fatherland Front, the conversations with the Chancellor and the Foreign Secretary clearly revealed the efforts of the British statesman to loosen Austria's dependence on Italy and to induce a stronger leaning towards the Little Entente. As Colonel Adam maintains, it could have been understood from Sir Austen's statements that, in Britain's opinion, Italy would defend Austria's independence under all circumstances, but that at the moment, Italy's position was much too difficult for Austria to forego the support of the League of Nations. In any case, a German-Austrian agreement was always the best guarantee for Austria's independence, provided that the Schuschnigg Cabinet made a number of concessions in the field of home politics to the German nationalist elements in Austria.

It is therefore not surprising that neither Herr von Berger nor the Federal Chancellor can have been very satisfied with their conversations with the former British Foreign Secretary.

I had an opportunity to speak to Sir Austen the day before yesterday. On his way back from Prague he will stay a few more days in Vienna and will give me the chance to expound the German-Austrian problem from our point of view.

If it does happen that the English wait to try to compensate French concessions in the question of fortifying the Rhineland by German concessions in the Central European question, then it will be practical to lay down as early as possible the lines along which the coming negotiations in the Central European area are to be conducted.

I take the liberty of reserving a further report on this question.

(sgd) Papen.

to the

Führer and Reich Chancellor,
Berlin.

By Courier.

(5255)

H1169-0131

DOC NO: D/ 703

Vienna, 12th May 1936

The Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary of the
German Reich on a special mission.

No: A.254.

CONFIDENTIAL

Contents:-

May Day demonstration of the Freedom Movement.

(3 copies for foreign office).

On my return I received the attached interesting report on the Sunday Parade of the Freedom Movement.

It shows that, in spite of extreme efforts on the part of the Heimwehr, they could not prevent the Workers Demonstration taking place. The cat-calls of the demonstrators showed quite clearly that the Heimwehr imagines the Freedom Movement to be camouflaged National Socialists, that is, people who want to be reconciled with Germany.

The attached "Neuigkeitsweltblatt" ("News of the World") speaks quite openly, in its report, about the strong internal tension which appeared the day before yesterday: the possibility of a split in their own camp which could hamper consolidation in the country. People would like to blame the split on to provocateurs, but they know perfectly well that it is a question of fundamental differences of opinion.

One thing is clear, that owing to Schuschnigg's participation, the Labour Movement has, from today, been acknowledged as a legal movement, in which the Federal Army and Police will in future see a comrade in arms against the Heimwehr, which is hated by all three.

The following event is interesting: The Czech Legation Secretary, DOHALSKY made an offer to Herr STAUD (the Leader of the Freedom Movement) to place at the disposal of the Freedom Movement, on behalf of the Czech Government, any amount of money he needed to support him in the struggle against the Heimwehr. The only condition was that the Freedom Movement must guarantee to adopt an anti-German attitude. Herr STAUD refused this demand point blank. This shows in itself how even people in the enemy camp are already judging the new re-grouping of forces.

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This further shows the necessity of our continuing to support this movement financially, and, in fact, primarily with a view to its continuing the fight against Jewry. I consider a sum of 100,000.--RM. necessary, which, under certain circumstances, could be put at their disposal in Schillings, and ask for approval of this.

Our connection with the Freedom Movement, especially with its leader, STAUD, is already so intimate that I have been asked what personalities the German Government would desire, in case of the introduction of ministers of the national opposition into the cabinet.

The Starhemberg Declaration (Neues Wiener Journal, 9.5.36) in which he calls for a crusade against Bolshevism and the creation of a united front from North to South, has met with considerable attention in the foreign press. Everything is being tried in English circles here to diminish the influence of Starhembergand his intimate co-operation with Italy. It may be assumed that a possible approach by Starhemberg to the German Government would be viewed with greater scepticism by the British Foreign Office.

My conference with the Federal Chancellor will probably take place tomorrow.

(sgd) V. Papen.

To the Führer and Reich Chancellor,
Berlin.

By Courier.

H1169-0133

DOCUMENT NO: D/703

May Day Demonstration of the Freedom Union

of 10th May, 1936.

As already reported, the Police have imposed a formal embargo on the leaflet of the Freedom Union which was ready for distribution on Friday. This embargo was imposed not so much because of the protest of the Jewry, as because of the protest on the part of Starhemberg, who objected to the picture of a cock on the title page, which was a symbolic representation of the home defence. Of the 250,000 copies only 300 copies were seized. At 6.30 p.m. on Saturday, Staud (the leader of the Christian Socialist Workers Union and of the Freedom Union) was called before Schuschnigg. The latter declared to Staud that, because of the above mentioned leaflet, (News-sheet of the Freedom Union) he (Schuschnigg) could no longer keep his promise to take part in the May demonstration. Staud explained to the Chancellor of the Union that it was too late to warn the masses of the disappointment which will be caused by the Chancellor's absence. He was therefore obliged to carry on with the May demonstration with the Chancellor absent. As, however, relations between the Freedom Union and the Heimwehr were strained to the utmost, the Freedom Union was obliged to bear in mind the possibility of an open conflict, and, in order to meet all eventualities, and for reasons of safety, supply 20,000 armed members of the Freedom Union with live ammunition. The Freedom Union did not strive after a solution of the conflict with the Heimwehr by violence, but had no need to fear it. Out of loyalty, however, he must openly express his fears, that, after the solution of the conflict by means of arms, the masses of the Freedom Union will hardly be able to understand why Schuschnigg should remain a member of the Cabinet. In the course of further discussions, Schuschnigg withdrew his original statement and renewed his promise to be present at the demonstration. In any case, his appearance was dependent on certain conditions which Staud could not decline for reasons which are to be given later. These conditions were:-

1. Inquiry into the editorship of the leaflet and infliction of certain measure of disciplinary punishment on persons responsible for it and for the derisive attitude towards the Home defence (this did not bring any results, on the contrary, this affair was settled in Austria, i.e. without causing harm to any one).

2. No arms were to be carried, with the exception of one armed company of the Freedom Union.

While the conversations were still in progress, the Bund-Chancellor had a sudden telephone call from Major Fey, who strongly advised him not to take part in the demonstration, because the Heimwehr would use violence against the Freedom Union. This caused further discussion on the question whether the Bund-Chancellor should attend or not. In this discussion Schuschnigg did not appear in the best light, for he wavered continuously between "yes" and "no" and between rage and fear. He then decided on the rage and the "yes".

In connection with the course taken by the demonstration, particularly noteworthy is the following:

At the beginning of the procession, there appeared a motor-cycle with a side-car seating two officers of the Heimwehr, one of whom was of a higher rank - Major Fitzner. The motorcycle drove in front of the procession, with its passengers shouting, "Heil Starhemberg". At the corner of Babenbergerstreet and the Ring several incidents took place. A group of men of the Heimwehr, partly in uniforms and partly in civilian clothes, attempted to break up the procession and shouted continuously: "Heil Starhemberg", "Nazi bandits", "Down with the Government", "Fie Schuschnigg", "Nazi dogs in disguise", "Black Marxists".

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H1169-0134

Suddenly, on the balcony of the second floor of the house at the corner of the Ring and Babenbergerstreet appeared Major Fey. During further progress of the procession it came at various points to fighting, in which many people were injured, mostly lightly, but some very seriously. The fact, that Bund-Chancellor Schuschnigg, quite unforeseen and against the program, suddenly left the festive platform and stood with the procession in order to march with it, - deserves special mention.

The following course of ideas was accepted in the concessions made by Staud to Bund-Chancellor:

Schuschnigg's participation in May demonstration means legalisation of the Freedom Union. With this the national ideology of the Freedom Union, the fight against the Jewry and against the Heimwehr become legalised. In addition, further progress of the demonstration led to the fact that the official organs of the State (the Army of the Bund and its Police) saw in the Freedom Union a legalised support for the State, and in the Heimwehr, a threat to the order and to the State. All the more so, as the provocation of the Heimwehr forced the police to arrest 114 members of the Home defence.

Special attention should also be called to the fact that the National Socialists behaved in a particularly clever and reasonable manner, according to their directions. The Freedom Union has greatly enhanced its prestige by brilliantly conducting the May Demonstration, from the technical and organizing points of view, under favourable political circumstances.

Doc. No. D 704.

The Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the German Reich on a Special Mission.

Vienna, 3rd July 1936.

A. [illegible].

Contents:

Discussion with Prince Starhemberg.

(Three copies for Foreign Office)

Prince Starhemberg today invited me to a longthy discussion, in order to disclose to me that, in view of the Olympic Games and in the interest of further lessening the tension in our relations, he intends to lift the ban on sports.

To this he attached the special request that the German press should not evaluate this decision in the sense of its being an attempt by Starhemberg to make friends with National Socialism or the Reich government. He considered it important to stress the fact that his attitude to the Schuschnigg government was one of the greatest loyalty.

I gave the Prince the reply that I could only applaud the lifting of the ban on sports, and that I would do my very best to obtain a comment in the German press in accordance with his wish. As the lifting of the ban must be sanctioned by the cabinet, the Prince will inform me of it officially in a few days time. But may I be permitted to ask now already, most respectfully, that the German Press be be instructed to comment on this step as being a happy result of the further lessening of tension, without attaching any political considerations to it.

In reply to my question as to his further intentions, Prince Starhemberg told me that he intends to use the summer for his recreation and for travelling, and that only in the autumnwould he again occupy himself intensively with the affairs of his Heimwehr (Home Guard). He was glad not to be a Minister any longer, as he hated offices and files. Within the next few days he will go once again to an Italian seaside resort.

During the course of the conversation he also asked me about the success of my conciliatory efforts, during which - as already previously - he expressed the opinion that, as a consequence of the catastrophic developement of a tendancy to the Left in France as well, a union of the countries with Fascist governments was more than ever necessary. I told him that my efforts to reach a modus vivendi with the Austrian Chancellor were surely in the same direction as his own wishes. We were convinced that , in the future political developement of Austria, the Heimwehr would yet have a decisive task to fulfil, and we should welcome it if, after peace had been restored, we could fight for the same aim.

The Prince then asked me why Germany adopted such an antagonistic attitude towards a restoration. He had become convinced that the party political and clerical disintegration that was taking place within the army and officialdom could only be halted if somebody neutral - a monarch - were to head the country. He therefore believed that Austria must adopt this course. When I attempted to make clear to him why a restoration, particularly if carried out in a way that was aimed against Germany, must evoke the very strongest opposition, and that to me it appeared doubtful whether a personality such as Otto could exercise the influence that Starhemberg desired, he said that Otto was not at all a member of the black camp and strongly criticised political Catholicism.

Our discussion, which was held in a very friendly atmosphere, left me with the astounding impression that Starhemberg also seems to be counting on a restoration. On the other hand I do not think it impossible that on re-enter-

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-ing the political arena in the autumn, he might decide to campaign for President Miklas' position. Such a solution would perhaps, if - after a conciliation has taken place - it were to be eventually supported by Rome and Berlin, form a happy counter-balance to the all too clerical tendencies of the Schuschnigg government.

(Sgd) PAPEN.

To the
Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor,
Berlin.

By Courier.

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Document No. D. 705

Translation.

The Envoy Extraordinary
and Minister Plenipotentiary
of the German Reich on a
Special Mission.

At Present. Berlin W.9.
9. Lennestrasse.

16th July 1936.

My Fuehrer!

On July 26th 1934 you proposed to the late Field Marschall that I should be sent to Vienna on a temporary mission, for the restoration "of normal and friendly relations."

With the agreement signed on July 11th, the decisive step has been taken in this direction. I know very well how difficult you found it in many respects to take this step. All the more is it - according to my innermost conviction - a first class piece of statesmanship.

The effect in the fields of foreign politics is clearly visible: our friends admire the decision; our enemies must admit that the direction of European politics has slipped out of the French or or Franco-English hands into the hands of Germany.

As far as the internal effect of the German-Austrian agreement is concerned, I can state that it was welcomed with great joy, both in Germany and Austria. The Party Members in Austria have assured me that they stand, fully disciplined behind the Fuehrer whose step has guaranteed them the future destiny of Germany. To sum up; an enormous spiritual burden has fallen from the German people on both sides of the frontier, who are now aiming at a solution of the German question along new lines.

It has always been a proud feeling for me that you, my Fuehrer, entrusted me, at a critical moment in German history with a task, which embraced the shaping of the fate of Germany as a whole for the future. In these last two years, I have had many bitter disappointments and even personal humiliations on this path. Today, I can feel that the path I followed was not in vain.

Even though the German question will need very careful and considerate handling in the future too, especially after the incredible difficulties which have gone before I would like now, at the end of the task you entrusted to me to lay my office back in your hands.

I thank you, my Fuehrer, for having had the good fortune to work for Germany and your great mission

Papen.

To the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor.

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GB 506 dated June 19

Doc. No. D/706

The Envoy Extraordinary
and Minister plenipotentiary
of the German Reich
on a special mission.

Vienna, 21 August, 1936.

Diary No. A 455.

Contents:

After the Olympic Games.

(Three copies for the Foreign Office)

Affected still by the overpowering impression of the turbulent will to live, the concentrated energy, the wonderful organization and the unsurpassed sports performances of the German nation - an impression which deeply moved every participant - one is struck particularly strongly by the contrast of the sober commonplaceness which envelops one on leaving German soil. The Austrian participants in the Olympic Games must also have experienced these feelings when they returned from Berlin. Although the press here has reported the great German performance absolutely truth fully and appreciatively, great concern was nevertheless obviously felt lest the impressions gained in Berlin should have too great an influence on the National-Socialist atmosphere here, and the reception of the returning athletes was therefore made as unobtrusive as possible.

No official celebration whatsoever took place in Vienna, in order to avoid the feared demonstrations. These celebrations were transferred to Linz, where Prince Starhemberg had travelled. Joy at the Austrian Olympic success was expressed in individual celebrations, as for example in Kreins, where the Olympic victory in the single-canoe event was given the freedom of the city, amidst the enthusiastic participation of the whole population.

Austria did not do badly in Berlin. It is placed after Great Britain in the total score. Pride over this, but especially the over-whelming experience of common German will-power will bear rich fruit in this country and will prove an irreplaceable aid in the battle for the victory of the national idea.

Apart from this, there is the following to report:

On the occasion of a dinner which I gave on Sunday night in Berlin in honour of the Secretary of State in the Polish Foreign Office, Count Szembeck the latter expressed his great satisfaction to me about his talk with the Fuhrer and the latter's declaration that Germany had no desire to disturb Polish-French relations, provided that the loyalty of German-Polish relations did not suffer throught them. Count Szembeck repeatedly stressed the fact - which, incidentally, the Polish envoy here confirmed to me yesterday - that no political discussions whatsoever took place on the occasion of General Gamelin's visit.

I learnt further from envoy Attolico that he had been informed from a most authentic source that Sir Robert Vansittart reported to his government that the conception which has been entertained about the Hitler Regime in London until now, would have to be corrected in many points. The Berlin discussion and events had made on him a deep impression of the tremendous will to live of the German people.

About Austria I have to report that Prince Starhemberg has apparently now entered into a closer alliance with the legitimists. Herr Moreale who, in a rather sensational article, yesterday gave the Austrian Government some

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instructions as to how they should behave towards Germany in the future, toldmy informant that Mussolini urgently desired to place Starhemberg in President Miklas' position in autumn. It is possible that Starhemberg wants to further this aim by his connection with the legitimists. But it is not out of the question, either that he is trying to ally himself with the legitimists in order to place as many difficulties as possible in the way of the solution of July 11th. It appeared to me a good idea, in any case, that the anticipated talk with Colonel General Göring should take place before too long. Starhemberg in Miklas' place, in so far as he allows himself to be harnessed to the German policy, would be an asset if cleverly directed.

I would take this opportunity to request that our envoy in Rome be instructed to suggest there sometime, whether, after the change of July 11th, the dismissal of the really most unpleasant Herr Moreale is not possible.

Lastly, to throw light on the present position in Austria, I append an extract from an instruction of the Prague Secret Service to its Viennese branch:

"It has unfortunately to be noted that the wild National-Socialist excesses of July 29th of this year have not had the result we expected. Austria's rapprochement to the Third Reich in the field of foreign politics, is making further progress, as well as the process of the "cultural" collaboration of the two sister nations. One can also assumefrom your most recent reports that the Trojan Horse of National Socialism is bringing ever greater confusion into the ranks of the Fatherland Front and particularly into the ranks of the "Heimatschuts" (Home Guard). Opposition to the normalising of German-Austrian relations, which is extremely dangerous to Austrian independence, appears, nevertheless, to be relatively very great; it obviously only lacks good organization. It is, furthermore, very difficult to bring together the opponents of an agreement between Austria and German National Socialism; the legitimists of all shades, the Socialists the "Fascists", the democratic elements of Catholicism and liberalism - all these bitter opponents of German National Socialism represent sections of the Austrian population who are almost more inimically minded towards each other than towards the Third Reich.

It appears hopeless and also unpractical to us to strive to influence Austrian legitimism or the 'Heimwehr' movement. There are, on the other hand, comparatively strong elements in Austrian Catholicism who could - with certain reservations - be called democratic. These elements, which are gradually grouping themselves round the "Freheitsbund"(Freedom Union) and which are inclined, basically, to work for an agreement with the Social Democrats, represent, in our opinion, that group which would, under certain circumstances, be inclined to bring about a revolution in internal politics in Austria".

(Signed) Papen.

To the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor
Berchtesgarden.

by courier.

H1169-0140

TRANSLATION OF 2246 PS

The Envoy Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary of the
German Reich on Special
Mission,
No. A 4801.

Vienna,

1 September, 1936.

Contents: Re the Situation in the Danube region.

The secret Czech information service recently gave its Vienna branch the following survey:

"The increased activity of German and particularly of Hungarian diplomacy and the introduction of 2 year compulsory military service in Germany which has just taken place, give Czechoslovakia cause for the most serious fears with regard to further developments in Europe and in particular in the Central European region. Although the reports we have received from Rome, Paris and London still continue to leave open the question of Italy's orientation and of its political aims for the imminent future (we have no confirmation for the time being of the creation of a German-Italian military alliance), Czechoslovakian policy must reckon with the probability of a German-Hungarian-Austrian-Italian bloc, which Poland and Bulgaria might under certain circumstances join (though with reservations).

The general European situation, and in particular the tension in the Danube region and in the Balkans, is so serious at the present moment that we see ourselves forced to devote all our attention to this question. The focal point of the problem lies, in accordance with its nature, in the relations between Italy and the German Reich, all the more so as the diplomacy of both Rome and Berlin is carrying on a game which is extraordinarily complicated and, in many points, completely impossible to see through. In this game, stakes are concerned which are so high for both the imperialistic powers that, when judging the present situation, one is forced to take every "trifle" and every "nuance" seriously into account".

Simultaneously the secret Czech information service placed a sum of 250,000 Czech crowns at the disposal of the Vienna information service for the necessary special expenditure.

The nervousness which is visible in the above lines was increased even further by the Regent Horthy's visit to the Fuehrer and the resignation of Titulescu which took place so suddenly the day before yesterday.

About the withdrawal of Titulescu I hear from the Yugoslav minister here that Prince Regent Paul has for a long time been actively trying to eliminate this unpleasant politician. Fears were felt that, at the meeting of the Little Entente planned for the 12.9 at Bratislava, Rumania and Czechoslovakia would again press most strongly for a reconciliation of Belgrade with Moscow. Central European politics experienced an extraordinary detente as the result of this resignation, especially as the collaboration between Benes and Titulescu was thereby terminated. The new Rumanian Foreign Minister was actually a declared Francophile. He would however unconditionally follow the line laid down by the King. It was hoped to obtain deliveries of war material from France under favourable conditions, but under no circumstances would any engagements in the direction of Soviet efforts be entered into in exchange.

In Austria the events in Spain have had the effect of an extraordinarily heavily stressed front against all influences from Moscow. Ecclesiastical (Innitzer's proclamation) and state authorities repeatedly draw attention to the danger of an advance of Bolshevist influences.

I hear confidentially that the Federal Chancellor had a detailed discussion with the board of the Freedom Union and Trades Union Society on the 26.8. The Federal Chancellor campaigned for the support of both these powerful organisations, stating that autumn would bring several reshuffles in the government "in which the workers would receive due appreciation".

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"I beg you, gentlemen, to support me. I am resolved to continue to dedicate myself to the difficult tasks of our state. I am not thinking of marrying. And the rumours that my alleged bride is demanding that I should retire from politics are untenable and stupid. The agreement with Germany of the 11th July was a necessity. Bolshevism stands on the frontiers of our Austria. We must protect ourselves, so that it should not penetrate into our country. In Autumn we shall have 50,000 regular soldiers. We cannot create a compulsory militia because we have no money for clothing, food and pay. Let us give foreign countries the impression that we are united and let us create a volunteer militia of 200,000. I have spoken with a foreign military expert who explained to me the dangers of Bolshevism. The showdown between the antagonistic ideologies may occur soon. But it is sure to occur within two years at most. Support me, I count on you".

Herr Stand gave the assurance that the Freedom Union (Freiheitsbund) as a political organisation of workers, stood behind the Federal Chancellor. It is, however, certain that it will put forward political counter-demands.

The increasing aversion - particularly of the working classes - to Jewish domination is pleasing. The "Austrian workers Paper" of the 30.8 published a sensational article about this. (See "Essener National-Zeitung" and D.A.Z.) And also Georg Klockemeyer's book "Regarding the Viennese Jewish question" is being widely circulated and is causing a great sensation. I enclose a detailed commentary by the "Wiener Neueste Nachrichten" dated the 1.9. This work is particularly suitable for use for propaganda owing to its unassailable objective argumentation:-

The Spanish development is impressing the statesmen here ever more clearly with the world historical importance of the decision which the Fuehrer took when he set up an impenetrable dam against Bolshevism with Germany. Recognizing this, the Federal Chancellor pressed that about 230 million shillings should be used for the army in the drawing up of the budget which is just ending. Against the opposition of the Finance Minister, they are accounted for in the "regular budget", owing to the difficulties which would otherwise have to be expected from Geneva. Other necessary expenses have naturally had to be reduced to this end.

I have already mentioned recently that the Federal Chancellor has in principle approved the getting of war material from Germany, and it would be appropriate to begin negotiations about this after the termination of the Geneva talks. Government circles are worried that after the withdrawal of the League of Nations delegate it will not be possible - owing to the objections of the Jews sitting on the international banking commission to bring about the cessation of the international financial control in Geneva, which is actually self-evident.

The Finance Minister, Draxler, has therefore got a middleman to request me that the Reich Government should make its good services available to win Rome's support in the question of stopping the control. In view of the Ballhausplatz' good relations with Rome, this request is somewhat surprising. It could only be explained if Mussolini fears that, if the control ceased, German economic and financial influence might become too strong.

The progress of normalizing relations with Germany at the present time is obstructed by the continued persistence of the Ministry of Security, occupied by the old anti-National Socialistic officials. Changes in personnel are therefore of utmost importance. But they are definitely not to be expected prior to the conference on the abolishing of the Control of Finances (Finanzkontrolle) at Geneva. The Chancellor of the League has informed Minister Glaise-Horstenau, of his intention, to offer him the porte folio of the Ministry of the Interior.

As a guiding principle (Marschroute) I recommend on the tactical side, continued, patient psychological treatment, with slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the regime.

H1169-0142

The proposed conference on economic relations, taking place at the end of October, will be a very useful tool for the realisation of some of our projects. In discussion with Government officials as well as with leaders of the illegal party (Leopold and Schattenfroh) who conform completely with the agreement of July 11, I am trying to direct the next developments in such a manner to aim at corporative representation of the movement in the fatherland front (Vaterlandischen Front) but nevertheless refraining from putting National-socialists in important positions for the time being.

However, such positions are to be occupied only by personalities, having the support and the confidence of the movement. I have a willing collaborator in this respect in Minister Glaise-Horstenau.

(Signature) PAPEN.

To: The Führer & Reichcanellor
Berlin.
By Courier.

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Doc. No. D. 767.

The Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the German Reich on Special Mission.

Vienna, 12.10.36.

Diary No. A. 5653.

Contents:

1) Dissolution of para-military formations.
2) Berlin trip of Secretary of State Schmidt.
3) Supply of Army materials.

(Three copies to the Foreign Office).

1) Further to the report by the Charge d'Affaires - No. A 5572 of 8.10. - and to my verbal report of yesterday's date, may I add the following about the sensational events of the last few days.

After the elimination of the differences which have for a long time existed within the Heimwehr (Home Guards) had led to a complete break between Starhemberg and Fey, both these gentlemen had turned to the government for assistance. Staremberg had, as is known, accused the former Vice Chancellor, Fey, of having traitorously participated in the events of the July Putsch of 1934, to which Fey intended to answer by bringing a public action. After Chancellor Schuschnigghad at first seemed inclined to let such a trial take its course, he changed his mind on the intervention of various minsters, when it was pointed out to him how untenable the position of the government would become, which had, after all, tolerated Vice Chancellor Fey in its midst for a whole year after the 25.7.1934. Therefore, in order to avoid a public scandal, attempts were made to mediate between the two sides. Now, however, Starhemberg made the demand that he be again taken into the cabinet and given the position of Minister for War.

The Federal Chancellor turned down this ultimatum, where-upon a violent argument took place, during which the Chancellor threatened Prince Starhemberg with the dissolution of the Hei-wehr. In the meantime, Herr Mandel had called a large number of well known Hei-wehr leaders to the well known meeting at Wiener-Neustadt, at which Prince Starhemberg made an extremely sharp speech against Schuschnigg, whose true intention of dissolving the Heinwehr he said he had now recognised, and whom he accused of being a traitor to the Fatherland Front. "Our comrades in the Heinwehr now know what to do," with these words he indicated the ministers Bahr and Drexler who were present and who nodded their heads affirmatively. Amazingly, Morcale had sat down next to the Prince in Fascist uniform in order to save the last trump card for the Italian government if possible.

When the Chancellor received the police report on the meeting the following morning, he was extremely indignant and determined not to make any further concessions to Starhemberg. All the same, he fought shy of the dissolution, and a compromise formula was sought for many hours under the leadership of the Minister for Finance, Draxler. During the night of Friday/Saturday, the arguments assumed such a turbulent character that the sentries in the passages had to be removed and ordered into the courtyard. Minister Glaise von Horstenau took up a stand right from the beginning against any compromise and demanded a straightforward solution, which is what the Chancellor finally decided on. Whilst Minister Bahr - Baaranfels was reproached by Prince Starhemberg with having broken his pledged word of honour (namely that, on Starhemberg's order to do so, he would leave the government at any time), the more adroit Minister Draxler managed, by his negotiations for a compromise, to remain in the cabinet without getting on bad terms with both sides. Thus the remark in Starhemberg's letter of resignation to the effect that Minister Draxler remains in the cabinet with his consent is explained.

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H1169-0144

It is understood that the Federal Chancellor's decision to dissolve the para-military formations means a strong increase of his authority. Secretary of State Schmidt, with whom I today had a 1½ hour discussion on the situation, entirely agreed with me when I stressed the fact that this step by the Chancellor had only been made possible by the peace treaty with the German Reich, and that its consequence must be a further and visible improvement in German-Austrian relations. Secretary of State Schmidt told me that both he and the Federal Chancellor had gained an extremely sympathetic impression from the discussion with Prime Minister Goring in Budapest, that personal contacts of this kind ought to be frequently repeated, and that both he and the Federal Chancellor were convinced of the rapprochement and of the necessity for strengthening German-Austrian relations, in a manner visible from outside as well.

As the Chancellor has convened a large assembly of the Fatherland Front in Vienna for the 18.10, at which he will define his attitude to the new situation in a speech on high politics, I have taken the opportunity of impressing on the Secretary of State the need for Herr von Schuschnigg saying some clear and unambiguous words on this occasion regarding his relations with Germany and on reconciliation with National Socialism. I am hopeful that he will comply with this.

Regarding the effect of the dissolution of the para-military formations on internal Austrian affairs, nothing can be said as yet. It is entirely possible that this decree, like so many other Austrian decisions, will remain only a facade. Strictly speaking, the para-military formations were actually already dissolved once before, as a result of the decision to form an independant militia, but nobody took any notice of this dissolution. But one thing is certain, the anti-Austrian orientation of the Reich, which existed until the 11th of July, again and again made it possible to combine the most heterogeneous elements in the para-military formations against us. Now that this orientation has, thank God, been removed, the Blacks, the Yellows and the Greens will only have each other to deal with, and the truly national elements will find their way to where people are working for the interests and the future of the Reich. For this reason the new developement is a further progress in the policy started by the Fuhrer on the 11th of July which will have the greater effect the more we remember not to awake renewed fear of totalitarian ideas of the Reich by unneccessary pressure or too obvious propoganda.

Any actions by the dissolved para-military formations against the government are extremely unlikely at the moment.

2) I took the opportunity to discuss with Secretary of State Schmidt the question of his visit to Berlin. He said that, before the conference of the Rome Protocol powers, which was taking place in Vienna from the 11th to the 13th of November, he would be overloaded with work, and that he would therefore prefer to pay his visit after this conference.

Count Ciano would come here on an official visit on the 9th and 10th of November, and he, the Secretary of State, intended to pay his respects in Budapest shortly, which would be returned by Herr von Kanya on the 11.11. On the conclusion of the Vienna conference, Count Ciano then intended to pay his visit to Budapest.

There had also been talk in Budapest of the Regent Horthy visiting Rome and Vienna at the end of November.

3) The Austrian government desires that a contract should come into being as soon as possible regarding the first instalment of the supplies of army material, to the amount of about 8 million Schillings. The inspector of the Austrian Air Force, General Lohr, is already in Berlin since today, in order to conduct talks on this matter too. The military attache is going to be instructed to put forward in Berlin the requests as to the purchase of tanks.

5230.

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H1169-0145

Doc. No. D. 707.

The Austrian government hope that, as the new economic negotiations will hardly be opened before the middle of November, the receipts from the army supplies, which are outside the barter transactions, will be used to pay for the tourist traffic during the winter months. At the same time the Secretary of State repeatedly stressed the fact that it was necessary to come to terms soon regarding the army supplies, so that, in the interest of a rapprochement between the two armies supplies should, in future, only come from Germany. The first contract would be decisive for this.

With regard to the political importance of this question, may I ask that instructions to this effect be issued to the departments concerned.

(Sgd) PAPEN.

To the
Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor,
Berchtesgaden.

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H1169-0146

D. 708

Vienna, the 19th October, 1936.

The Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the German Reich on special mission.

A. Diary No. 5821/36.

Contents:
Consolidation of the "Front Militia".
Demonstration by the "Fatherland Front".

The dissolution of the para-military formations has had the direct result of the "Front Militia" taking their place. The decision of the council of ministers of the 9.10 gives the necessary instructions for this. With this, the plan for concentrating under a united command all the forces capable of fighting has been brought to a logical close.

The fact that, in spite of the surprise all over the country, the dissolution of the para-military formations did not cause the slightest reaction, proves that the Federal Chancellor acted at the right psychological moment. Starhemberg, Fey and the other lei minores were ripe to disappear from the political stage.

It was clear that the deciding step for the consolidation of Austria had to be connected with an appeal to those forces on whom Schuschnigg's programme leans for support. The eve of the great demonstration by the Fatherland Front was introduced by a speech of the Federal chancellor and leader of the Front, which has been made public by the press. After Schuschnigg had given a picture of the consolidation which had been carried out in stages, he said: "But what does all the recognition of the sovereign state - all platonic declarations of sympathy - help us, if we are not capable of defending ourselves arm in hand?" Therefore the Front Militia had to take its place beside the Federal Army which was based on general conscription. In place of the vice-chancellor, Baar-Baarenfels, who resigned probably because of his quarrel with Starhemberg on a point of honour, the provincial Hauptmann of Corinthia, Lieutenant Field Marshal Hülgerth, had been appointed to lead the Front Militia, an old and proven soldier and fighter for freedom, who is actually more Black-Yellow than anything else and has understanding for the people's national movement. The Fatherland Front remains the representative of the political will of the state. In it, everybody who acknowledged the independence of Austria and her constitution could cooperate. Turning to the National Socialists, he said that a painful chapter in German history was at last a thing of the past. He had never wanted more than the acknowledgement of the sovereignty of the Austrian Fatherland, which had always loudly and clearly acknowledged itself to be a German State - a thing that would never change in the future.

"We know of a thousand year old cultural community which again and again came to the fore in spite of all vicissitudes. We shall always be conscious of that. We shall continue to follow a policy which, to the best of our conscience, serves as a contribution to the preservation of European peace, and we know that in this we are one with the German Reich, whose responsible government as well as ourselves consider the agreement of the 11th of July as a contribution to European peace". Even though Minister von Glaise and I myself urged the Federal Chancellor to treat the tasks pursued in common with the Reich in a more decisive and cordial manner, he confined himself to the above-mentioned remarks. I suspect that he was trying anxiously to avoid any further irritation of Heimwehr circles by an emphasized cordiality towards the Reich.

The often repeated appeal to the population to stand together in the fight for Austria's freedom was followed by an announcement that the Kruken-kreuz flag and the Dollfuss anthem had received the character of a State flag and a Federal anthem. The Government does not yet seem to have grasped the fact that such things can not be decreed, but that they can only emerge from the elemental will of a people.

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H1169-0147

Noteworthy is the attitude of the Federal Chancellor towards the monarchist question. His attitude in this connection and his endeavours to represent the independence of the Austrian constitution against the Little Entente are known. Probably the wish to win legitimist circles over finally for cooperation in the Fatherland Front has been the decisive factor in this renewed assertion. Actually this affair is today of only a platonic character.

The mass demonstration of the Fatherland Front on the 18th October on the Schelz, the parade ground of the Viennese garrison of the old Austria, is celebrated in the whole press as a first class example of organisation and as striking evidence for the victory of the Fatherland idea. The first can be admitted with reservations, but certainly not the latter, even if approximately 300,000 persons, including the army formations, assembled in this big square. The impartial observer had to admit that it had been made the duty of all those, on whose positions in life the state has some deciding influence, to appear. The participation of the other circles of the population of Vienna was very small. There was little public in the streets through which the march took place, and the applause was weak, except when it was actually aimed at the colourful appearance of the marksmen from Wilten in Tirol, who had been brought as a special attraction. The beflagging of the houses of Vienna was hardly sufficient, - in spite of the compulsory measures employed - to cover the great lack of interest. Slighter still was the general interest in the ceremonies of laying the foundation stones of a Dollfuss Memorial and a Dollfuss Youth Leaders' school.

The conclusion of the festivals was the ceremonial administration of the oath to 10,000 Federal army recruits on the Schmelz, which took place today in the presence of the diplomatic corps. The presence of the French Ambassador and the representatives of the Little Entente showed that they now appear to have accepted the introduction of general conscription.

The past days have proved that the government is resolved to continue with all their powers along the path of consolidation on which they have entered. But because of the state of flux of the New Order in Europe they will soon have to convince themselves that their exertions must prove fruitless against the only solid value that Austria can show - the national avowal of her young generation.

(Signed) PAPEN

To the
Fuehrer & Reich Chancellor,
Berchtesgaden.
-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.
By courier.

3902

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H1169-0148

Doc. No. D. 709.

The Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the German Reich on Special Mission.

Vienna, 2nd. Nov. 1936.

Diary No. 6134.

Contents:

Secretary of State Schmidt's Journey to Berlin.

(Three copies for the Foreign Office).

I had a lengthy conference with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs today about the meeting of the Rome Protocol powers in Vienna and about his impending journey to Berlin.

In the sense of my report No. 6116 of the 21st October 1936 to the Foreign Office, I asked the Secretary of State if an economic rapprochement to the Little Entente, in particular to Czechoslovakia, was contemplated on the part of the Three Powers, and how far plans to that end had already proceeded. The Secretary of State informed me in confidence, in this connection, that Rome had indeed urgently desired an inclusion of Czechoslovakia and that Austria also fundamentally desired an improvement in her relations to a country with whom she had formerly been connected, but that Hungary had raised considerable objections. The very pronounced attitude which Mussolini adopted towards the Hungarian revision demands for yesterday could presumably be traced back to the questionnaire which Czechoslovakia had handed in in Rome as a result of these endeavours. The opinion in Vienna was that the matter had now no chance of success. He, the Secretary of State, was, however, convinced that Mr. Benes would soon change his course decisively, in view of the fact that the external and internal situation in Czechoslovakia was constantly growing more impossible.

The government here would, furthermore, set particularly great store by keeping me continually informed of the course of the negotiations.

In conversation so far, the period around the 20.11 had been suggested for the Secretary 's journey to Berlin, According to wishes here the final date would appear to depend on the decision as to whether and when the anticipated economic discussion between Berlin and Vienna would take place. We have maintained here that these new negotiations which were arranged in the summer would only be practical if they could conclude with a definite result. It was realized during the talks which Senior Legation Councellor Dr. Clodius had here that, although Germany was in an excellent position for absorbing a big series of Austrian products, sufficient possibilities for compensation were lacking on the Austrian side. With a view to creating room for a greater volume of trade between Germany and Austria, I today suggested to the Secretary of State once more that he should widen the credit market inside Austria on the German model, in order to make available in that way larger extra-ordinary sums for creating work and for rearmament. As is known, this extension of credit has until now been prevented by the financial control of the League of Nations, and, even today, the President of the note-issuing Bank, who bears the budget very much in mind, is considerably opposed to it. The Secretary of State was, however, of the opinion that it might well be possible to win the Federal Chancellor and, through him, the government, over to this plan, if it was tackled gradually and adapted to the limited Austrian conditions. He promised to bring about a fundamental decision about the matter this week.

Should this path be entered upon, a better platform would be created for the economic negotiations, and it then might be possible to have them begin at the end of November.

5271.

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Otherwise, i.e., if only a limited result is to be anticipated, the Secretary of State would like to combine the agreements, - which would then have to be arrived at without negotiating via delegations, - with his Berlin journey.

An early agreement on the financing of tourist traffic on both sides for the winter appeared to him most urgent. To achieve this, he was prepared to conclude immediately the first transactions of the army deliveries which had already been discussed, so that Germany could make available for tourist traffic the sums in Schillings accruing therefrom. It would therefore be necessary to ascertain quickly what deliveries Austria desired and what the German Army Administration was prepared to give.

I support, from a political standpoint, a continuation of the existing tourist traffic within the existing limits. It has been proved that the travelling of Austrians in the Reich, especially, has also been accompanied by strong political repercussions. To interrupt the tourist traffic owing to lack of foreign currency would, furthermore, only be playing into the hands of those who are actively interested in a deterioration in German-Austrian relations.

My repeated and urgent representations about dissolving the political police, abolishing the numerous petty chicanery against the national elements and including the latter in economic and political life, would appear to be going to lead to several further steps by the Government in the near future. The Federal Chancellor yesterday gave Minister Glaise-Horstenau to understand that he would soon be entrusted with the Portfolio of the Interior. The position of Vice Chancellor Baar-Baarenfels is the subject of much competition; the leader of the Fatherland Front, Secretary of State Zernatto, is strong for the succession. The Minister of Finance, Draxler, has a very bad name with the Federal Chancellor; it is said that his place will be taken by Ministerial Councillor Riey, a good official who does not follow the Dollfuss line. The exchange of Minister for Trade, Stockinger, against President Hassladier is equally in the scales.

These cabinet changes will not presumably be effected until after the Tripartite conference. I would be grateful if the German press would abstain from all mention of cabinet changes in the meantime, since, as is shown by past experience these comments always do nothing but make the Ministers who are to be thrown out all the more secure in their offices.

(Sgd) PAPEN.

P.S. I would report that the "Illustrierter Beobachter" (Illustrated Observer) is permitted in Austria as from yesterday. The first number deals with Goring's speech about the Four-Year-Plan.

To the
Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor,
Berlin.

By Courier. 5273.

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H1169-0149

H1169-0150

The Envoy Extraordinary
and Minister Plenipotentiary of
the German Reich, on Special Mission.

D 710.

Vienna, 4th Nov 1936.

Diary No. A 6191

Subject ; The Governmental reshuffle in Vienna
(Three copies for the Foreign Office).

Further to my telegram of yesterday's date on the reorganisation of the government, the following must be added :

Although the local press is busy representing the complete reorganisation of the cabinet as an act which will remain without influence on the known aims of the Schuschnigg government all informed circles consider it as a marked success for the policy of the 11th July, that personalities who, at the time of the conflict, always took up a sharp attitude against the Reich are being eliminated and men of fundamentally nationalist views are being brought in. At any rate, all the friendly diplomats congratulated me to-day in this sense.

As stated in my report No. 6134 of 2.11., my recent urgent representations to the Secretary of State for foreign affairs and to the federal chancellor expounded the opinion of the Reich Government that the maintenance and development of the policy of the 11th July must now express itself also in a marked turning away of the present government from political methods employed to date. In this connection it is striking that, though I was notified for another interview with the Federal Chancellor for yesterday, the day of the reorganisation of the government, he preferred to postpone this interview until to-day to avoid giving the impression to outsiders that this reorganisation took place under the pressure of my representations. The fundamental questions in future developments is whether the new Chief of the Security Service swings the whole police machinery towards an understanding with the nationalist elements. To this question, which I put to him to-day, the Federal Chancellor replied that Herr von Neustädter-Stürmer has taken office on this understanding. However, he repeatedly requested me to stress the fact in Berlin that only slow progress can be made in this direction since patriotic (vaterländisch) circles are causing him the greatest difficulties. As for the rest, Herr von Schuschnigg stressed the fact that he is desirious of keeping unswervingly to the policy of the 11th July, which, after the conferences in Berlin and the speech by Mussolini has become an axiom of European politics, The introduction into his cabinet of men of Nationalist leanings emphasizes this decision publicly too.

It is known that already in 1930 the new Security Minister was elected to the Nationalrat as a representative of the Heimatblock party and appointed President (Obmann) of the caucus of Heimatblock representatives. While a secretry of state in the Dollfuss government he created the voluntary labour service and although in July 1934 - also as a representative of the Dollfuss government - he was prominent in the relief of the chancellery, he must still be considered as a man of classically nationalist leanings.

Minister von Glaise-Horstenau, who has now become Minister of the Interior, will be able to represent National interests effectively - particularly in the field of the associations affairs.

It is a good sign for our economic negotiations that Herr Stockinger, who was sabotaging every attempt at a rapprochement and was one of the big-income groups, has at last been dropped. With the new Minister of Trade, who has the reputation of being an efficient expert, as well as the new Minister of Finance we will be able to reach results much more rapidly.

H1169-0151

During the course of today's interview, the Federal Chancellor assured me in particular that he, too, urgently desires an increase in the volume of trade and had already agreed with the president of the Bank of Emission on the floating of a considerable loan in the near future.

The elimination of the former Minister of Justice, Baron von Hammerstein, is to be regretted. By means of my intimate relations with him I often succeeded in unofficially bringing about satisfactory solutions for our National Socialists. Herr von Hammerstein will assist the Minister of Education, who remains in office, in the conduct of the Art Division. In this connection I today came to an agreement with the Minister of Education that Herr von Hammerstein should shortly be put at the head of the Cultural Association in order to eliminate for the future the Jewish trends which still exist there.

The important thing for us is that the development of the internal situation in Austria has become fluid. As I hear, the term of office of the new security minister will not be of overlong duration, since the provincial directors establishment expires at the end of this year, whereupon this office will cease. The next step will then have to be the return of Police Authority to von Glaise's ministry.

Concerning the meeting of the representatives of the protocol powers in Vienna, I hear that, in accordance with my former report about this, the Italians are continuing their efforts to include Czechoslovakia in the economic system of the three powers. The Polish envoy told me that his Government had been asked to persuade the Hungarians to support this, as they were making difficulties. When I asked him how these Italian efforts could be reconciled with Mussolini's brisque declaration about Hungarian revisionism, he thought that this flourish of trumpets aims at inducing the Hungarians to agree, without touching the question of revision.

In the field of the press, further progress is likewise to be noted. The following are now permitted : the "Illustrierter Beobachter" "Simplicissimus" the "Münchener Illustrierte Presse" (Original Ausgabe) and the "Deutsche Illustrierte."

signed P a p e n .

5287.

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H1169-0152

Doc. No. D. 711.

The Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary of
the German Reich on Special
Mission.

Vienna, Nov. 11th. 1936.

Diary No. A. 6356.

Contents:

The Restoration Question.

(Three copies for the Foreign Office).

The news which has appeared in the press of various countries on the occasion of the Viennese conferences, to the effect that the Habsburg restoration question is again in the foreground, caused me to discuss the matter yesterday with the Austrian envoy in Rome, von Berger-Waldenegg, who is here at present. Herr von Berger admitted that Herr von Wiesner had been in Rome and had also had a talk with Mussolini. The Rumanian Envoy in Rome had already visited him there for that reason and had asked for an explanation. He had been able to assure him most categorically that Herr von Wiesner's visit had been a private affair and that the Austrian government was not in any way engaged with the restoration question. As far as Mussolini, was concerned, he believed that the Duce favoured the restoration in theory, but was opposed to it in practice. The rumours of Otto's marriage to the daughter of the King of Italy were, as far as he knew, without foundation.

I hear from circles here that the "Union of the Catholic nobility of Austria" recently expelled Herr von Wiesner from the association because he was pursuing the legitimist policy with a pronounced anti-German tendency. This step had been taken primarly at the instigation of Colonel General Count Schonburg.

It appears to me from a visit which the former French Envoy in Budapest, Monsieur de Vienne, recently paid at Stenockerzeel, that the Quai d'Orsay is also supporting the matter more strongly again recently.

(Sgd) PAPEN.

To the
Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor,
Berlin.

By Courier.

5275.

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H1169-0153

D 712

The Envoy Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary of the German
Reich on a special mission.

Vienna, 26. 7.37.

Diary No. A 4906

Contents:

Counter action against Wels.
Extraordinary Legislation.

If further proof had been needed to show how deeply the tremendous demonstration for the Reich and its Fuhrer by the Austrians gathered in Wels for the ex-service-men's meeting affected and damaged the "Fatherlanders" - then that proof is supplied by the counter-demonstration organized by the Fatherland Front last Sunday.

A compulsory Gau meeting had been convened in Wels as part of the memorial celebrations for the Dollfuss regime, at which the Provincial Hauptmann, Gleissner, declared, with the indignation of a "fatherlander", that 53 German-national gymnastic clubs had taken part in the veterans' meeting. He foreshadowed new measures against them. I have learnt, furthermore, that the provincial Hauptmann has petitioned Vienna to postpone the abolition of extra-ordinary legislation indefinitely. The cabinet was supposed to arrive at a final decision on this matter last Friday. After Minister von Glaise had tendered his resignation as a reply to the Federal Chancellor's proposal to defer the draft law, the cabinet apparently desisted from the postponement. One cannot learn more, as the ministers have been sworn to silence on their word of honour. I have, nevertheless, reason to believe that the draft law was decided on, but its announcement postponed for four weeks.

As far as the atmosphere in the country is concerned, one can only say that the government did itself the worst possible service when it agreed to this counter-demonstration in Wels. New compulsory measures against the German-national associations appear quite out of the question, unless the whole "Action of Appeasement" is to fall through and the antagonisms are to flare up again in the bluntest form. The demonstration of the national Austrians for the Reich is, however, on everybody's tongue now, and has given a strong new momentum to the whole movement.

The negotiations of the German-Austrian cultural committee with regard to the admission of books and leaflets, which was concluded on the 24.7., followed a satisfactory course. It was possible to put through 80% of the books suggested on the German side for admission into Austria.

To the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor,
Berchtesgarden.

5279

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H1169-0154

D 713

Meeting of the Austro-German Cooperative Group.

Vienna, 15th Dec., 1936.

The Austro-German Cooperative Group yesterday held a meeting in the house of the Union of Engineers and Architects. President Friedrich Tilgner welcomed the arrival of Federal Minister Glaise-Horstenau, the Foreign Minister, Dr. Schmidt, Ambassador v.Papen, Legation Counsellor Baron von Stein, the head of the Reich German economic delegation Dr. Clodius, the former Federal President Hainisch, the former Federal Chancellor Streeruwitz and a number of members of its sister organization, the German-Austrian Cartel, who had come to the meeting from Munich and Berlin.

President Tilgner pointed out the four years interruption in the work of the co-operative groups of both sides caused by the state of the relations between the German Reich and Austria, and said that this interruption was now happily ended owing to the agreement entered into by the two German States on the 11th July 1936. The cooperative group would now be able to turn their attention again to the special fostering of cultural unity and to the shaping of economic relations, while excluding any political activities. In this spirit he called upon all members of the co-operative groups to tackle their work.

The Federal Minister Glaise-Horstenau in an opening speech of welcome mentioned the two statesmen who had brought about this truly German and European act on the 11th of July, the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, and the Federal Chancellor, Dr. Schuschnigg. It was an agreement between two independent, but two German nations, which are held together by the iron clamp of German folkdom. The work of the co-operative group, which was not in the political but the cultural and economic sphere was wished good progress by the Minister.

Ambassador v. Papen seconded these thoughts and wishes. It had been high time to end the strife by an agreement between the two German States and he expressed the hope that it might succeed in advancing German collaboration amidst a European situation full of danger, on the basis of true internal satisfaction in Austria. He applauded the co-operation of such outstanding men of science and economy at this meeting of the Austro-German cooperative groups particularly since, through a happy coincidence, the German-Austrian economic negotiations had commenced at the same time too.

On behalf of the sick chairman of the German-Austrian cooperative group the former War Minister, Dr. Gessler - Privy Councillor Dr. (honoris causa) Renshard from Munich conveyed the greetings of the Reich German sister-organization and the desire for a renewal of more active cooperation. He described how, in spite of the tensions of the last few years, this could not break the personal, cultural and economic contacts, and how happy people were in the Reich to see the roads open again to an ever better understanding.

President Dr. Karl Drexel then reviewed the coming into being and the work of the two cooperative groups in Austria and in the Reich, which simplified many important tasks of the governments in the fields of law, culture and economy, and which in future also hoped again to achieve something useful in this sphere.

University Professor Dr. Josef Nadler made a gala speech within the framework of the cooperative group, during which he threw upon the poetic world of Adalbert Stifter the transfiguring light of German-Austrian ideals of humanity. Professor Nadler received much applause.

H1169-0155

In the closing speech by President Tilgner, which terminated the meeting, the will of the Austro-German cooperative group to serve the spiritual and economic intercourse in both countries, - for the good of the German people and to the best of their ability, as they had done in former years, was once again given expression.

(5281

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H1169-0156

RK 9244 B - 5th June 1937. Roh. (pencil)
(Rubber Stamp)

Doc. No. D. 724.

The Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of The German Reich
on a Special Mission.

Vienna, 1st June 1937.

Diary No. A. 3557. Stamp:

The Fuhrer has
been informed.

"Marginal Note"
1) Mentioned to the State Secretary yesterday for exact information.
2) F.d.A.

Contents:

The New British Ambassador
in Berlin About Austria.
(Three copies for the Foreign Office).

On the occasion of the 70 year jubilee of the "Union Club", I had invited the new British Ambassador, Sir Neville Henderson, to dinner. Our talk, of course, very soon touched on the sphere of politics, and it appears to me valuable, as a guide to the character of this new diplomat, to put on paper his attitude towards the Austrian problem.

Sir Neville stressed first that he was very grateful for the friendly reception which he had met with here everywhere, especially from the Fuhrer. He was in complete agreement with the Fuhrer that Bolshevism was the foremost and greatest danger to the existence of Europe and that this point of view should take precedence over all others.

In England people were beginning to see much more clearly in this connection too, and the desire to understand the new Germany, as well as to come to an agreement with her, had made particular progress during the last few weeks.

When, during the course of the conversation, I explained the German - Austrian problem to the ambassador, as we see it, he said that he was convinced that England fully comprehends - even from the view point of historical perspective alone - the historic necessity of a solution of this question in the Reich German sense. When I told him further that the British Ambassador in Vienna had a totally different point of view, that he was doing everything to support the thesis of Austrian independence in London and to make difficulties for the German policy, he admitted that he knew about these views of Sir Walford Selby. "But my opinion is quite different, and I am convinced that my opinion will prevail in London too, only you should not precipitate the solution of this question. It is a question which concerns France more than us, and in which we must have time to correct the French attitude". "But please", the British Ambassador continued, "do not betray to my Viennese colleague that I hold this view".

It will be interesting to ascertain whether Sir Neville Henderson will really represent the view mentioned here to his government.

(Signed) PAPEN.

To the Fuher and Reich Chancellor.
Berlin.
By Courier.

England. (Austria) (in pencil)

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5392.

H1169-0157

Translation of D/882.

Extracts

from

Schulthes's European Historical Calendar, Vol. 73, 1932, P. 302.

25 Sept. Prime Minister Herriot makes a big speech on foreign policy at Gramat.
Among other things, Herriot says the following: "The French government's thoughts are directed above all towards peace. To our minds, as to Briand's, war is a crime. There is nothing ambigious about our programme; we gave expression to this in our reply to Germany (cf. League of Nations, VI, 11 sept.). We are following the League of Nations' Policy, a policy in the eyes of which all nations, whether great or small, have equal rights. We note with pleasure that we were not the only ones to declare that German rearmament is the beginning of the return of the old follies; for it is a question of rearmament. There are numerous proofs of this available besides the wellknown announcements. The technical details for rearmament have been multiplied. A minister who continually reproaches us for our alleged desire for hegemony exposes the intention expressed in a very reserved form in the diplomatic note, by demanding materials and asking that a militia be created. The decree of the 13th Sept. organises the preparation of German youth in such a way that they are in a position to bear arms. It is one of the saddest chapters of the present period to call up the young generation - who ought to have benefited by their fathers' painful experiences - for exercises which are not favourable to disarmament and to peace. How can one teach children the art of killing? France, which has very often been calumniated, can call upon the world to bear witness to the fact that it has not fallen a victim to this infection and that it is directing its national education towards other goals. But we have another cause for concern as well. This is aroused in us by the obvious intention of proving that agreement exists between the demands which certain circles consider moderate and the publications of military experts who refuse to admit our Geneva declaration of faith and who mock at the difference we make between a war of aggression and a defensive war. These experts, whose authority is incontrovertible, wish to make us believe that Germany is trying to organize a very powerful modern army not only intended for national defence - which would be entirely justified - but also suitable for attack. Just as Prussia once used the conditions which had been imposed upon her to create a dangerous army of a completely new kind, might not Germany's military genius try today to create an army - or even a double army - with the intention of striking a decisive blow into the heart of her opponent, for whom national defence is only one of the forms of a citizen's duties? That is what makes the disarmament problem so dramatic. It is indeed true that the Allies of the last war promised to decrease their armament. But people too often forget the preamble to Part V of the Versailles Treaty and the explanatory document which Clemenceau handed over in the name of the Allies. This document states clearly that the disarmament of Germany is the first step towards that diminution and general limitation of armaments which all the powers are trying to carry out as one of the best means of preventing war - a diminution and limitation of armaments which the League of Nations ought to have brought about as one of its first duties. Undoubtedly the British memorandum of the 15th Sept., which loyally adheres to the will to cut down armaments, emphatically showed that the preamble to Part V does not deprive the treaty of its obligatory nature, and that not a single reference to the ways and means whereby the disarmament is to be carried out is to be found in the general statements of Article 8 of the League of Nations Pact. But France intends to respect most loyally this Article 8 and the obligations contained therein.
I believe, I decisively proved in my reply to Germany that France has contributed to a considerable extent towards saving the Disarmament Conference in June and July. Herriot quotes from the answer of the French Scialists in 1917 to the Stockholm questionnaiere the parts concerning mutual assistance, and declares that this doctrine which was then expressed by the Socialists was also his. Had it been fulfilled Article 8 of the League of Nations

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covenant would have been applied to its full extent. The reduction of armaments would be carried out without much ado. A system of mutual supervision would be established , would limit official armaments and bring about the necessary abolition of secret armament. In such a "mutuality of peace" the solution of the problems raised by Germany would not be hard. It was necessary to create a peace statute which would bring together all European nations in the same system of security and would give Germany her complete pacification. He thought he knew that prominent members of the League of Nations were at the moment studying a programme which was intended to bring about the co-ordination of disarmament with security. Under the present circumstances, France intended to build up her doctrine and her actions on unlimited respect for the Peace Treaty and for the League of Nations covenant. France did not hate any people. She could still have been standing on the Rhine today. She had given Germany free hand before the time limit in the territories occupied as a result of the treaties. She had received no thanks for this. She had had to rebuild part of the devastated area. After the Young Plan, faithful adherence to which was sworn by Germany, was put into force, she had made the greatest sacrifices in her reparation claims. For this too she had received no thanks. France, which was herself affected by the economic crisis, had to protect her own production, but in spite of this she opened her frontiers to German goods, and in 1931 Germany had had a surplus of 3,385,000 francs in her trade with France. For this she was not thanked either."

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Translation of D/883

Extracts from

"TRIERISCHE LANDESZEITUNG"

No.158 - 12th July 1932 - 58th year.

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v. Papen defends his achievement in Lausanne.

.....The German delegation's ability to act in Lausanne suffered considerably because of the fact that the Reich Chancellor von Papen was immediately abondoned also by those people whose mandate he thought he could claim. Herr v. Papen is entitled to feel that he is a man who harvests no gratitude where he could expect it. Hitlers scornful statement that in a few weeks time the whole treaty would no longer be worth three marks can exasperate the Reich Chancellor, who signed this treaty, if the statement is exploited by Anti-German circles abroad to Germany's prejudice. But in this connection the question can certainly be asked as to who is responsible that we are having an election campaign now. It is after all the present cabinet which ordered the dissolution of the former Reichstag and thus complied with a demand of the same Herr Hitler who would now like to have nothing to do with Papen's cabinet.

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No. 11A (ENGLISH)

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Cross-examination

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Franz V. Papen Doc. Book 11a